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Larry Bennett's Fragments of Cities: The New 
American Downtowns and Neighborhoods exam­
ines the social consequences of both the new 
approaches to downtown design and the physical 
upgrading of residential neighborhoods. 
Bennett draws upon lively case studies—rang­
ing from Detroit's Renaissance Center to New 
York City's SoHo to Chicago's Wrigley Field—to 
relate physical redevelopment and urban social 
life. He demonstrates that a small, well-located 
delicatessen can bring people together while 
clusters of multi-million-dollar office centers in 
renovated downtowns can drive them apart. 
Bennetts evaluation of contemporary urban 
rebuilding, which is unique in giving equal atten­
tion to the political, economic, and social impact 
of urban design and rebuilding, is frequently pes­
simistic. He finds that the gentrification of many 
big-city neighborhoods and the design strategies 
characterizing new downtowns do little to pro­
mote street life, unplanned social encounters, or 
public life in general. Bennett also contends 
some advocates and practitioners of the much-
praised neighborhood movement have chosen 
isolation and local security as their primary 
goals, thus echoing in their concerns the physical 
plans developed by urban designers. In contrast, 
Bennett argues, both groups should embrace a 
vision that encompasses the entire city, or they 
will risk losing some of the best things cities 
encourage—surprise, tolerance, innovation, and 
democratic participation. 
Bennett does find cause for optimism in the 
designs of some particularly innovative architects 
and planners, and he praises the broadening ini­
tiatives taken by many residents acting indepen­
dently to give life to their cities. American cities 
face a crossroads, he says, and must choose 
between becoming genuine communities or a 
series of isolated zones. 
Larry Bennett is Associate Professor of Political 
Science at DePaul University. He received his doc­
torate in urban planning from Rutgers University. 
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Preface

This book began a number of years ago in Philadelphia. I was 
visiting a friend there and had the opportunity to spend a day 
walking around the city's central neighborhoods. I had gotten 
to know Philadelphia initially during the mid-1970s while I was 
doing graduate work at Rutgers University, but in the few years 
since I had moved from the East Coast to Chicago the city had 
changed dramatically. Trying to account for the changes I was 
observing that day in Philadelphia, and which were taking shape 
across the country in other big cities, set in motion my work on 
this book. In its first drafts the manuscript quite explicitly sought 
to extend Jane Jacobs's analysis of American cities in the 1950s 
to the emerging cities of the 1980s, but as I rethought and re­
worked the project it took new directions. Ultimately it became 
the normative assessment of contemporary urban design and of 
the effects of urban rebuilding on neighborhood-level politics 
that now holds center stage in the completed book. Since the 
1950s, scholars studying American cities have produced a rich 
body of work. It is my wish that the present volume makes at 
least a small contribution to extending the reach of this literature. 
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1 
The New American City

On the evening of August 8, 1988, Chicago's normally busy 
Wrigleyville neighborhood was livelier than usual. In the after­
noon the Goodyear blimp had cruised above Wrigley Field, the 
home of the National League's Chicago Cubs baseball franchise. 
Over 500 reporters and broadcasters were in town to cover a 
late-season game between the fourth-place Cubs and the fifth-
place Philadelphia Phillies. Crowded into the ballpark were 
40,000 fans, a few thousand in excess of seating capacity. Several 
thousand additional onlookers milled around Wrigley Field, and 
in the surrounding neighborhood a fleet of tow trucks patrolled, 
removing illegally parked cars. The tow trucks were accompa­
nied by a foot patrol of approximately 200 neighborhood resi­
dents, members of a local community organization, who in 
addition to identifying illegal parkers intended to report unruly 
behavior by fans outside the park. 
At 6:05 PM an elderly Cubs fan pulled the lever that activated 
the stadium lights above Wrigley Field. At this moment the Cubs 
became the last major-league baseball franchise to inaugurate 
nighttime ballgames. This event, rather than the contest be­
tween two also-ran National League Eastern Division ball clubs, 
had drawn the blimp, the out-of-town media, the huge crowd, 
and the crush of onlookers. It had been preceded by years of 
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negotiation among Cubs officials, local politicians, and neigh­
borhood activists, action in the Chicago City Council and the 
state legislature, and debate on television and radio, in the press, 
and on the street. 
What the management of the Cubs viewed as its preroga­
tive—updating Wrigley Field in order to meet the demands of 
the baseball commissioner's office and the major television net­
works—was challenged by residents of Wrigleyville and several 
of their political representatives. Neighborhood critics of the 
Cubs organization advanced a number of distinct and sometimes 
clashing perspectives. For example, a portion of Wrigleyville's 
residents found the status quo—daytime baseball and limited 
parking, some unruliness by baseball spectators—unsatisfactory 
and wished that existing state and municipal statutes prohibiting 
evening games would drive the Cubs to relocate in the suburbs. 
Others found the status quo tolerable but argued that evening 
baseball in Wrigleyville would cause unacceptable disruptions. 
A third group contended that the unlighted Wrigley Field con­
tributed to a unique neighborhood environment, and that the 
advent of nighttime baseball would upset the subtle and over­
lapping rhythms of its commercial and residential life. Con­
versely, some local residents, notably merchants, feared that the 
Cubs' departure from the neighborhood would undermine the 
viability of local businesses. This group actually supported the 
baseball franchise's efforts to repeal the statutory bans on base­
ball after dark, if only to retain the Cubs as a local economic 
anchor. 
Ultimately, enough consensus was achieved among neigh­
borhood residents to force the Cubs organization to accept 
restrictions proposed by the city government, most notably a 
limitation on the number of evening games to be scheduled in 
any given playing season. The franchise, while modernizing the 
stadium, also installed antique-style street lamps on the adjoin­
ing sidewalks in an effort to preserve the neighborhood ambi­
ence. For its part, the city developed a parking plan to ease 
neighborhood congestion and reserve streetside parking for 
local residents. Nonetheless, some neighborhood activists claimed 
that they were excluded from the final phase of bargaining, and 
they pledged to continue legal action against the Cubs. 
The Wrigley Field lights debate turns on a number of issues 
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characteristic of planning and land-use disputes in contempo­
rary American cities. How do new construction and rehabilita­
tion of older buildings affect the street life and social make-up 
of surrounding areas? Are neighborhood economic welfare and 
residential welfare necessarily contradictory? What role should 
neighborhood residents play in affecting municipal develop­
ment initiatives, or the decisions of corporations that affect local 
land use, traffic, and street life? 
These kinds of questions form the backdrop of this book, 
whose subject is the changing physical character of American 
cities. Its principal objectives are to explore the relationship of 
social, cultural, economic, and political factors to the redesigned 
built environment of U.S. cities since World War II, and to 
suggest how these physical changes are likely to affect the future 
use of American cities by their residents. Through the explora­
tion of these parallel issues I will develop my central argument, 
which is that the characteristic feature of contemporary urban 
design is the segmentation of urban space, and that this spatial 
segmentation has a variety of consequences for patterns of 
public space use, neighboring and popular assumptions about 
"good" and "bad" neighborhoods, and even the tactics and 
objectives of neighborhood political mobilization. I will further 
argue that, for the most part, these consequences of urban 
spatial segmentation undermine the capacity of cities to provide 
an exciting, stimulating, and creative environment. 
My starting point in developing these themes is the assump­
tion that the city's physical form is an important register of the 
content of culture at large. Those buildings and urban spaces that 
are prized by the residents of a particular city, or by a broader 
population, are prized in large part because of the way they 
underscore widely held social values. Conversely, the neglect 
and avoidance of some urban spaces, such as the public housing 
complexes that dot many inner cities, reflect another popular 
consensus: that the residents of such places deserve nothing 
better. 
But, in addition, the physical structure of cities—their ar­
rangement of different neighborhoods, the location and acces­
sibility of different modes of transportation, the characteristic 
design features of public and private spaces—plays an autono­
mous role in shaping human action. Without making claims that 
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smack of physical determinism, one can observe that the way 
we structure neighborhoods has some bearing on our attitude 
toward different racial and ethnic groups, that our images of 
urban society are affected by the different means we use to move 
about the city, that public spaces can be designed to encourage 
or discourage interaction by pedestrians. 
My motivation for taking this particular approach to the city 
as a social artifact and physical entity transcends the desire to 
provide an account of the interaction between "social" factors 
and the built form of cities. It is my conviction that the city as 
an environment has, historically, been a significant impetus for 
important social developments. And with such social critics as 
Marshall Berman I share the assumption that urban culture, in 
recent generations, has provided the most fruitful responses to 
the challenges of life in the modern world.' 
I can best illustrate how the urban environment cradles 
society and contributes to some of its principal virtues by dis­
cussing three places in my home city of Chicago. The first of 
these is a street on Chicago's near Northwest Side. I discovered 
West Cortland Street while riding my bicycle. I had just crossed 
a major commercial street and passed under an expressway 
overpass when I found myself in a mainly residential neighbor­
hood. I emphasize mainly residential, because a large Roman 
Catholic church and a small park center the surrounding neigh­
borhood's rows of detached brick houses. To my right I found a 
well-maintained delicatessen and grocery. Beyond the deli-grocery 
were several small factories and warehouses. This stretch of West 
Cortland, whose character I would have never anticipated, is 
very close to my office, so I have returned to it often and eaten 
in the delicatessen several times. The deli is, itself, a remarkable 
spot: on most weekdays it is busy with a diverse crowd of local 
residents, workers from nearby businesses, and peripatetic sand­
wich gourmets such as myself. In short, this stretch of West 
Cortland Street and the surrounding blocks function as a social 
oasis in a larger district given over to commercial and transpor­
tation uses. 
The second place is further north and nearer Chicago's 
lakefront: the corner of Belmont Avenue and Clark Street. This 
intersection is much busier than West Cortland. To the west 
about a block is an elevated train station, and in the general 
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vicinity are dozens of bars, restaurants, and nightclubs. The 
point at Belmont and Clark that I find striking is not a physically 
noteworthy location. In fact, it is the parking area in front of a 
chain restaurant. What was remarkable about this parking area 
in the spring and summer of 1985 was its use. For reasons that 
are not easily discernible, this parking lot became a hangout for 
teenagers either posing as punks or quite immersed in punk 
culture. 
For several months, most evenings of the week, an ongoing 
"scene" was created in this parking lot. In front of a structure of 
the most banal, suburban design dozens of kids in black chatted, 
joked, danced, huddled, and occasionally shouted at passersby. 
Once when watching this corner I was censured for my T-shirt, 
one of the parking-lot punks claiming that I knew nothing of 
anarchy, whose symbol was emblazoned on my shirt front. I was 
taken aback, but the kid's assessment of my "fellow traveling" 
forced me to reconsider how important the symbols of punk 
rebellion, and even this space, had become for the Belmont-
Clark revelers. After a few months the Belmont-Clark parking lot 
lost its distinctive character—possibly overtaxed by its very 
popularity, or maybe killed off by winter winds—but during its 
time it was a most interesting locale within a generally diverse 
and exciting neighborhood. 
Traveling a few blocks north of Belmont and Clark, one 
arrives at where we began this chapter, Wrigley Field. By de­
scribing the stadium and its neighborhood, we can identify 
some of the concerns expressed by the neighborhood residents 
who opposed evening baseball. Wrigley Field, which was built 
before World War I, is a compact structure, fitting within the 
city's street grid on a single large block. Beyond its outfield walls 
stand typical Chicago two- and three-floor single-family homes 
and apartment buildings. Several of these dwellings are distin­
guished, however, by their roof decks. On game days, and now 
evenings, small crowds of nonpaying fans assemble on these 
decks to observe the game. On the side streets adjoining Wrigley 
Field, an array of taverns, souvenir shops, and other businesses 
take advantage of Cubs traffic. 
On game days in the spring, summer, and early fall, the 
presence of the stadium still gives the neighborhood a most re­
markable temporal character. In the morning, after many neigh­
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borhood residents have gone to work, a few very committed 
fans begin to assemble, waiting at the gates to observe batting 
practice before the game, or standing outside the outfield walls 
to shag batting practice home runs. In early afternoon, the whole 
neighborhood is busy as the game-time crowd gathers, stops at 
taverns and shops, and finally enters the stadium. During the 
game, the surrounding streets are once again without substantial 
traffic, but the stadium itself becomes a presence as fans vocally 
react to the turns of the contest within. After the game, the crowd 
rushes out, many fans once more stopping in local businesses 
for souvenirs and refreshments. By evening, Wrigleyville reas­
sumes a character like that of many other North Side Chicago 
neighborhoods. 
With the advent of evening baseball, this fragile temporal 
relationship between residential use of the neighborhood and 
professional baseball has been undercut. Just as residents return 
to their houses and apartments from work, the game-time crowds 
arrive. Where once these two uses overlapped without much 
inconvenience for either, residents now worry about parking, 
noise from the park, and unruly street behavior. It remains to be 
seen whether Wrigley Field will continue to be the good neigh­
bor that it has been in the past. 
URBAN FORM AND URBAN SOCIETY

These three places in Chicago provide a context for considering 
four crucial attributes of urban life that grow from the intersec­
tion of human use and built form. These are surprise, tolerance, 
innovation, and democratic participation. For some readers, this 
quartet of urban virtues may seem incongruous, because much 
of the commentary on cities in the United States has interpreted 
these characteristics less optimistically, and indeed, has sought 
to find contrary, compensating values, such as security and 
stability, in particular pieces of the urban fabric. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the most influen­
tial approach to interpretation of cities in the United States has 
emerged from the "Chicago School" of urban sociology, notably 
through the work of such pioneering members as Robert Park 
and Louis Wirth. As a rule, Chicago School sociologists and their 
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followers have described an overarching urban environment in 
which economic differentiation, huge populations in concen­
trated space, and race and class polarities threaten the ability of 
individuals to find personal satisfaction, hold together families, 
and avoid physical harm.2 For example, Park wrote: "The social 
problem is fundamentally a city problem. It is the problem of 
achieving in the freedom of the city a social order and a social 
control equivalent to that which grew up naturally in the family, 
the clan, and the tribe."3 A similar pessimism is expressed in 
Louis Wirth's classic interpretation of the city as a social system, 
"Urbanism as a Way of Life,' and more recent Chicago School 
sociologists, such as Gerald Suttles, continue to interpret the 
city as an essentially dangerous place.4 
In reaction to this attitude, many researchers have sought to 
locate stable, secure "communities" within the city, and studies 
such as Herbert Gans's The Urban Villagers and Robert Slayton's 
Back of the Yards provide convincing portraits of neighbor­
hoods in which streetside sociability, maintenance of family ties, 
and successful individual adjustment have been the norm.5 
Yet even as such writers as Gans and Slayton have advanced 
the proposition that the city neighborhood can be a place in 
which satisfactory social relations develop, other strands of 
urban analysis have seemed to accept the Park/Wirth formula­
tion of cities as risky environments while designating neighbor­
hoods as the place where contented, involved urban residents 
may be found. In the first half of the twentieth century, profes­
sional city planners in this country fixed on a spatially autono­
mous "neighborhood unit" as the principal building block of 
successful cities.6 More recently, activist and social critic Harry 
Boyte has advanced the argument that neighborhood activism, 
freed of the complications and reductionism of larger ideologi­
cal debates, is the best route to building a more egalitarian 
political order in this country.7 
In separate but complementary ways, both the neighbor­
hood unit and Boyte's "backyard revolution" assume that life in 
the city beyond the secure neighborhood can be physically 
dangerous and normatively unhinged, and is unlikely to stimu­
late the individual's imaginative powers or the group's capacity 
for collective action. There is, however, another, rather loosely 
allied, school of urban observers whose vision of the city is more 
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optimistic than that of most of the writers just surveyed. Among 
its practitioners are Jane Jacobs, Richard Sennett, and Marshall 
Berman; and to give an extremely brief, collective summary of 
their work, their view of the city finds vitality in diversity and 
judges its unsettledness as a virtue rather than a liability.8 In 
practice, successful cities require generally accessible and lively 
public spaces as well as rooted neighborhoods and a public 
ethos that encourages expressive personal styles as well as secure 
streets. Thus, in emphasizing the virtues of surprise, tolerance, 
innovation, and participation, I am following a line of analysis 
that seeks to balance the often overly pessimistic picture of 
weak, middling, and strong local communities beset by an ocean 
of urban disarray. 
Throughout history, accounts of urban life have included 
reference to the sense of surprise so often felt by visitors to, and 
residents of, cities. Sometimes this is a sense of fearful surprise, 
as in Nathaniel Hawthorne's story "My Kinsman, Major Mo­
lineux," in which a boy from the country visits Boston in search 
of a wealthy relative. Most of the boy's encounters are unpleas­
ant, as his life in the country has not prepared him for the people 
and sights of the city.9 
Other narratives attach a more favorable interpretation to 
the sensations of surprise and wonderment evoked by the city. 
In Dombey and Son, Charles Dickens imagines the progress 
through London of another child, Florence Dombey, in this 
fashion: 
The roar soon grew more loud, the passengers more numerous, 
the shops more busy, until she was carried onward in a stream 
of life setting that way, andflowing, indifferently, past marts and 
mansions, prisons, churches, market-places, wealth, poverty, 
good, and evil, like the broad river side by side with it. . . .10 
This vision of London does not portray a city that is unequiv­
ocally pleasant. Among marts, mansions, and churches are also 
prisons and poverty. Yet it does evoke just the sense of possibil­
ity that motivates so many people to come to the city: the 
possibility to meet new people, to make a living as one desires 
rather than as one is directed, to discover modes of life that one 
can hardly even imagine in advance. 
A city's capacity to surprise in this fashion is one key to its 
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maintenance of vitality. When I first rode through West Cortland 
Street, I anticipated a continuation of the commercial district 
through which I had been passing. I do not recall just where I 
intended to go, but when I suddenly discovered this quiet street 
with its church, park, and delicatessen, my surprise and pleasure 
were palpable. In a city that I knew very well, I had found a new 
spot that would draw me back again and again. 
For me, the punks' use of the corner of Belmont and Clark 
was another kind of surprise. An essentially banal space was 
transformed by kids who had nowhere better to go. Of course, 
for many of the proto-, true, or posing rebels occupying the 
parking lot, this space had probably been an even more memo­
rable place of surprise. They had in some fashion discovered it, 
and then used it to make connections with new friends, music, 
or ideas. It is when a city sustains and indeed continues to 
produce such places that it manages to communicate the kind 
of excitement that makes urban life attractive to so many people. 
Urban society is also a tolerant society, in part some may 
claim because city residents encounter so many surprises. In 
cities we live among a wider spectrum of occupations, a more 
diverse mixture of ethnic and religious groups, and some people 
who are quite simply eccentric. Many of us who live in cities do 
not merely tolerate such differences; we consider the variety of 
human life to be one of the main attractions of city life. 
Furthermore, throughout history cities as social collectivi­
ties have developed institutions to both highlight and allow 
individuals to cope with this diversity. Note, for example, histo­
rian Gunther Barth's description of turn-of-the-century vaude­
ville houses: 
In the vaudeville house, a distinctly urban form of popular theat­
rical entertainment drew the residents of the modern city to­
gether and gave them a glimpse of themselves. The show drama­
tized the spectrum of humanity in the city and diversity of urban 
life through its subject matter and variety. Consequently, it at­
tracted the entire range of city people and, after exposing them 
through comedy and song to a diverse set of human problems, 
provided them with afleeting measure of harmony.'' 
Each of the three Chicago locales that I have described is a 
place that breeds social tolerance. The deli-grocery on West 
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Cortland Street caters to several distinct audiences: local house­
wives purchasing traditional ethnic cooking ingredients, lunch­
ing workers, urban explorers on the lookout for good sandwiches. 
The Belmont and Clark parking lot was a setting for punks to 
display themselves, probably to the chagrin of the fast-food 
restaurant's management and some neighbors, but also to dem­
onstrate that in spite of their wild clothes and hairdos they were 
just kids having fun. Wrigley Field, until its recent moderniza­
tion the big-city stadium that most clearly evoked the nineteenth 
century, is one of the very institutions that Barth identifies as 
integrating the American industrial city's population. 
The city's built form and social structure also intersect to 
generate innovative action. Jane Jacobs has written 
. . . that cities are settlements where much new work is added to 
older work and that this new work multiplies and diversifies a 
city's division of labor; that cities develop because of this pro­
cess, not because of events outside of themselves; that cities in­
vent and reinvent rural economic life; that developing new work 
is different from merely repeating and expanding efficiently the 
production of already existing goods and services. . . .12 
Those who are familiar with Jacobs's commentary on cities, 
running from her early criticism of urban renewal in the United 
States to her later analysis of the place of urban economies in the 
world economy, will recognize in this quotation some of her 
continuing themes: the creativity set in motion by the city's large 
and densely packed population, the overlapping of various land 
uses and activities, and the efforts of individuals to mount suc­
cessful economic enterprises in such an environment. 
While commenting on Jacobs's interpretation of the city, 
Marshall Berman expands on her view of innovation in the urban 
environment: 
This celebration of urban vitality, diversity and fullness of life is 
. . . one of the oldest themes in modern culture. Throughout the 
age of Haussmann and Baudelaire, and well into the twentieth 
century, this urban romance crystallized around the street, 
which emerged as a primary symbol of modern life. From the 
small-town "Main Street" to the metropolitan "Great White 
Way' and "Dream Street," the street was experienced as the 
medium in which the totality of modern material and spiritual 
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forces could meet, clash, interfuse and work out their ultimate 
meanings and fate.13 
Berman speaks of an innovation that transcends the production 
of new goods or services and the exploitation of new markets. 
It is innovation in the broadest cultural sense, by which individ­
uals come to terms with the changing character of society, 
express the meanings of these changes, and propose answers to 
the problems produced by these changes. 
Among the three locations I have described in Chicago, the 
Belmont and Clark corner most directly expresses the sense of 
social innovation—including its ambiguities—described by Ber­
man. No one planned that the fast-food parking lot would 
become a punk hangout, and their choice of meeting place 
suggests some degree of desperation on the part of the Belmont 
and Clark scene makers. Nonetheless, confronted with the high 
cost of entrance to some local nightspots and their inability to 
enter clubs selling alcoholic drinks, these teenagers founded 
their own gathering spot. In many respects it was a brilliant 
choice: very visible at the intersection of two major streets, easy 
to locate, and, given the formal economic mission of the site— 
the sale of quickly produced, inexpensive, low-quality food—a 
place laden with irony. As a location for social innovation, the 
Belmont and Clark parking lot had its limitations, but for a time, 
for its crowd, it served a purpose. 
Finally, the conjunction of urban physical structure and local 
social forces often elicits democratic, participatory action. At 
most times and in most places this has been a potential attribute 
of cities, but it is a possibility that colors the interpretation of 
urban life by many commentators. The achievements of classical 
Athens are one source of this vision, as noted by social theorist 
Murray Bookchin: "What strikes us at once about Athens, the 
most advanced of the Greek cities, is that civic activity involves 
an exceptionally high degree of public participation."14 
A different but equally powerful sense of this possibility for 
meaningful participation in collective life is reflected in Lewis 
Mumford's comments on a contemporary description of a reli­
gious procession in medieval Antwerp: 
Note the vast number of people arrayed in this procession. As in 
the church itself, the spectators were also communicants and 
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participants: they engaged in the spectacle, watching it from 
within, not just from without: or rather, feeling it from within, 
acting in unison, not dismembered beings, reduced to a single 
specialized role. Prayer, mass, pageant, life-ceremony, baptism, 
marriage, or funeral—the city itself was stage for these separate 
scenes of the drama. . . ." 
In contrast to Bookchin's attention to public participation 
in reaching explicitly political decisions and seeing to their 
implementation, Mumford focuses on the individual's sense of 
membership and participation in a meaningful community. Cit­
ies can be the seat of both kinds of participation, as well as a third 
discussed by Manuel Castells in his comparative study of urban 
social movements, The City and the Grassroots.l6 Castells con­
tends that the urban environment typically has been the setting 
for popular movements seeking to redefine such fundamental 
social relationships as landlord and tenant, boss and employee, 
male and female. 
The Wrigley Field debate clearly demonstrates how efforts 
to reshape the city's built environment can generate unforeseen 
political mobilization. For many residents of Wrigley ville, the 
ballpark is a central and extremely evocative part of their com­
munity. For others it is an important economic stimulus. As a 
result, the Cubs management was unable to make decisions 
regarding the stadium as if it were merely a piece of private 
property. Although some neighborhood activists criticized the 
means by which the settlement permitting lights in Wrigley Field 
was achieved, and others disliked the details of the settlement, 
their efforts had ensured that the public nature of this space was 
accepted by all parties to the dispute. 
THE MYSTERY OF CITIES 
Far more challenging than describing these socially beneficial 
attributes of urban form is the prospect of explaining how cities 
generate them. This is, indeed, the mystery of cities, which any 
number of observers have sought to understand. Louis Wirth, 
although obviously wary of such social consequences of urban­
ization as juvenile crime and the attenuation of family ties, 
nonetheless contributed an important insight in "Urbanism as a 
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Way of Life" by linking the quantitative uniqueness of cities to 
qualitative differences in their social life. 
Wirth may not have anticipated that succeeding generations 
of urban ethnographers would find that urban neighborhoods 
could be characterized as "communities" in which resident 
solidarity was substantial and upon which political action could 
be based. But this finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
broad line of Wirth's argument—that urban society is different. 
Nor should it be surprising that an acute observer of cities 
working outside the sociological tradition, Jane Jacobs, might 
make an important extension of Wirth's line of reasoning. This 
is the notion that the apparent physical disorder of cities masks 
a peculiar kind of social order, which, further, is the source of 
tremendous creative energy. 
Yet the materialistic analysis that links Wirth, the ethno­
graphic tradition, and Jacobs does not uncover the whole mys­
tery. Observers of the city whose visions are shaped by Utopian 
considerations, such as Berman, Bookchin, and Mumford, also 
find something of great value in cities. This is the power of 
urban spaces and the historical legacy of particular cities to give 
life to political visions and provide a setting for political dia­
logue and mobilization. Not all cities hold this power, and there 
are particular cities—one thinks of Berlin during the Nazi era 
and Moscow during the Stalinist era—in which the suppression 
of vision and political discourse was the norm. Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated by Castells in The City and the Grassroots, across 
the centuries and in widely varying social, economic, and 
political contexts, cities have given shape to and provided a 
backdrop for the most liberating of political action. This we 
must attribute to some force beyond the quantitative unique­
ness of cities. 
This brief account of how the city comes to be a place of 
surprise, tolerance, innovation, and participation is not intended 
as a comprehensive explanation, which probably exceeds my 
powers as an analyst. What this discussion has sought, however, 
is to underline the significance of these four attributes of cities 
and suggest why their maintenance is crucial to the preservation 
of congenial urban communities. The bulk of this book is de­
voted to an exploration of how the physical restructuring of the 
post-World War II American city has impinged on these special 
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virtues of cities as physical space and unique social system. In 
the next section of this chapter we examine a group of events 
and trends that during the postwar period has affected popular 
thinking about cities in this country, the availability of resources 
to bring to bear on urban problems, and the political and eco­
nomic structure of American cities. 
SOURCES OF THE POST-WORLD WAR II 
CITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the four decades since the conclusion of World War II, the city 
in the United States has changed dramatically. On the one hand, 
big cities are a more pervasive part of the American landscape. 
In the South, Southwest, and West there are more cities than 
there were before the war, and across the country a greater share 
of the population now lives in metropolitan regions. On the 
other hand, central cities typically are now surrounded by miles 
of suburbs. The latter are less densely settled than central cities, 
and their characteristic physical pattern of single-family-home 
residential communities linked to commercial and industrial 
nodes by expressways represents a new form of urbanization. 
The focus of this book, however, is central cities, and during 
this same postwar period a series of events and trends has 
substantially recast their particular physical, economic, and po­
litical character. These include the large-scale public works ini­
tiatives of the 1950s and 1960s (notably urban renewal projects 
and urban expressways), the racial violence of the mid- and late 
1960s, the gentrification movement of the 1970s and 1980s, 
economic restructuring in the wake of the long post-World War 
II boom, and political reordering associated with the decline of 
urban political parties and the rise of neighborhood activism. 
Urban Public Works 
The primary impetus for the massive urban renewal projects and 
highway building in the two decades following World War II was 
federal legislation.17 Principal among these initiatives were the 
U.S. Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, which introduced urban 
renewal, and the Highway Act of 1956, which appropriated 
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funds for the 40,000-mile interstate highway system, whose 
planning had occupied the previous decade. 
Supporters of these initiatives included members of Con­
gress, local public officials, and business leaders who were 
concerned about the decline of central cities but were optimistic 
that a major federal commitment to rebuilding cities could cure 
their principal ills. Simultaneously, visions of a new kind of 
city—highrise structures arrayed in park-like settings, automo­
biles racing from one area to another on high-speed express­
ways—were at large in our culture. The accomplishments of 
public works leaders such as Robert Moses of New York were 
already beginning to give concrete form to these visions, and 
legislative action followed.18 Both urban renewal and the inter­
state expressway network received support from extremely 
broad political coalitions. 
By the late 1950s, a number of cities had begun urban 
renewal and expressway construction, and the unforeseen ef­
fects of these two initiatives were becoming visible. Huge sec­
tions of cities had to make way for urban renewal clearance and 
expressway routes. Often, residential neighborhoods were bi­
sected or altogether removed by these projects, which antago­
nized many incumbent residents and set in motion waves of 
relocation that affected surrounding neighborhoods. Some of 
these public works projects also wiped out numerous commer­
cial and industrial enterprises, leading to their closing or relocat­
ing outside the city, which in turn led to considerable local 
unemployment near their former sites.19 
The ultimate consequence of the physical and social turmoil 
produced by urban renewal and central city expressways was 
political. Neighborhoods slated for these "improvements" began 
to object, and in many instances city officials were forced to alter 
their initial plans or drop them altogether.20 In the long run, 
neighborhood resistance to urban renewal and expressway con­
struction was the seed of the "neighborhood movement" of the 
1970s.21 
Racial Violence 
In the second half of the 1960s, hundreds of violent, racially 
motivated incidents occurred in American cities. Some of these 
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incidents pitted a few inner-city blacks against a similar number 
of local police officers. On other occasions, outright warfare 
broke out. Burning and looting of property accompanied these 
large-scale riots. Hundreds of local residents and police were 
injured, and for a few hours or days the maintenance of basic 
civil order was impossible.22 
The sources of these civil disturbances were several. Mainly 
black, inner-city neighborhoods were among those hardest hit 
by urban renewal and expressway construction. By the mid­
1960s, residents of these neighborhoods were quite hostile to 
the municipal governments that had initiated such projects. 
Furthermore, the national civil rights movement reached its 
high-water mark in thefirst years of the Johnson administration, 
during which time major legislative initiatives promised to pro­
vide full political rights to southern blacks and "equal oppor­
tunity" to racial minorities across the country. Nonetheless, local 
municipal governments often seemed to resist the prescriptions 
of these enactments. Police forces were still overwhelmingly 
white and presented an unfriendly face to inner-city black resi­
dents. Local school systems seemed to move ever so slowly in 
integrating neighborhood schools.23 Finally, in spite of eco­
nomic gains growing out of the postwar boom economy, many 
inner-city blacks perceived themselves to be falling behind in 
the overall rise to affluence of the American population. In short, 
there was much frustration in inner-city minority neighbor­
hoods at this time, which was easily kindled to violence by the 
provocations of police officers or other representatives of mu­
nicipal government. 
The consequences of these racial disturbances ranged from 
the very specific and physical to broader effects that began to 
reshape thinking about cities and the nature of their political 
order. In several cities, racial violence decimated extensive areas, 
driving out residents and merchants. It was already difficult to 
attract investment to these neighborhoods, and the aftermath of 
the rioting left burnt-out territories which in many instances 
have yet to be rebuilt. The residents of adjoining mixed or 
mainly white neighborhoods felt threatened by these events, 
and it appears that inner-city violence gave additional impetus 
to the ongoing trend of "white flight" to the suburbs. 
Politically, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the 
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election of several "law and order" mayors in big cities. Mayors 
such as Frank Rizzo of Philadelphia spoke for white ethnic 
populations and municipal employees who were intimidated by 
the civil rights revolution and the recent urban disturbances.24 
Their agendas emphasized increased expenditures for police 
departments; their rhetoric contributed to the racial polarization 
already fragmenting urban white and minority populations. 
At the national level, in 1968 Richard Nixon's successful 
campaign for president featured a platform that proposed that 
federal programs had contributed to urban unrest. In the early 
1970s, the Nixon administration, with the approval of Congress, 
increased local municipal governments' discretion in spending 
federal funds. Ultimately, this resulted in less spending on such 
social programs as job training and other neighborhood services 
and greater use of federal funds to underwrite basic service 
provision and physical redevelopment.25 Finally, the rise of the 
"law and order" mayors and the initiatives of the Nixon admin­
istration helped fuel the development of the "new right" political 
agenda in the United States.26 
Gentrification 
Gentrification is the term popularly used to describe the reha­
bilitation of older neighborhoods by young, affluent homeown­
ers. It came into wide currency in the mid-1970s, when local 
officials and social scientists began to observe an influx of new 
residents to older, scenic neighborhoods, such as Brooklyn 
Heights and Park Slope in New York, Society Hill in Philadelphia, 
and Lincoln Park in Chicago.27 
The gentrification process represents something of a para­
dox because its appearance corresponds to the end of the mas­
sive urban renewal era. One of the intentions of most urban 
renewal projects was to lure typical gentrifiers, young profes­
sionals and entrepreneurs with the cash to purchase property 
and invest in its upkeep, yet much gentrification has occurred 
in neighborhoods that were bypassed by urban renewal. The 
charm and historical resonance of such neighborhoods are, of 
course, at the opposite end of the aesthetic spectrum from the 
highrise communities built under the auspices of urban renewal. 
Nonetheless, both critics and supporters of urban renewal note 
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that much subsequent gentrification might not have proceeded 
had not urban renewal cleared "slums" in adjoining communi­
ties, provided assistance to pioneering rehabbers, or through 
"spot clearance" permitted some new construction in otherwise 
renovating neighborhoods.28 
Four factors account for gentrification. One was the substan­
tial inflation of housing prices during the 1970s, which for a time 
made real estate in central-city neighborhoods a more attractive 
investment. At the outset, this was a major impetus for gentrifica­
tion. A second factor was the coming of age of a huge population 
cohort, the postwar "baby boom" generation, from which many 
gentrifiers have been drawn. Third, the restructuring of urban 
economies has generated many new white-collar jobs in corpo­
rate management, firms providing business services, and tradi­
tional professions such as law. Many of the new recruits to these 
occupations work in the central city, and for them residing in a 
near-downtown neighborhood can be highly attractive. Fourth, 
in her discussion of loft living in lower Manhattan, sociologist 
Sharon Zukin makes a point that can be applied to the process 
of gentrification in general: substantial portions of the middle 
class, because of nostalgia and an aversion to 1950s-style subur­
bia, have once more embraced the urban neighborhood as a 
place of residence.29 Of course, the steadfastness of many gentri­
fiers remains to be seen. Although many singles and couples in 
their twenties and thirties may consider suburban bedroom 
communities, with their isolation, uniform physical settings, 
and circumscribed entertainment options, to be sterile, the ar­
rival of middle age and children may reveal the compensatory 
virtues of these same communities. 
The direct consequences of gentrification have yet to play 
out. Neighborhood rehabilitation continues in dozens of cities; 
however, in no major U.S. city does the number of gentrifying 
neighborhoods represent more than a small fraction of the local 
housing stock. Thus, gentrification, of itself, does not promise 
to reconstitute the property base of local municipalities or re­
build whole cities. Gentrification in some cities has dislocated 
poorer incumbent residents who can no longer afford the rents 
asked in "upscale" neighborhoods. This effect has continued the 
interneighborhood stresses observable since the urban renewal 
era. Lastly, in a few cities loft conversion in industrial areas has 
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pitted real estate developers against incumbent commercial and 
industrial enterprises, the latter being threatened by the rent and 
tax increases that can strike properties that are proximate to such 
conversions.30 
Economic Restructuring 
Cities in the United States, as in other parts of the world, increas­
ingly are subject to the vicissitudes of a world economy that is 
dominated by huge multinational corporations. The contempo­
rary world economy permits the extremely rapid movement of 
capital, which means that particular locales can quite suddenly 
feel the pinch of capital flight, or, conversely, experience eco­
nomic boom because of the arrival of massive investment. At 
present, U.S. cities, as high-cost production sites, are often in a 
disadvantaged position within this order.31 
In the United States, the most visible urban sign of this 
international economic order has been the decades-long process 
of suburbanization, by which firms have taken advantage of 
cheap land, lower taxes, and expressway access to remove large 
portions of their facilities and work force to locations outside 
the central city.32 During the 1970s, much attention also was 
directed at interregional economic shifts, in particular at the 
plight of the deindustrializing "snowbelt" coupled with the eco­
nomic boom of the "southern rim" or "sunbelt."33 Ironically, 
within a few years of the discovery of the snowbelt/sunbelt 
dichotomy, economic forces, including the plunge in oil prices, 
brought a bust to portions of the sunbelt (notably Louisiana and 
Texas) and renewed economic growth in parts of the snowbelt 
(such as New England). Nevertheless, this turnabout, as well as 
the subsequent collapse of northeastern booms such as the 
"Massachusetts Miracle,' teaches a familiar lesson: what the 
international corporate economy gives, it may also take away. 
Aside from the long-term trend toward suburbanization, 
there are several other urban effects of the world economic 
order. Cities that house or attract significant pieces of the corpo­
rate control apparatus—headquarters, major business service 
enterprises, and the like—have received tremendous downtown 
investment.34 Even as New York and Chicago, for example, have 
failed to hold on to their industrial bases, their downtown cores 
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have received huge capital injections from corporations and 
speculative real estate developers. This downtown "renaissance" 
is also visible in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Dallas, Houston, Los 
Angeles, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, and several other major 
cities. 
Accompanying the downtown renaissance is the gentrifica­
tion process in adjoining neighborhoods, which, as we have 
noted, should be viewed as part of the process of economic 
restructuring. However, even in cities with booming down­
towns and some neighborhood gentrification, once one leaves 
the central core one is likely to find neighborhood upon neigh­
borhood that has not benefited from this restructuring. In these 
areas, unemployment is high, local public services are often 
inadequate, and maintenance of the housing stock is tenuous. 
The extreme examples of this trend are the many small and 
medium-sized factory towns of the old industrial belt stretching 
from the eastern seaboard to the upper Midwest that have lost 
much of their industry and experienced very little corporate-
management or service-sector growth. In these cities, neighbor­
hoods in decline surround downtowns that are equally starved 
for investment. 
Political Restructuring 
In the two decades following World War II, some characteristic 
features linked the otherwise diverse political systems of Amer­
ican cities. Political parties continued to play an important role 
in recruiting municipal leaders and mobilizing voting blocks. A 
generation of postwar mayors, such as Richard Lee in New 
Haven, Richard Daley in Chicago, John Collins in Boston, and 
William Hartsfield in Atlanta, came to power pledging to rebuild 
their cities. Their primary tool was the federal urban renewal 
legislation, and within their cities these and other "building 
mayors" cultivated supportive coalitions of business and labor 
leaders, party operatives, and professional planners in the mu­
nicipal bureaucracy. Until the mid- or late 1960s, these "pro­
growth coalitions" were the single most powerful force in city 
politics across the United States.35 
Little remains of this early postwar concentration of local 
political power. As is true at the national level, political parties 
 21 The New American City
at the urban level can manage only a weak hold on the allegiance 
of their constituencies. With two or three exceptions, building 
mayors are artifacts of the past, and their progrowth coalitions 
are discredited in many cities. Across the country there is a rising 
urban political force—neighborhood organizations—whose ul­
timate effect on local politics and the more general character of 
cities remains to be seen.36 
The sources of these changes are relatively obvious. The 
failures of urban renewal and other major public works expen­
ditures tended to undercut support for building mayors and the 
programs of progrowth coalitions. Moreover, reductions in fed­
eral aid for redevelopment, as well as the shifting terms of the 
federal aid process, have reduced the ability of mayors to orches­
trate the publicly initiated rebuilding projects that characterized 
the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, the coming of age of neighborhood 
mobilization has created a base for local political mobilization 
that is an alternative to party organizations, and given force to 
the opposition of grand-scale redevelopment projects. The re­
building of American cities has, of course, continued, but it is 
directed largely by banks and ambitious developers and is less 
subject to the veto of opponents with access to public decision-
making mechanisms.37 
The contemporary political economy of U.S. cities has pro­
duced three basic power arrangements.38 In thefirst, the politics 
of corporate caretakership, fiscal constraints on municipal gov­
ernment have, in effect, dictated public officials' absolute depen­
dence on the local corporate sector. In cities such as Cleveland, 
Detroit, and New York, mayors, city council representatives, and 
development officials accept an economic development agenda 
set in the private sector and commit substantial resources to help 
underwrite this agenda.39 
In the second power arrangement, the politics of mayoral 
intermediation, a relatively strong local economy matched to a 
municipal administration that has avoided absolute fiscal im­
poverishment allows mayors to negotiate a middle course be­
tween corporate expectations and neighborhood demands. Among 
the cities in this category are Boston, Chicago, and San Fran­
cisco, whose recent mayors have pursued variants of the "middle 
course."40 
Characterizing the third power arrangement are a few "move­
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ment cities,1 or, as planner Pierre Clavel has labeled them, "pro­
gressive cities. "4' In smaller communities—such as Berkeley and 
Santa Monica, California, and Burlington, Vermont—neighbor­
hood-based coalitions have come to power and dictated alterna­
tive modes of municipal decision making and representation of 
local interests, economic development, and government regula­
tion of private property. These cities are a small minority in the 
United States, and their neighborhood movements' hold on city 
government has sometimes been transitory, but they do repre­
sent a distinctly different pattern of local political power. 
THE BOOK TO COME 
Reconstruction by massive public works, racial violence, gentri­
fication, and economic and political reordering are the main 
contextual elements that have affected the postwar rebuilding of 
American cities. These are also the subjects of a rich literature 
that analyzes their sources in and implications for federal and 
local public policy, their impact on urban housing markets, and 
their effect on the future of urban economies. Less attention has 
been directed at the connection between urban rebuilding as a 
strictly physical phenomenon and the use of public space, neigh­
borhood life, and the evolution of political movements in cities. 
In the chapters that follow we will explore how the peculiar 
forms of contemporary urban rebuilding can be traced back to 
these contextual phenomena, and give lengthy consideration to 
how this rebuilding will affect urban life in the emergent Amer­
ican city. In particular, to recall the normative foundation of this 
book's approach to urban rebuilding, we will examine how 
urban rebuilding will affect the American city as a place of 
surprise, tolerance, innovation, and democratic participation. 
Chapter 2 examines the reorganization of downtowns in the 
United States, focusing on the social sources and implications of 
typical design strategies. Chapter 3 considers residential re­
building by contrasting the recent evolution of two neighbor­
hoods in Chicago. 
Chapters 4 and 5 move from the largely descriptive concerns 
of the preceding two chapters to interpret downtown and neigh­
borhood reordering from two standpoints. Chapter 4 is devoted 
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to "visions" of the American city, identifying three predominant 
visions of the contemporary city, explaining the sources of these 
visions, and suggesting the likely social consequences of imple­
menting these visions. Chapter 5 looks at the impact of urban 
rebuilding on neighborhood politics, using the experience of a 
neighborhood movement in Chicago to suggest that neighbor­
hood mobilization can express some of the same values as the 
urban rebuilding that local activists often criticize. 
Chapter 6 concludes the book by first examining the influ­
ence of Jane Jacobs's critique of city planning on urban design 
since the 1960s. Finally, we return to the neighborhood move­
ment to suggest, in general terms, its limitations as a force in 
support of surprising, tolerant, innovative, and participatory 
cities; but also to indicate how the neighborhood movement 
could link its program to more inclusive movements for social 
transformation. 

The Downtown 
Renaissance 
Writing in the early 1950s, housing expert Catharine Bauer 
recalled that the disparate alliance supporting the 1949 U.S. 
Housing Act, and in particular its provisions for urban redevel­
opment, had coalesced because " . . different groups of people, 
like the blind men feeling the elephant, made entirely different 
assumptions as to the essential nature and purpose of this legis­
lation. " Public housing advocates and such congressional spon­
sors as Senator Taft of Ohio envisaged a program that would 
deliver decent, affordable shelter to poorly housed urbanites. 
Leading city planners proposed that the legislation would permit 
the rebuilding of cities to enhance their physical amenity and 
economic efficiency. Downtown business leaders expected re­
development to prop up their investments in department stores, 
hotels, and corporate headquarters. Municipal officials looked 
forward to reinvigorated central-area tax bases.1 
By the mid-1950s, urban redevelopment was renamed ur­
ban renewal, and in many cities the complementary views of 
downtown business leaders, real estate developers, and politi­
cians produced a consensus that proclaimed downtown rebuild­
ing to be its principal objective. Yet the road to achieving this 
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objective appeared to be impassable. The process of program 
approval and execution was debilitatingly slow, and cities some­
times cleared huge sites for renewal only tofind that they elicited 
little or no interest from real estate developers. This impasse left 
ugly holes in the downtown fabric of many cities, and these 
municipally held, empty sites contributed nothing to the local 
tax rolls. 
The perception of downtown decline began to shift some 
time in the late 1960s or the early 1970s. Private investment in 
downtown areas accelerated, and architects and urban planners 
developed new approaches to downtown building and organiz­
ing the movement of people through urban space. What has 
been called the downtown renaissance is directly related to the 
success of these new designs for downtown use. In this chapter 
we examine the evolving functions of downtown areas as ex­
pressed by these design formulas and consider the new down­
town's likely impacts on how people use the city. 
THE LONG SLIDE 
The best way to begin an exploration of the purposes and 
consequences of the new downtowns is with a review of the 
evolution of American downtowns since the nineteenth cen­
tury.2 On the eastern seaboard, cities such as Baltimore, Boston, 
New York, and Philadelphia, of course, predate the nineteenth 
century. However, these cities, as well as the more recently 
settled centers of the Midwest, grew to metropolitan scale during 
the nineteenth century as the national economy shifted from a 
predominantly agricultural base and the United States became 
an industrial giant. 
Characteristically, these cities grew from settlements located 
on natural transportation links, such as ocean, lake, or river, or 
they capitalized on access to the preeminent man-made trans­
portation innovation of the nineteenth century, railroads. As a 
rule, the initial settlement point continued to be the center or 
downtown of these communities, and the imperative of access 
to transportation yielded very concentrated development at the 
core. The fabrication of products required transportation access 
in order to receive raw materials and ship finished products. 
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Management of production was on-site, and with the growth of 
huge industrial corporations, the location of management oper­
ations remained in the urban core. Other sectors of the local 
urban economy also had a stake in central locations: banks that 
did business with the rising industrial combines, retail establish­
ments that themselves depended on transportation facilities and 
required selling points accessible to the greatest number of 
consumers. 
Until the midnineteenth century, these communities re­
mained "walking cities." Local transit was quite primitive, and 
residential districts clustered near commerce and industry, en­
abling employees to walk to work. Although the movement by 
affluent urbanites to suburban developments was evident in the 
decades preceding the Civil War, even those sylvan retreats were 
quite close to the urban core by today's standards.3 
During this period, the concentration of activities in the 
urban core produced an extremely mixed pattern of land uses. 
Department stores abutted train depots, and factories stood 
alongside residential blocks. Nineteenth-century industrializing 
cities experienced massive growth, with soaring demand yield­
ing soaring property values and, in turn, the rapid turnover of 
property. Property moved not just from owner to owner, but 
also from use to use. 
The withdrawal of exclusive residential districts from the 
south end of Chicago's downtown is an example of this process. 
At midcentury, on the west side of South Michigan Avenue, 
across from what is now Grant Park, were several blocks of 
elegant rowhouses whose owners included prominent members 
of the city's commercial elite. By the last decade of the nine­
teenth century, these blocks had been given over to hotels, 
theaters, and office buildings, and a more opulent residential 
enclave had been established just half a mile to the southeast on 
Prairie Avenue. Here were the truly palatial homes of industrial­
ists such as George Pullman, founder of the Pullman Palace Car 
Company. However, within a few more years the encroachment 
of factories and railyards greatly reduced the attractiveness of 
Prairie Avenue, and its affluent residents moved elsewhere.4 
This case is not unique. The following description of resi­
dential upheaval in Manhattan appeared in Putnam's Monthly 
in 1853: 
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Aristocracy, startled and disgusted with the near approach of ple­
beian trade which already threatened to lay its insolvent hand 
upon her mantle, and to come tramping into her silken parlors 
with its heavy boots and rough attire, fled by dignified degrees 
up Broadway, lingered for a time in Greenwich-Street, Park 
Place, and Barclay-Street, until at length finding the enemy still 
persistent, she took a great leap into the wilderness above 
Bleeker-Street.5 
The consequence of this accelerated process of property devel­
opment and turnover was a truly labyrinthine pattern of down­
town land use, as one wave of construction followed another, 
with the succeeding developments seldom totally obliterating 
the remnants of their predecessors. 
The pressure of downtown development relaxed somewhat 
at the end of the nineteenth century. With the arrival of elec­
trified mass transit (and later the automobile), cities' growing 
middle-class populations could reside in newly developing 
neighborhoods at some distance from the downtown core.6 The 
mass of industrial workers also could travel greater distances to 
work, and the larger industrial complexes then being erected 
could be placed on cheaper, less congested sites away from the 
central city. In fact, some industrial facilities were planned on 
such a grand scale that more or less complete communities were 
developed around them. U.S. Steel's development of Gary, Indi­
ana, is such a case, and also a sign of the centrifugal tendencies 
beginning to characterize metropolitan growth.7 
Nonetheless, it was not until after World War II that the 
deconcentration of downtowns became a source of broad public 
and official concern. The factors promoting this concern had 
roots in both the perception of downtowns and in the objective 
character of postwar development patterns. When one considers 
the economic context immediately following World War II, it is 
not difficult to imagine the widespread perception of downtown 
decline. Following the onset of the Great Depression, there had 
been a hiatus in private construction. Thus, aside from federally 
sponsored public facilities, few new commercial structures had 
been built downtown, nor had cities experienced much residen­
tial construction or rehabilitation since the 1920s. Yet with boom 
conditions spawned by World War II, large numbers of work 
seekers had flooded into the cities and crowded into whatever 
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housing was available. With little new construction to meet this 
demand, the wear and tear on already aging housing stock was 
magnified. Following the war, the hyperactivity in frayed down­
town cores subsided, and the consequent concern of town fa­
thers, especially those holding downtown real estate, was prob­
ably predictable. 
In fact, postwar development trends were reshaping metro­
politan regions, at some cost to the vitality of the old downtown 
areas. The wartime mobilization that brought so many workers 
to central cities also stimulated even more growth outside cit­
ies.8 Further, after World War II, firms seeking modernized plant 
capacity increasingly looked to suburban locations (or locations 
quite outside the mid-Atlantic-to-Great Lakes manufacturing 
belt), where larger parcels were available, real estate prices and 
local tax levies were low, and the new interstate highway net­
work could be used to transport products. 
Accompanying the postwar deconcentration of industry was 
the explosion of suburban residence. The federal government 
played a substantial role in adding luster to the prospect of a home 
and lot on the metropolitan periphery by financing the urban 
spurs of the interstate highway system and by initiating the Fed­
eral Housing Administration and Veterans Administration home 
mortgage insurance programs.9 Yet even in the absence of gov­
ernment sponsorship of suburban residential development, the 
lure of jobs would have drawn many urbanites out to the suburbs. 
As metropolitan regions grew in size and the distribution of 
population shifted toward the metropolitan periphery, down­
towns experienced a reduction in use by shoppers. By the mid­
1950s, suburban shopping malls were becoming commonplace 
and offering direct competition both to downtown department 
stores and to smaller retailers. Thus, it is not surprising that 
retailers were among the segments of the downtown business 
community that contributed most to the call for urban renewal.10 
In a little more than a decade, the ambience of urban core 
areas must have seemed quite transformed. The old down­
towns, with their jumble of structures and land uses, were often 
unsightly, but as late as World War II the industrial boom, 
administrative personnel, and job seekers that had descended 
on the cities had filled them with activity. Then came demobili­
zation. Central-city factories reduced the scale of their opera­
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dons, or they relocated to new suburban facilities. Government 
offices related to wartime production closed, and many middle-
class urbanites sought new homes in the suburbs. After the war, 
the use of urban mass transit declined quite dramatically; fewer 
people traveled downtown, and those who did increasingly 
relied on automobiles.11 The contents of downtowns suddenly 
escaped, as if from a high-pressure balloon that had sprung a 
leak. What remained were aging commercial, industrial, and 
some residential structures. Also troubling to business leaders 
and government officials was the increasingly black population 
of the residential neighborhoods nearest the central city. Often 
living in the oldest and most decayed housing, blacks were 
viewed as the harbinger of further physical deterioration and, as 
such, a threat to the economic viability of the downtown. 
Ironically, the first wave of government-sponsored redevel­
opment efforts only exacerbated the emptying of downtowns. 
Urban renewal and the construction of the central city links of 
the interstate highway system required the clearance of large 
downtown tracts. The initial urban renewal strategy was total 
clearance of large sites, which redevelopment planners pre­
sumed would be most to the liking of private developers. How­
ever, in their zeal to clear, redevelopment planners in such cities 
as Newark, New Jersey, substantially overestimated the demand 
for these sites, leaving large, vacant eyesores in close proximity 
to the downtown core.12 
The intent of the expressway planners was to reconnect the 
downtown with burgeoning suburban populations, thereby 
easing the commutation of employees and shoppers from the 
metropolitan periphery to the core. The result, however, was 
that the circumferential links in the expressway system made it 
convenient and economical to avoid the downtown altogether. 
Furthermore, the broad swaths cut by highway rights of way 
forced much residential demolition, sometimes crowding dis­
placed people into adjoining neighborhoods, sometimes induc­
ing them to relocate outside the city. Finally, the increasing use 
of automobiles by those who did enter the downtown increased 
demand for another type of space: parking. Many vacant urban 
renewal sites were adapted to this purpose, and owners of 
underused downtown structures also discovered that they 
could reduce taxes and increase revenue (while waiting for a 
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good offer) by demolishing their buildings and renting space 
for parking. 
The physical features of downtowns that resulted from this 
mixture of historical circumstances, centrifugal development 
trends, and public policy are still visible. Underused and aban­
doned manufacturing and transportation complexes can be found 
in the vicinity of most downtown areas. On the fringes of many 
downtowns, one observes seas of surface parking where more 
substantial investment has not followed public or private demo­
lition of structures. Central city expressways everywhere cut 
into the downtown; in a few cities, massive parking garages have 
been erected in proximity to entrance/exit ramps and house 
automobiles during the workday. Mass transit service and facil­
ities are still present, but they serve a relatively small portion of 
the downtown population. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century office and commercial structures, many decayed, 
underused, or abandoned, are scattered among postwar struc­
tures. Were this picture all that could be drawn of contemporary 
downtowns, the fears of those business leaders and municipal 
officials who two generations ago had called for a war on urban 
blight would be realized. However, this picture does not include 
all the elements of the new downtowns, and it is to the remainder 
that we now turn. 
UP FROM URBAN RENEVCAL 
Even as the decentralizing economic trends and misguided pub­
lic policies of the 1950s and 1960s were working their effects, 
other trends anchored some functions in the downtown cores 
of major cities. Downtowns continued to be the chief location 
for corporate management and government administration, as 
well as such ancillary services as banking, accounting, and ad­
vertising. Moreover, as multinational corporations decentralized 
production there was, in fact, an accompanying imperative to 
centralize control functions. As a result, cities that had been sites 
of corporate headquarters and had efficiently provided the array 
of business services necessary for corporate management were 
able to attract additional headquarters operations. Thus, a hand­
ful of headquarters cities, such as Chicago, New York, and San 
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Francisco, became more prominent as management centers dur­
ing the post-World War II period.13 
Nevertheless, for at least two decades following World War 
II, the construction associated with the agglomeration of man­
agement functions only enhanced the perception of downtown 
decay. For this sort of work takes place in offices, and quite 
unlike retailers, who usually require street frontage, or even 
manufacturers, who require ground-level floor space, offices can 
be piled high atop one another. Because of the high price of 
central-city real estate throughout the postwar period, develop­
ers of office buildings in many cities erected structures of un­
precedented height. These office towers often appealed to the 
grandiose ambitions of municipal boosters, but their effects on 
surrounding real estate were not so favorable. The huge new 
structures attracted tenants away from older and therefore less 
prestigious office buildings, undermining their economic viabil­
ity. As late as the early 1970s, and in a real estate market as 
extensive as lower Manhattan, the construction of the huge 
World Trade Center complex had just this impact.14 In short, 
office development in the early postwar period, in many in­
stances, only aggravated the physical decline evident in down­
town areas. 
The central problem confronting architects and planners 
thus was to discover ways to transform urban space so that 
residents of the city and, even more importantly, visitors would 
willingly use the downtown area. The downtown core's preem­
inence as a center for management functions was demonstrated; 
and closely associated with these business uses was the grow­
ing importance of conference-, convention-, and trade show-
derived tourism. In addition, downtowns continued to be the 
preferred location for metropolitan-scale cultural institutions 
and major sporting facilities. 
Yet, with the spreading out of the metropolitan population, 
downtowns had to entice people in a fashion that was once 
unnecessary. Suburban shopping malls and movie complexes 
were close at hand for residents of the metropolitan periphery. 
The predominantly white suburban population, as well as many 
out-of-town visitors attending conventions and trade shows, 
were afraid of urban crime or nasty street encounters. Conse­
quently, the downtown renaissance can be traced to the appear­
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ance of design solutions that grew out of the economic functions 
held by the downtowns and were predicated on a restructuring 
of central-city space that was consistent with the expectations 
of the desired users of that space. 
The Design of the New Downtowns 
The architectural vocabulary that has been developed in re­
sponse to this dilemma, and whose mark is apparent in virtually 
every contemporary American downtown, includes three main 
elements: the multiuse office/commercial/residential structure, 
frequently called the "megastructure"15; the enclosed shopping 
arcade; and the pedestrian mall. Although the sources and appli­
cations of these urban design elements may be discussed sepa­
rately, contemporary urban architects and planners typically 
combine them as a means of organizing large pieces of the urban 
fabric. Just how these elements are combined is dependent, of 
course, on the predilections of particular designers and the 
particular design problem presented by specific downtown 
areas. 
The first principal design element, the megastructure, is, in 
many cities, linked to enclosed arcades, pedestrian malls, and 
conventional structures by underground passageways or above-
street-level "skywalks."16 As a rule, skywalks and underground 
passageways are employed as pedestrian links and, as such, may 
be considered auxiliary elements in the design of the new down­
towns. However, in Montreal and Toronto, Canada, systems of 
underground passageways featuring a wide array of shops and 
other establishments are integral parts of downtown commer­
cial complexes. 
Megastructures are ubiquitous components of the contem­
porary American downtown.17 Among the most renowned are 
Atlanta's Peachtree Center, Chicago's Water Tower Place, the 
Renaissance Center in Detroit, the Bonaventure Hotel complex 
in Los Angeles, and the IDS Center in Minneapolis. In small and 
medium-size cities, scaled-down megastructures often are the 
centerpieces of downtown redevelopment plans.18 Integrated 
within such complexes are space for conventions and trade 
shows, accommodations for conventioneers and other visitors, 
and retail and office space. Typically, megastructures are isolated 
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from the surrounding city, either by their location or by design 
features that limit pedestrian access. By maintaining a continu­
ous schedule of conferences, trade shows, and other special 
events, however, their managements seek to sustain a high vol­
ume of consumer expenditures for their commercial tenants. 
Such megastructures as the Citicorp Center in New York, the 
John Hancock Center in Chicago, and the IDS Center in Minne­
apolis offer their corporate sponsors unique use, investment, 
and environmental benefits. In each of these cases, the offices of 
the sponsoring firm occupy substantial portions of the building, 
but a large part of the structure is leased to commercial tenants 
seeking shop or office space. Residential condominiums also 
may be sold. In any event, space for the sponsor's future expan­
sion is available, and commercial tenants and residential pur­
chasers provide cash flow in the meantime. Finally, the array of 
shops and services offered within the confines of the megastruc­
ture constitutes an amenity for the sponsoring firm's employees. 
The second principal design element of the new downtowns 
is the enclosed shopping arcade. Sometimes these arcades are 
units within megastructures, as in the case of Chicago's Water 
Tower Place. However, some ambitious arcade developments, 
such as James Rouse's waterfront complexes in Baltimore, Bos­
ton, and New "fork, have been situated directly within the urban 
fabric. Rouse's Quincy Market in Boston and the renowned 
Ghirardelli Square complex in San Francisco are sympathetic 
remodelings of older commercial structures. In contrast, Rouse's 
Gallery complex in central Philadelphia is a new structure in­
serted within an existing commercial block. 
Unlike the megastructure, which in fact represents a design 
innovation, the enclosed arcades of contemporary American 
downtowns are descendants of the shopping arcades, some 
dating from the early nineteenth century, that one observes in 
many European cities. And like these European precursors, the 
contemporary American arcades typically attract visitors by 
offering a wide array of shops and a protected physical environ­
ment. 
The third design element in the new American downtown is 
the pedestrian mall. In many smaller cities, the main shopping 
street has been closed to vehicular traffic and pedestrians are 
free to wander among benches, kiosks, sculpture, and ornamen­
 35 The Downtown Renaissance
tal plantings between shopping visits to adjoining retail estab­
lishments. In large cities such as Chicago, Minneapolis, and 
Philadelphia, downtown pedestrian malls do permit buses, taxis, 
and delivery trucks, but otherwise their design elements are 
much the same as such malls in other cities.19 
Most pedestrian malls, in contrast to megastructures and 
enclosed shopping arcades, are planned and executed by mu­
nicipal governments.20 Often, their sponsors accept the propo­
sition that the midcentury decline of downtown shopping dis­
tricts resulted from the ascendancy of the automobile as the 
preferred mode of urban transportation. Thus, mall sponsors 
hope that the exclusion of automobiles from certain commercial 
streets will invigorate the economic atmosphere. Proponents 
and planners of pedestrian malls also cite as a source of inspira­
tion the squares, fountains, and other public spaces that abound 
in European cities. In this case, the pedestrian mall is viewed as 
a relaxed locale in which the social conviviality sought by design 
theorists such as Camillo Sitte may be promoted.21 
The New Downtowns and the Segmented City 
In practice, the design of the new downtowns serves to segment 
the city by reserving portions of the cityscape for specific kinds 
of users and reducing the likelihood of different kinds of people 
sharing the same spaces. 
The most apparent form of this segmentation is spatial, in 
particular the tendency to develop new downtown commercial 
districts at some distance from the old central business area.22 
There are obvious economic factors that contribute to this trend. 
Site assemblage is easier away from the traditional downtown 
core, and developers are likely to pay far less per square foot for 
these sites. But, in addition, the merchants housed in these new 
districts cater to a different class of customers than do retailers 
in the old downtown cores. 
In Chicago, north Michigan Avenue, about one-half mile 
northeast of the city's old commercial core on State Street has 
become the city's preeminent shopping area. North Michigan 
Avenue is anchored by Water Tower Place, a characteristic com­
mercial-retail megastructure that houses a new Marshall Field's 
department store as well as Lord & Taylor and numerous smaller 
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retailers. Although pedestrian access to Water Tower Place is not 
as limited as in some other megastructures, such as Detroit's 
Renaissance Center, the merchants of Water Tower Place cater to 
an overwhelmingly white, affluent, and largely out-of-town cli­
entele. Back on State Street, the remaining department stores are 
older, and for the most part they do not compete with the north 
Michigan Avenue establishments. Their clientele includes far 
more downtown workers, blacks, and Hispanics. 
A second type of spatial segmentation characteristic of the 
new downtowns is their detachment from the surrounding city. 
In many cities, quite imposing physical barriers, notably urban 
expressway links, separate the core from adjoining neighbor­
hoods. Many downtowns are also sealed off from the outlying 
city by broad tracts of cleared land or abandoned buildings left 
in the wake of urban renewal. 
However, the extreme example of spatial segmentation is 
provided by a new breed of structures whose internal functions 
do not require connection with the extant city street system and 
whose design reinforces this functional isolation. In Chicago's 
North Loop redevelopment area, the Transportation Center, a 
megastructure housing offices, retail space, parking facilities, 
and travel-related services, and linked with surrounding build­
ings by enclosed walkways, was described in this way by a real 
estate writer: "Visitors to Chicago will be able to land at O'Hare 
in the dead of winter, ride the CTA rapid transit line to the 
Transportation Center, conduct business at such places as City 
Hall, the Brunswick Building, and the First National Bank Build­
ing and return home without venturing outside."23 Admit­
tedly, for the January or February visitor to Chicago, avoidance 
of the city's climate is a reasonable desire. However, this descrip­
tion is more interesting as a commentary on the expected clien­
tele of the building, out-of-town visitors, and the way in which 
design features conform to the economic function of the build­
ing. The Transportation Center is a transfer point for individuals 
engaged in commercial activities linking Chicago to other cities. 
It is not intended to be a part of the city. 
The spatial segmentation of the new downtowns also con­
tributes to their temporal segmentation, the tendency of differ­
ent groups of people to use downtowns at different times. For 
example, from early morning until evening, Chicago's State 
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Street commercial corridor, like the old downtown cores of 
many cities, has a diverse group of users. However, as sundown 
approaches, its more affluent and white population vanishes, 
and the clusters of people that remain on State Street are mainly 
young blacks and Hispanics. These groups are attracted by the 
restaurants and movie houses that remain open for business into 
the evening hours. 
In part, the temporal segmentation of downtowns, with 
racial minorities becoming the principal users of the urban core 
after working hours, is related to neighborhood residential and 
economic patterns. A large share of the white, middle-class 
downtown work force resides in the suburbs or in city neigh­
borhoods that are well away from the downtown; moreover, 
many of these neighborhoods are likely to be close to their own 
entertainment and commercial districts. In contrast, the minor­
ity users of the evening downtown often live relatively close by, 
and in neighborhoods where entertainment and retail establish­
ments are in short supply. 
Yet this temporal segmentation is clearly amplified by the 
means used to design the new downtowns. Sociologist Murray 
Melbin notes that after-hours activities have been viewed for 
centuries as "crime-ridden and outside of ordinary social con­
trol."24 This concern is the source of design strategies typically 
used to limit pedestrian access to urban megastructures: long 
exterior walls without storefront entrances, points of entrance 
that are physically small and few in number, and empty street-
level foyers that buffer commercial and office space on the floors 
above. 
Here we have arrived at the considerations that yield designs 
such as that of the Renaissance Center in Detroit, a megastruc­
ture that includes substantial hotel space and is oriented to 
service for out-of-town visitors. Access from the city outside is 
limited, and inside, the wary guest finds an array of commercial 
outlets, restaurants, and taverns. Thus, for out-of-town visitors 
who may want to "cut loose'' outside the parameters of routine 
business hours, and who may be vulnerable to foul play in the 
city at large, the megastructure offers a pleasingly safe and super­
ficially varied environment. 
This pattern of segmented downtown use also affects the 
deployment of municipal public safety resources and popular 
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assumptions about danger in the city. Local police forces can 
adopt a less aggressive presence in portions of the city away from 
the new downtown, as they are not much needed to protect 
visitors, or ultimately, the reputation of their city. In addition, 
the segmentation of after-hours activities serves to associate 
racial minorities with the perception of late-night deviance de­
scribed by Melbin. For the city outside the new downtown is 
unsafe, and its lack of security must be because of the people 
who inhabit it. 
THE DOWNTOWN AS PLATFORM 
Raymond Williams begins The Country and the City by noting 
a paradoxical and longstanding English cultural theme, the de­
cline of the countryside. Williams observes that literary figures 
and social critics have lamented the loss of the yeomanry and 
"merry olde England" for more than three centuries, with each 
succeeding generation placing the demise of authentic country 
life near its own time and interpreting the meaning of this loss 
from the standpoint of its own experience. Thus, modern writ­
ers allege that the disappearance of occupations, village culture, 
and sensibility occurred around the turn of the century, whereas 
Ben Jonson was recording the same phenomena from his own 
perspective at the outset of the seventeenth century.25 
A somewhat analogous paradox is evident in American cul­
ture, only this time the city and city life are its subjects. It is 
widely supposed that at some time in the past city life in this 
country was better than it is at present.26 However, when one 
examines the real conditions in cities of the late nineteenth or 
mideighteenth century, it is easy to produce a lengthy inventory 
of unpleasant physical conditions: residential overcrowding, 
street crime, epidemics, ubiquitous filth, and so on. In fact, the 
source of this nostalgia is probably our perception that these 
earlier American cities, in spite of their physical unpleasantness, 
managed to sustain among their residents a sense of community 
that eludes cities of our era.27 
Until at least World War I, American cities seem to have 
developed institutions that elicited a degree of community loy­
alty, even among highly diverse populations whose class and 
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ethnic cleavages might otherwise have seemed unbreachable. In 
making this point, Gunther Barth describes a set of institutions 
that arose in American cities at the middle of the nineteenth 
century: 
The new ways of life identified city people who shared a grow­
ing awareness of a distinctly urban world. . . . As a result they 
moved with growing confidence through the strange setting of 
the modern city, their progress assured by the styles of thinking 
and acting they derived from the culture created out of new so­
cial and economic institutions. The world of city people thrived 
on their ability to use the apartment house, metropolitan press, 
department store, ball park, and vaudeville house for cultural 
ends, and that ability gave their ways of life distinctly American 
features.28 
What is interesting about the five institutions identified by 
Barth is that three, the department store, ballpark, and vaude­
ville house, almost without exception were located in nineteenth-
century downtown areas. The press primarily covered political 
and business activities, whose locus was the urban core, and the 
apartment house was most pervasive as a residential environ­
ment in the still-concentrated, pre-automobile-dependent city. 
Barth's description of the vaudeville show, quoted in chap­
ter 1, adds an important nuance to his characterization of the 
community-building role played by these five institutions. For 
the sense of community he describes, paradoxically enough, is 
built in large measure on a base of cosmopolitan curiosity and 
tolerance of diversity. Such an attitude toward the city was, 
during this era, most likely to be cultivated by frequenting the 
downtown areas of big cities. Thus, although Barth's attention 
is directed at the common process of socialization effected by 
these five institutions, it is reasonable to infer that these institu­
tions, as well as more specifically indigenous ones (such as city 
halls, municipal museums or auditoriums, and historical sites, 
all of which, as a rule, were located downtown) also managed to 
give resonance to the sense of a particular community's charac­
ter and heritage. In sort, these institutions were communicating 
a complicated and fragile set of social messages. 
Ironically, it is also from the middle of the nineteenth cen­
tury that the rising industrial city brought with it the sorting out 
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of urban functions and land uses that was so uncharacteristic of 
cities before industrialization. Indeed, our modern notion of the 
downtown, with its specified functions of business management 
and banking, retailing, and cultural propagation, is a conse­
quence of this process. Accompanying this reorganization of 
space, according to sociologist Lynn Lofland, was a shift in the 
perceptual practices of city dwellers: "The modern urbanite, 
then, in contrast to his preindustrial counterpart, primarily uses 
location rather than appearance to identify the strange others 
who surround him. In the preindustrial city, a man was what he 
wore. In the modern city, a man is where he stands."29 
The nineteenth-century industrial city, whose population 
size and geographic span far surpassed that of mercantile com­
munities, was also a city of far more specialized districts and 
neighborhoods. Its spatial order provided a grounding for its 
residents, but at the same time this segmentation of urban space, 
activities, and residents divided the city. For a time, the down­
town and the institutions located there provided a focal point 
for the residents of this otherwise divided city, reminding them 
of their diversity yet binding them to their city. Indeed, one of 
the persistent themes of nineteenth-century urban history is the 
effort by municipal officials and civic notables to build institu­
tions that underlined the special character of their communi­
ties.30 Yet in the long run, the segmentation of the city continued; 
and as we have described in the preceding section, it presently 
fragments that portion of the city that a few generations ago gave 
some sense of variety, place, and community to individual cities. 
The new downtown's specialized role as a location for busi­
ness headquarters, government, and tourist-oriented facilities 
has substantially reduced the variety of activities, structures, and 
districts within the urban core. The real estate required for the 
megastructures and office highrises characteristic of the new 
downtowns is substantial. Often, the site assemblage process for 
these developments forces out a variety of incumbent tenants. 
Soaring property values in the vicinity of new downtown devel­
opments further squeeze small-scale merchants, single-room­
occupancy hotels, snack bars, and unrenovated taverns. Munici­
pal planning officials may also determine that "nonconforming" 
uses should be zoned out of gleaming new downtown districts. 
In the short run, the new downtown separates itself from the old 
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downtown and excludes from its precincts the old downtown's 
occupants. Ultimately, the new downtown will vastly simplify 
the urban core's land use and activity patterns, thus ending its 
role as locus for urban diversity. 
The physical uniformity of the new downtowns is, in the 
first place, rooted in their functional uniformity; but, in addi­
tion, the character of the architecture profession in the late 
twentieth century undercuts downtown uniqueness. As new 
architectural philosophies, styles, and techniques are devel­
oped, their transmission among practitioners separated by re­
gion and country is quite rapid.31 There is much less chance than 
there was even fifty years ago for the evolution of regionally 
distinguishable approaches to building. Moreover, the multina­
tional firms whose commissions comprise much of the demand 
for major architects, and whose structures comprise a large part 
of the new downtowns, have developed a taste for the work of 
a handful of prestigious firms whose buildings can be found 
across the country. In short, what goes on in the downtowns of 
most major cities is much the same, and it is not coincidental 
that the structural envelopes of downtown areas appear increas­
ingly similar. 
The functional character of the new downtowns gives rise 
to another aspect of their "placelessness. Historically, cities 
have been "a world of strangers" in which individuals carry out 
occupational and personal chores among large numbers of other 
people, most of whom they do not know.32 Urban residents 
become skilled at coping with this strangeness: learning satisfac­
tory modes of interaction with unknown fellow urbanites, learn­
ing how to anticipate the actions of strangers on the street, 
learning how to move from one part of the city to another. 
Experience teaches these skills, and often this experience must 
be gathered in a particular location. Negotiating with police 
officers is likely to be quite different in New York City than in 
Birmingham, Alabama. 
Increasingly, however, the principal users of downtown areas 
cannot call upon such experience, as they are corporate employ­
ees who live miles away, visiting businesspersons, convention­
eers, or tourists. Design theorist Amos Rappoport, in speculat­
ing on the success of chain businesses such as McDonald's, 
argues that the uniformity of McDonald's physical presence, 
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even in widely disparate locales, is an important asset.33 Visually, 
McDonald's outlets, like all national chain restaurants, are easily 
recognizable, and their uniform appearance implies the predict­
ability of their cuisine and prices. The food may not be grand, 
but it never surprises. Much the same can be said about mega-
structures such as the Renaissance Center or Peachtree Center. 
Their familiar ambiences, defined in terms of structural design, 
characteristic retail tenants, and predictable users, make them 
quite congenial for suburbanites and out-of-towners whose di­
rect experience with the outlying city and its world of strangers 
is limited. 
The new American downtown is, in fact, a "global down­
town."34 Its principal functions of corporate and government 
management, investment, and entertainment and tourism form 
the local links in an international system of economic activity 
and intergovernmental relations. Its design is consistent with 
these functions. What its design does not seem capable of doing 
is contributing to the sense of place of particular cities or ex­
pressing in physical terms the individual city's unique accom­
plishments and heritage. Moreover, the physical uniformity of 
the new downtowns is at odds with the diversity, capacity to 
surprise, and social tolerance that characterized nineteenth-cen­
tury downtowns. Given the functions of the new downtown, 
and the design strategies chosen for it, this is not surprising. Yet, 
to the extent that the physical form of cities historically has 
expressed important civic and larger social values, and the 
expression of these values has confirmed popular notions of 
citizenship and community, this failure is quite significant. 
THE REVIVAL OF DOWNTOWN RESIDENCE 
For much of the post-World War II period, the downtowns of 
American cities usually were not associated with residence. Most 
of the core-area housing that was characteristic of the mercantile 
city was demolished or adapted to different uses during the 
period of urban industrialization. The skid row residential hotels 
and rooming houses in and around the downtowns of many cities 
were considered an aberrant and essentially unwholesome vari­
ety of housing. Yet housing for the affluent never disappeared 
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from central cities. Neighborhoods such as Beacon Hill in Bos­
ton, the Gold Coast in Chicago, Gramercy Park and West Green­
wich Village in New York, and Nob Hill in San Francisco retained 
their attractiveness and well-to-do residents throughout the post­
war period. Yet since the 1970s there has been a substantial 
upswing in downtown residential use, whose character is in 
many respects consistent with the trend toward downtown seg­
mentation evident in the commercial downtown. 
The residential resettlement of downtowns has followed 
two courses, which can be distinguished as "sponsored resettle­
ment" and "residential invasion." Sponsored resettlement has 
occurred when municipal governments or private investors 
have planned large-scale residential developments for core 
areas. In the early postwar period, some major urban renewal 
projects, such as Boston's West End redevelopment and the near 
South Side redevelopment of Chicago, took the form of highrise 
residential complexes for middle-class tenants.35 More recently, 
abandoned railroad property and riverside landfill have been the 
sites for Dearborn Park in Chicago and Battery Park City in New 
York, respectively. Dearborn Park was financed mostly by pri­
vate investors, whereas Battery Park City has been built under 
the auspices of a more complicated public sector-private devel­
oper partnership.36 
Residential invasion better describes the process of resettle­
ment in neighborhoods such as SoHo, in Manhattan. SoHo, lying 
south of Greenwich Village and north of the lower Manhattan 
financial district, was at one time the province of small manufac­
turers and warehousers. By the late 1960s and early 1970s many 
of the neighborhood's loft buildings had been vacated by their 
previous industrial and commercial occupants, and a variety of 
artists and other low-rent seekers began to make homes in these 
structures. Over the course of the following decade, a large 
portion of the SoHo loft space was converted to residential use, 
property values soared, and many of the original settlers were 
displaced by more-affluent residents attracted by the mystique 
of "loft living."37 In the 1980s, this pattern of older manufactur­
ing and warehousing districts yielding to residential and retail 
use has been duplicated in a number of other American cities. 
There are several positive attributes of the recent trend 
toward downtown residential resettlement. First, and most 
Dearborn Park 
Internal green space and walkways (above and below) 
Facing east along State Street 
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notably, the reemergence of the downtown as a place of 
residence seems to work at cross-purposes to downtown seg­
mentation. Having more residents downtown leads to more 
local-oriented shopping, schools, and other institutions that can 
give variety to the urban core. 
Second, and in marked contrast to early postwar urban 
renewal, much of the recent downtown resettlement has pro­
ceeded with little residential displacement. The use of landfill 
and abandoned industrial sites means that increments to the 
housing stock available to affluent city residents are not being 
removed from the housing stock available to less-affluent central-
city residents. 
Finally, at least some of the new downtown residential areas 
are the result, for the most part, of private investment. Again, 
unlike urban renewal, large public subsidies have not been used 
to underwrite the transfer of property from less-affluent to 
more-affluent hands. However, this general observation must be 
qualified by noting that in the post-urban renewal era, cities 
have found many new ways to induce private investment in 
downtowns, and many ostensibly private residential develop­
ments have in fact received substantial indirect public subsi­
dies.38 
In other respects, downtown residential resettlement pro­
ceeds under the same assumptions and by way of some of the 
same practices as the development of the new downtowns. On 
Chicago's near South Side, the sponsors of Dearborn Park hoped 
to attract affluent residents, including families with children, 
and designed a residential enclave that in most respects turns its 
back to the surrounding city.39 Dearborn Park's street system 
does not connect with Chicago's street gridiron, and entrance 
to the project is limited by extensive fencing. In effect, this 
designed isolation expresses the sponsors' and many residents' 
uncertainty about the city and living within it. On the one hand, 
Chicago is viewed as a place of great attraction and excitement; 
on the other, its excitement is threatening and physically dan­
gerous. As one stands in the middle of Dearborn Park and 
observes its quiet streets and well-manicured green spaces, it is 
easy to forget that one is in a big city; that is, until one glances 
up and sees the dark bulk of the Sears Tower rising over the 
community's northern edge. 
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Dearborn Park's physical separation from Chicago and the 
ambiguity toward urban life expressed by its design have been 
reflected in its local politics. In 1987 a public elementary school 
opened in Dearborn Park. Many of Dearborn Park's residents 
had assumed that only their children would enter the new 
school, and they were disturbed when residents of nearby low-
income neighborhoods also sought to enroll their children. 
Without directly impugning the children and residents of nearby 
public housing projects, such as the Raymond Hilliard Homes, 
the Dearborn Park residents were adamant in opposing a reduc­
tion of "standards" in the new school. After months of negotia­
tion, the Chicago Board of Education arrived at a compromise 
plan that allowed some integration of Dearborn Park and non-
Dearborn Park students.40 
Whereas Dearborn Park, a sponsored downtown residential 
settlement, segments itself physically from the surrounding city, 
the process of residential invasion also may produce what Rich­
ard Sennett has called "purified communities."41 Sociologist 
Sharon Zukin's account of the resettlement of SoHo emphasizes 
that the polyglot neighborhood invaded by artists, but still 
occupied by industrial and commercial firms involved in a 
variety of trades, soon enough gave away to a more homoge­
neous locale of affluent residents, boutiques, and galleries. What 
arriving loft dwellers in SoHo desired, instead of the busily noisy 
industrial district their neighborhood had been, was a quieter 
and more predictable descendant of that neighborhood. The 
new SoHo is enclosed by the same structures and occupies the 
same spaces as the old neighborhood, but its use has changed 
and taken on a much more quietly predictable character.42 
Dearborn Park and SoHo demonstrate that residential reset­
tlement does not necessarily deviate from the tendency to seg­
ment and homogenize use of the contemporary downtown. In 
other respects, their experiences touch on tensions that are 
prevalent in neighborhoods away from the downtown, as in­
cumbent residents seek to preserve their communities and pio­
neers move into changing neighborhoods. The restructuring of 
neighborhoods is another important part of the rebuilding of the 
American city, and it is the subject of chapter 3­
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Certain highly visible signs suggest that this is a time not only of 
downtown rebuilding, but also of great neighborhood vitality. 
Neighborhood festivals and street fairs are a ubiquitous feature 
of summer life in the big cities of the United States. The historical 
preservation movement devotes much of its energy to docu­
menting the wide variety of vernacular building styles found in 
residential neighborhoods around the country. Moreover, the 
rehabilitation of older structures that in many cases had been 
left to decay for decades receives great attention in the media. 
In most major cities there are at present at least a handful of 
residential areas whose property values are shooting skyward— 
in marked contrast to the nearly universal patterns of decline 
and stagnation that prevailed during the first three decades 
following World War II. 
In fact, the downtown and neighborhood rebuilding cur­
rently taking place in American cities are parts of the same 
process. The growth of employment in corporate management, 
business services, and tourism/entertainment has created a rap­
idly expanding demand for near-downtown residences. The 
impact of these economic and occupational shifts would not 
have been as great without the change in consumer preferences 
evident among young urban professionals, many of whom have 
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decided against settling in the suburbs where they grew up. 
Nonetheless, were members of this generation not in a position 
to find city neighborhoods attractive because of the location of 
their jobs, there would be far less gentrification today. 
These visible signs of neighborhood vitality are part of a 
larger picture that is more ambiguous. The vast majority of 
big-city neighborhoods are not gentrifying; and in gentrifying 
neighborhoods themselves, the tendency to segment space and 
reduce the likelihood of surprise, tolerance, innovation, and 
participation is discernible. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of orthodox explana­
tions of neighborhood change and notes how recent research 
has amended the paradigmatic invasion/succession model. Fol­
lowing this general discussion of neighborhood change are case 
studies of two neighborhoods in Chicago, Lincoln Park and East 
Garfield Park, whose contrasting paths during the post-World 
War II period underline the important general factors explaining 
differential routes of neighborhood change. Their stories also 
represent alternative routes to neighborhood segmentation. Where­
as the physical and social isolation of contemporary East Gar­
field Park conforms to a pattern that has been analyzed in the 
extensive literature on slum neighborhoods, the segmentation 
characteristic of gentrifying neighborhoods such as Lincoln Park 
is not widely recognized. This is the subject of the chapter's 
concluding section. 
POST-WORLD WAR II NEIGHBORHOOD 
CHANGE AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
In the years following the end of World War II, the deconcentra­
tion of metropolitan areas, which had begun in some cities in 
the nineteenth century but was slowed by the Great Depression 
and the war, resumed. Central-city population figures leveled 
and in some cases began to decline, while on the edge of the city 
suburban population growth exploded.' This larger process set 
in motion a parallel pattern of inner-city neighborhood decline, 
as local populations turned over and physical decay of the 
housing stock accelerated. 
For the residents of many big-city neighborhoods, and for 
51 Neighborhood or Enclave? 
1 LINCOLN PARK 
2 EAST GARFIELD PARK 
Chicago, Lincoln Park, and East Garfield Park 
some academic urban-affairs experts, postwar neighborhood 
decline was a terrifying new phenomenon. A research team 
examining neighborhood change in St. Louis described this 
attitude in the following terms: "The shock of these huge shifts 
in the socio-economic character of the city population and their 
devastating impact on neighborhoods has understandably been 
difficult for many to assimilate. They have perceived the phe­
nomenon as a strange new visitation of the times, as bewildering 
as it has been dismaying."2 
Many observers concluded that the, neighborhood turnover 
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visible in so many American cities was a magnified expression 
of the invasion/succession model of neighborhood change de­
veloped by Chicago School sociologists early in the twentieth 
century.3 The invasion/succession model was one of the princi­
pal elements of the human ecology approach to urban life. In 
this account of urban development, the land-use pattern of 
modern cities typically included a dense core devoted to com­
merce, business, and some residence. A "zone of transition" 
adjoined the core, in which older, run-down, and inexpensive 
housing served as a port of entry for new immigrant groups. 
However, housing in the zone of transition was constantly under 
siege by businesses expanding their overcrowded core-area op­
erations. This competition for space tended to hold down hous­
ing maintenance and rents in the zone of transition, but business 
encroachment also tended to propel residents into the neighbor­
hoods beyond. Outside the zone of transition was a series of 
neighborhood areas, with resident affluence and housing-stock 
quality increasing as one moved to the periphery. 
As time passed, observers of urban real estate began to note 
exceptions to this "concentric zone" model of land use. For 
example, in the 1930s Homer Hoyt proposed that neighborhood 
residential development occupied distinguishable "sectors" that 
were aligned along transportation paths radiating from the urban 
core.4 However, most students of urban neighborhoods re­
mained of one mind regarding invasion and succession. Thus, 
Hoyt, who proposed the sectoral model of urban residential land 
use as an alternative to the concentric zone model, also observed: 
"Occupants of houses in the low rent categories tend to move out 
in bands from the center of the city mainly by filtering up into 
houses left behind by the high income groups, or by erecting 
shacks on the periphery of the city."5 This is the essence of the 
invasion/succession model. Different population groups com­
pete for space within the city, and within particular locales 
lower-status, less-established groups tend to replace groups with 
the wherewithal to relocate in newer, higher-quality housing. 
This formulation of invasion/succession describes an ongo­
ing process that is not inherently threatening to neighborhood 
residents. Indeed, housing analysts inferred from the invasion/ 
succession model a related concept, filtering, whose connota­
tion was quite positive. As economically successful families 
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sought larger and higher-quality residences on the periphery of 
the city, their relocation from older neighborhoods "freed up" 
usable housing for newly arrived lower-income groups.6 
Nonetheless, in the context of post-World War II neighbor­
hood decline, invasion/succession was not a comforting con­
cept. The movement of affluent white residents from inner-city 
neighborhoods was called "white flight" and linked to the rhym­
ing notion of "urban blight." In particular, as hundreds of thou­
sands of southern blacks immigrated to cities such as Washing­
ton, D.C., Philadelphia, New York, Detroit, and Chicago—and 
the natural increase of urban black populations exceeded that of 
the white populations—the neighborhood invasion/succession 
model assumed an air of inevitability. Poor blacks poured into 
cities, and the area of their residential neighborhoods expanded. 
Some whites, fearful of the threat of racial turnover, abandoned 
their neighborhoods. As homeowner and landlord confidence 
in such neighborhoods declined, buildings deteriorated, and 
thus low-income minority groups could establish a foothold. 
From this point, racial turnover and further physical decline 
seemed guaranteed. 
These circumstances and expectations formed the context 
in which the urban renewal program was implemented; and 
indeed, in the 1954 revision of the 1949 Housing Act, the 
preservation of threatened housing joined slum clearance as a 
program objective.7 In practice, many neighborhoods were lost 
through urban renewal. In their haste to clear slum areas, local 
governments often demolished socially viable communities whose 
physical appearance offended planners and downtown business 
groups. Herbert Gans's study of Boston's West End, The Urban 
Villagers, reported one of the clearest examples of this circum­
stance. A physically decrepit area on the back side of Boston's 
Beacon Hill, the West End, nonetheless provided a congenial 
residential environment for a longstanding, mainly Italian-Amer­
ican community. However, because it was located so close to the 
core of the city, which was the focus of early urban renewal in 
Boston, and was damned by narrow streets and shabby building 
facades, the West End was classified as a slum and demolished.8 
Urban renewal also demolished more housing units than it 
built, and, as a rule, newly built housing was too expensive for 
neighborhood incumbents.9 The resulting residential disloca­
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tion accelerated decay in adjoining neighborhoods as dislocated 
residents of renewal areas squeezed into whatever housing was 
available. Probably the most egregious failing of local redevel­
opment authorities was their inability or unwillingness to pro­
vide assistance for individuals unhoused by urban renewal.10 
Finally, as Jane Jacobs observed in the late 1950s, the type of 
residential environment that was characteristic of urban renewal 
projects worked very poorly as urban "tissue." Physically iso­
lated highrise apartment complexes provided very anonymous 
environments for their residents, and they did little to enhance 
street life in adjoining areas.'' Indeed, the substantial residential 
dislocation that preceded construction of the bigger urban re­
newal projects often added to overcrowding in the areas adjoin­
ing these sites. 
Yet even during the era of what seemed to be universal 
neighborhood decline, and despite the ineffectiveness of the 
public policy prescribed to remedy that decline, acute observers 
of American cities found exceptions to the general trend. For 
instance, sociologist Walter Firey noted that some neighbor­
hoods were the object of emotional attachments that worked to 
preserve property values and residential incumbency. Beacon 
Hill was an example of such an area: "Associated with this 
persistence of the Hill's reputation is the existence of certain 
spatially referred values that are shared by residents of the 
neighborhood. These values, articulated in and symbolized by 
Beacon Hill, seem to be a genuine attractive force to certain old 
families of Boston."12 
There were also instances of less-distinguished neighbor­
hoods that managed to arrest decay. Jane Jacobs, by way of her 
concept of "unslumming,' offered examples in The Death and 
Life of Great American Cities of two neighborhoods that re­
versed their declining fortunes in the years after World War II. 
In the first case, Boston's North End (which, like the West End, 
was a central-area neighborhood with a predominantly Italian-
American population), housing rehabilitation was accomplished 
by individual homeowners who shared skills and tools with their 
neighbors.l3 Although the term was not yet invented, this was a 
harbinger of what is now called sweat equity. 
In the second instance of unslumming, Jacobs discussed 
how the Back-of-the-Yards Neighborhood Council (BYNC) in 
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Chicago organized residents into a political force that could 
pressure local politicians.1"1 Unlike the more or less informal 
unslumming that had occurred in the North End, the BYNC used 
organizational power to win resources for its community. In the 
years since the founding of the BYNC, which was one of Saul 
Alinsky's pioneering projects, the organizational approach to 
neighborhood preservation has been widely adopted.15 
More-recent academic research has added some nuances to 
these accounts of neighborhood revitalization, although many 
of the substantive processes are quite in line with Firey's and 
Jacobs's descriptions. In a study of five neighborhoods in St. 
Louis, Sandra Perlman Schoenberg and Patricia L. Rosenbaum 
found that one local area, the Hill, had sustained a high degree 
of continuity in recent decades. As in Boston's North End, 
community leaders in the Hill capitalized on ethnic ties, and in 
particular on a network of organizations that adopted preser­
vationist agendas. Schoenberg and Rosenbaum emphasize the 
latter circumstance because it has allowed the Hill to bring into 
the neighborhood resources, such as funds to support housing 
rehabilitation, that are essential for local stabilization.16 In a 
sense, their analysis of the Hill fuses the factors noted by Jacobs 
in the North End and the Back-of-the-Yards. 
Quite different chains of events and causality mark the evo­
lution of Lafayette Park. Lafayette Park, the first St. Louis neigh­
borhood to achieve national historic district status, is a charac­
teristic example of gentrification. Young, affluent purchasers of 
the area's grand old homes invested substantial sums of money 
in renovation, and these incoming gentrifiers ultimately replaced 
a much poorer incumbent population.17 Of course, the gentri­
fication of Lafayette Park is a story that has been played out in 
many cities since the early 1970s. 
In a study of eight Chicago neighborhoods in the late 1970s, 
three University of Chicago researchers, Richard P. Taub, 
D. Garth Taylor, and Jan D. Dunham, also sought to identify the 
crucial factors affecting neighborhood change and stability. Their 
assessment of why some neighborhoods achieved greater stabil­
ity than others turned, in large part, on an argument quite at odds 
with the old ecological model—but not inconsistent with some 
of the observations we have discussed. Taub, Taylor, and Dun­
ham placed special emphasis on the behavior of "corporate 
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actors," entities such as banks or savings and loan associations 
and local institutions such as universities, hospitals, and large-
scale businesses. When these corporate actors invest in commu­
nities, whether by adding to their own facilities, or, in the case 
of lending institutions, by financing home purchases and im­
provements, neighborhoods can hold residents and maintain 
housing quality. When such corporate actors are not present in 
or abandon neighborhoods, physical decline and resident turn­
over are more likely.18 
Also in the late 1970s, planning scholar Philip Clay surveyed 
officials and agencies in thirty cities in reference to local efforts 
at neighborhood rejuvenation. From his research, Clay identi­
fied two processes of neighborhood revitalization: gentrifica­
tion and incumbent upgrading. The first and more-familiar term 
describes the process of affluent newcomers purchasing old but 
aesthetically or historically significant structures, renovating 
them, and in the end physically transforming a neighborhood.19 
This transformation usually means that incumbent populations 
must relocate. 
The second process that Clay identified, incumbent upgrad­
ing, usually occurs in neighborhoods that are less physically and 
locationally attractive than gentrifying areas and that have been 
preserved by long-term residents. Demographically, upgraders 
can be distinguished from gentrifiers: they tend to be older and 
less affluent and to have larger families.20 Had Clay toured the 
North End with Jane Jacobs in the late 1950s, he would have 
observed a characteristic case of incumbent upgrading. 
By the 1980s, observation and research in residential neigh­
borhoods around the country had brought to light many ex­
ceptions to the invasion/succession model of neighborhood 
change. Some researchers and many neighborhood activists 
propose that organization building is an essential technique for 
stabilizing communities and avoiding physical decline. Others, 
sharing the general perspective offered by Taub, Taylor, and 
Dunham, argue that access to outside resources distinguishes 
"successful" from "unsuccessful" neighborhoods. However, rel­
atively little attention has been devoted to discussing what kinds 
of neighborhoods are most able to build organizations and 
attract outside resources. Nor have many observers questioned 
the presumed "goodness" of the more common of Clay's two 
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types of neighborhood renewal, gentrification. Community ac­
tivists and some social scientists have sought to draw attention 
to the displacement of lower-status groups as neighborhoods 
gentrify, but there is little commentary on the kind of physical 
environment that is characteristic of gentrifying areas and how 
this physical environment may shape their local social systems. 
In the next section of this chapter we look at the contrasting 
post-World War II evolution of two Chicago neighborhoods, 
Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park, as a means of illuminating 
these issues. 
LINCOLN PARK AND EAST GARFIELD PARK 
In some ways, Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park21 are quite 
comparable. Both neighborhoods took shape in the half-
century following the great Chicago Fire of 1871, when the city's 
stupendous growth was one of the wonders of the western 
world. In part because of the coincidence of their physical 
development, their housing stocks also reveal some similarities. 
In each community, along the principal streets one observes a 
significant number of the large, heavily ornamented, stone-
fronted mansions that were favored by prosperous Chicago 
families at the turn of the century. On the side streets are the 
narrow brick rowhouses and frame "Chicago cottages" that were 
built by less-distinguished residents. "Six-flats" and some larger 
apartment houses are found on many corner lots. 
Although any long-time Chicagoan would be quick to dis­
tinguish between Lincoln Park as a North Side and East Garfield 
Park as a West Side neighborhood, in fact the two neighbor­
hoods are situated rather similarly in relation to the city's down­
town core, the Loop. Lincoln Park covers an area extending west 
from the shore of Lake Michigan. The neighborhood's southern 
boundary is about three miles north of the Loop. East Garfield 
Park is a similar distance from the Loop, but directly to the west; 
two of its important thoroughfares, Washington Boulevard and 
Madison Street, are also major downtown streets. Both neigh­
borhoods are named for large public parks. Lincoln Park, paral­
leling the shore of Lake Michigan, forms the entire eastern 
boundary of its neighborhood namesake. Garfield Park forms 
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Table 3-1 
Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park in 1940 
LP EGP 
% of the work force in clerical, craft, 
operative, or service positions* 
75.0 77.7 
median school years completed by those
25 years of age or above 
8.5 8.3 
% single-family dwellings 6.1 7.0 
% owner-occupied dwellings 12.7 15.3 
% dwelling units built before 1920 79.2 86.6 
'the four largest occupational categories in each community 
Source: Local Community Fact Book of Chicago, Louis Wirth and Eleanor H. 
Bernet, eds. (University of Chicago, 1949). 
the western boundary of the neighborhood of East Garfield 
Park. 
As table 3-1 indicates, a half-century ago the similarities 
between Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park included social as 
well as physical and locational characteristics. The occupational 
structures of the two communities were comparable, as were 
the educational levels of their populations. Although most hous­
ing in both communities was multiunit, somewhat more than 
10 percent of the dwellings in each was owner occupied. How­
ever, since the 1940s the paths of Lincoln Park and East Garfield 
Park have diverged. The purpose of looking at this particular pair 
of neighborhoods is to highlight the sources of these divergent 
paths. 
Lincoln Park was initially settled in the middle of the nine­
teenth century, and for some time afterward maintained a rather 
pastoral character. Lying north of the Chicago River, the com­
munity was isolated from the remainder of the city. Indeed, 
truck farming was a principal activity of its Irish, Scottish, and 
German immigrant population. In 1871 the Chicago Fire de­
stroyed most of the community's housing, but rebuilding pro­
ceeded quickly. The western margin of the neighborhood is 
formed by the north branch of the Chicago River, and in the latter 
decades of the century factories located beside the river. The 
housing built for the work force of this factory district was 
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3 DIVERSEV HARBOR 
4 NORTH POND 
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8 COLUMBUS HOSPITAL 
9 GRANT HOSPITAL Lincoln Park 10 AUGUSTANA HOSPITAL 
consistent with previous construction; however, the composi­
tion of the residents was different. This part of Lincoln Park 
became home to a variety of eastern and southern European 
immigrant groups. 
By 1889 the entirety of present-day Lincoln Park was within 
the corporate limits of Chicago, and after the turn of the century 
there was relatively little new construction in the community. 
There were some exceptions, such as the expansion of the 
industrial facilities in western Lincoln Park. Also, between the 
two World Wars a row of imposing ten- to fifteen-story apart­
ment buildings took their place at the eastern edge of the neigh­
borhood, overlooking the park and Lake Michigan. 
At this point Lincoln Park had assumed the physical charac­
ter that it sustains to this day. The most-affluent areas of the 
community formed a band along the lakefront, with the apart­
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ment towers overlooking the lake giving way to blocks of single-
family dwellings and smaller apartment buildings. Housing qual­
ity declined as one moved from the lakefront to the north branch 
of the river, and increasingly one encountered small manufactur­
ers and warehouses amid mainly residential blocks. West of 
Clybourn Avenue, industry predominated. 
In 1940, when the census reported Lincoln Park's popula­
tion at just over 100,000, a quarter of the population was still 
foreign born. Following World War II, the neighborhood's pop­
ulation declined substantially: to 88,836 in I960; to 57,146 in 
1980. At the southern end of the community, blacks began to 
replace whites, and by 1970 a more widely distributed Hispanic 
population approached 10,000.22 
Following World War II, a number of neighborhood organi­
zations appeared in Lincoln Park, most notably the Lincoln Park 
Conservation Association (LPCA), which was constituted in March 
1954. Initially formed by several private institutions and two 
existing neighborhood organizations, the LPCA ultimately spoke 
for seven neighborhood groups covering most of the Lincoln 
Park area. Reacting to signs of the community's physical decline, 
such as the large number of substandard dwelling units, through­
out the late 1950s and the 1960s the LPCA and its constituent 
groups were insistent proponents of neighborhood improve­
ment.23 The city of Chicago began planning for a Lincoln Park 
urban renewal program in 1956. In 1962 it published the "Lin­
coln Park General Neighborhood Renewal Plan," which pro­
posed the clearance of 2,000 structures as well as an aggressive 
program of building rehabilitation. The plan also envisaged the 
expansion of several local institutions, including DePaul Univer­
sity and a number of hospitals.24 In the years that followed, the 
city worked closely with the LPCA, which provided most of the 
members of the local urban renewal board, the Lincoln Park 
Community Conservation Council. 
Urban renewal cleared a broad swath of territory along 
North Avenue, the southern border of the neighborhood, and by 
the mid-1960s observers of Chicago already were calling Lin­
coln Park a neighborhood "on the way back."25 Yet probably 
more important than slum clearance in yielding this quick turn­
around were the efforts of the local neighborhood organizations 
to promote building rehabilitation and, in turn, the work of 
 61 Neighborhood or Enclave?
thousands of rehabbers. The LPCA's constituent groups trum­
peted the charms of their local areas through neighborhood 
fairs, garden walks, and housing tours. By the 1970s two LPCA-
affiliated neighborhood organizations, the Old Town Triangle 
Association and the Mid-North Association, had portions of their 
territories declared historical districts, thus providing tax advan­
tages for rehabbers. The LPCA itself sponsored workshops on 
rehabilitating structures, offered annual prizes for the best build­
ing renovations, and in the late 1950s and 1960s shamed build­
ing code "infractors" by publishing their names and properties 
in its newsletter.26 
In fact, in the early 1960s investment in Lincoln Park was 
occurring at such a pace that the LPCA and city planners were 
concerned that new development threatened to render the Gen­
eral Neighborhood Renewal Plan obsolete before its final ap­
proval. In 1963 one of the planners working in Lincoln Park 
commented: "Lincoln Park is unique. In any other area, a dilap­
idated building will almost certainly get worse. But in Lincoln 
Park very often someone buys and rehabilitates it almost before 
you can drive past again."27 
Major developers certainly retained their faith in the neigh­
borhood. In the 1960s a second generation of much larger 
highrise apartment buildings joined the lakefront skyline. Just 
south of Lincoln Park, and adjoining the prestigious Gold Coast 
area, developer Arthur Rubloff bought an urban renewal site 
and built the huge Carl Sandburg Village housing complex.28 By 
the 1970s smaller developers were building in-fill apartments 
and condominiums in the previously suspect blocks well west 
of the lakefront. 
The gentrification of Lincoln Park has progressed so far 
that short-term residents are often unaware that at one time the 
"turnaround" was uncertain, and that there was resistance to 
the urban renewal effort. Like many other neighborhoods in 
Chicago, in April 1968 Lincoln Park was touched by the rioting 
that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Resi­
dents who recall the street disturbances in the vicinity of 
Waller High School also note their sense of uncertainty as to 
whether they should remain in the neighborhood. At about 
the same time, representatives of the black community at 
the southern end of the neighborhood were seeking to stop 
Lincoln Park 
Industrial building renovated for residential use 
Award-winning new home 
Historicist new construction— 
featuring private alleyway and off-street garages 
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building demolitions authorized by the community conserva­
tion council.29 
In general, though, the gentrification of Lincoln Park did 
proceed in a remarkably expeditious fashion. In its wake, the 
neighborhood's minority population declined substantially, and 
by 1980 the median value of owner-occupied houses was $123,700, 
well in excess of the citywide figure of $47,200.30 Whereas 
neighborhood conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s turned on issues 
such as the maintenance practices of landlords, urban renewal-
authorized displacement of minority residents, and the unre­
sponsiveness of city politicians, in the 1980s a new set of issues 
emerged. Homeowners in areas adjoining some of Lincoln Park's 
busy commercial districts complained of rowdiness by bar pa­
trons. At the eastern end of the neighborhood, highrise apart­
ment construction and commercial development had produced 
so much traffic congestion that a movement to forestall future 
high-density construction sought to "downzone" lower-density 
blocks in the vicinity of the lakefront. To the west along Cly­
bourn Avenue, developers sought to convert old factories and 
warehouses to residential use. Some manufacturers, fearful of 
rising property tax assessments and complaints from adjoining 
residential neighbors, supported the establishment of a planned 
manufacturing district.31 
Although the area that would become East Garfield Park was 
within the Chicago city limits before the complete annexation 
of Lincoln Park, the development of this neighborhood pro­
ceeded more slowly. The creation of the large public park on the 
western edge of the community produced some real estate 
speculation in the 1870s, and at this time a horse-drawn trolley 
line ran from the downtown. However, substantial building in 
this neighborhood awaited two transportation-related develop­
ments. At the end of the nineteenth century, commuter rail 
service to the Loop was improved, and the convergence of 
several long-haul rail lines within the neighborhood yielded the 
construction of an adjacent cluster of manufacturing facilities. In 
the years before World War I, Irish and German immigrants were 
the most numerous population groups. After the war, East Gar­
field Park became a point of settlement for Italian and Russian 
Jewish immigrants. 
Residential construction in East Garfield Park came to a halt 
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after the 1920s, and for much of the 1930s and 1940s this was a 
relatively stable community of single-family homes, apartment 
buildings, and, at the northern end, manufacturers. In 1940, 
the point when East Garfield Park's physical and social charac­
ter bore substantial resemblance to Lincoln Park's, the black 
proportion of the population was 4.5 percent. By 1950 this 
figure had increased to 16.7 percent, and in the subsequent decade 
blacks became the majority population group in East Garfield 
Park.32 
A number of factors account for the sudden postwar popu­
lation shift in East Garfield Park. Before World War II, Chicago's 
black population was concentrated on the near South Side, but 
following the war the geographic reach of black residence in­
66 Neighborhood or Enclave? 
creased dramatically.33 In part, this was due to the housing 
pressures created by the wartime immigration of southern blacks; 
but as historian Arnold Hirsch demonstrated in Making the 
Second Ghetto, central area redevelopment also pushed blacks 
outside the prewar "Black Belt."34 
East Garfield Park was in the line of black movement into the 
West Side of the city. By I960 less than 40 percent of the 
residents of East Garfield and three adjoining communities (the 
near West Side, North Lawndale, and South Lawndale) had lived 
in the same housing unit five years previously. Moreover, in each 
of these areas 5 percent or more of the 1960 residents had lived 
in a southern state five years previously.35 
During this period extensive building demolition occurred 
in East Garfield Park and the surrounding communities. In the 
northeastern corner of the neighborhood, space was cleared to 
make way for commercial and industrial development. At the 
southern end of the community, the right-of-way for the Eisen­
hower Expressway took space that had been devoted to hous­
ing. In addition, neighborhood residents complained of irre­
sponsible landlords who allowed buildings to deteriorate before 
abandoning them or, in some cases, having them torched.36 In 
1950, East Garfield Park's population had peaked at 70,091; by 
1980 it was a mere 31.580.37 But in contrast to Lincoln Park, 
where depopulation occurred without a substantial loss of hous­
ing units (37,538 in I960; 35,315 in 1980), in East Garfield Park 
housing was lost at about the same rate as the decrease of 
residents. In I960 there were 20,353 housing units; in 1980 
there were only 10,933.38 
As in Lincoln Park, postwar changes in East Garfield Park led 
to substantial organizational mobilization. In 1947 the Midwest 
Community Council (MCC) was founded, and by the late 1950s 
the council had approximately fifty block clubs affiliated with 
it. Over the years the MCC has focused community attention on 
such local problems as youth crime and has pressured city 
government to provide better services. In the past decade the 
MCC has shifted emphasis to a degree by seeking corporate 
financial assistance for local economic development initiatives.39 
Another important neighborhood organization is Fifth City, which 
since its initiation in 1962 has organized a series of social service 
and economic development enterprises. Among these are a pre­
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Table 3-2 
Estimated Cost of All Building Permits: 
Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park 
LP EGP 
1968 $19,717,052 $2,637,731 
1969 18,049,314 710,943 
1970 17,720,418 1,146,712 
1971 55,885,989 3,262,205 
1972 36,689,983 2,117,286 
Source: City of Chicago, Department of Buildings, "Summary of Work Classifica­
tion Permits," 1968-1972. 
school, job-training and building rehabilitation programs, and 
an auto repair center.40 
In short, East Garfield Park's transition elicited a consider­
able organizational response. However, this organizational mo­
bilization was not able to counter economic disinvestment in the 
community. During the 1950s and 1960s lending institutions 
redlined East Garfield Park. As a consequence, many current 
homeowners in the neighborhood bought their houses by "con­
tract"; that is, through monthly payments on a high-interest loan 
in which equity was transferred only at the point of full payment 
of principal and interest. 
Table 3-2 compares investment figures for East Garfield Park 
and Lincoln Park during a key period in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, and gives some idea of the degree of capital starvation 
experienced in the former community. It should be noted that 
the population and number of housing units are larger in Lincoln 
Park, but this numerical disparity does not account for the huge 
excess of building investment in Lincoln Park. 
These years are critical in the evolution of East Garfield Park, 
because most observers agree that the neighborhood's greatest 
trauma can be traced to a specific date in 1968—April 5. On that 
Friday evening, the West Side of Chicago exploded in reaction 
to the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and at the center 
of that explosion were the adjoining neighborhoods of East 
Garfield Park and North Lawndale. Madison Street, the principal 
commercial avenue in East Garfield Park, went up in flames on 
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the evening of April 5,1968.41 Twenty years later, there has been 
no rebuilding along several stretches of Madison Street. In the 
aftermath of the West Side riots, most of the neighborhood's 
remaining white residents and businesspersons left East Garfield 
Park. The economic effect of the riot is registered quite dramat­
ically in table 3-2. In 1969 building permits were issued for 
about 2 5 percent of the value of the already low 1968 investment 
figure. 
By 1970 East Garfield Park was 98 percent black.42 More­
over, the community had become home to thousands of unem­
ployed and poor people. In 1980, 30 percent of the families 
reported incomes below $ 5,000 per year; the annual incomes of 
43 percent of the population fell below the poverty line.43 
Physically, East Garfield Park has become a neighborhood of 
old, poorly maintained buildings punctuated by large open 
spaces where uncut grass and weeds invade the broken side­
walks. There are, scattered throughout the neighborhood, iso­
lated blocks in which buildings and yards are well tended. The 
residents of these blocks often are active in block clubs and feel 
quite a proprietary interest in the larger neighborhood. They 
wish for development in the blocks decimated by urban renewal 
or the 1968 riots. They also speak derisively of the landlords 
who have allowed their apartment buildings to deteriorate, and 
of the police, who seem to do nothing to stop the prostitution 
and drug dealing on the sidewalks in front of these buildings. 
In the 1980s East Garfield Park has experienced a few signs of 
economic rejuvenation. The city opened a large bus-maintenance 
facility at the eastern edge of the community, and to the south 
Bethany Hospital carried out a substantial expansion. In 1982 a 
local development corporation collaborated with the state of 
Illinois and used federal funding to open Ike Sims Village, a well-
designed and maintained senior citizens' complex that faces 
Garfield Park on the western border of the neighborhood. There 
are even a few signs of gentrification by black professionals 
attracted by East Garfield Park's location, low real estate prices, 
and remaining turn-of-the-century mansions.44 In 1987 the 
neighborhood's leaders confronted a new issue: the likely effects 
of a proposed football stadium housing the Chicago Bears NFL 
franchise, whose sponsors sought to locate it just to the east of 
East Garfield Park. Supporters of the stadium pointed to its 
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potential for generating jobs and, possibly, some housing devel­
opment. Opponents wondered if the new stadium would yield 
anything other than residential dislocation and Sunday after­
noon traffic congestion.45 
NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION: 
SOURCES AND IMPLICATIONS 
Since the mid-1970s, neighborhood revitalization has taken its 
place among the important subjects of urban affairs research. 
Observers of American cities have offered a variety of explana­
tions for what at one time appeared to be a most unlikely trend. 
Some observers have emphasized very broad-scale factors, such 
as the restructuring of urban economies and shifts in taste among 
young professional urban residents. For a time, early in the 
observation of gentrification, such environmental factors as the 
aesthetic quality of housing and the location of neighborhoods 
experiencing new investment were given considerable atten­
tion. More recent commentators often have turned to "political 
economic" explanations, notably organization building and ac­
cess to outside resources.46 
In practice, varying combinations of all of these factors have 
influenced the course of gentrification and incumbent upgrad­
ing in particular neighborhoods. From our recounting of the 
recent evolution of Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park we 
cannot infer a general model of neighborhood revitalization— 
indeed, no such general model is likely to exist—but we can 
discuss some of the significant connections, or lack of connec­
tion, among these factors. 
For example, the gentrification of Lincoln Park, and more 
recently other North Side neighborhoods in Chicago, has oc­
curred in the midst of a substantial restructuring of Chicago's 
economy. This restructuring has assumed a familiar shape, as 
manufacturing firms and employment have declined even as 
substantial downtown investment has created new jobs in 
corporate management, business services, and travel/tourism/ 
entertainment.47 Moreover, a casual observation of Lincoln 
Park reveals the physical expansion of gentrifying areas, the 
appearance of hardware stores catering to rehabbers, and the 
East Garfield Park 
Signs of gentrification 
One of the neighborhood's many decimated blocks 
Tidy 3600 block of West Walnut and its block association rules 
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mushrooming of upscale restaurants, boutiques, and health 
clubs, providing evidence of the new taste for urban living noted 
by observers such as Sharon Zukin. 
However, these conditions do not produce gentrification in 
all available neighborhoods, and, of course, they have little to do 
with incumbent upgrading. In East Garfield Park, which is very 
near the Loop and has many solid old homes available at very 
low prices, there has been only limited gentrification. The rea­
son is fairly obvious: though close to the downtown, this neigh­
borhood is also on the "other" side of the racial divide and thus 
quite unattractive to many prospective gentrifiers. Indeed, for 
many black professionals interested in central-city living, East 
Garfield Park can be just as unattractive as for whites—if it 
happens that these individuals seek a racially mixed residential 
environment. 
The absence of gentrification in East Garfield Park is thus 
also related to environmental factors. As a site for gentrification, 
Lincoln Park's particular locational advantage over East Garfield 
Park was its proximity to a longstanding upper-income enclave, 
the Gold Coast. This meant that early rehabbers could search 
for promising inexpensive properties in an area not so distant 
from a demonstrably "solid" residential neighborhood. As for 
realtors, they were able to sell Lincoln Park as a neighborhood 
"on the way up" by characterizing it as the natural extension of 
a locale that had always been "up." 
At least until the 1968 riots in Chicago, some intrepid rehab­
bers or very aspiring realtors might have moved into East Gar­
field Park—trumpeting the beauty of its adjoining public park, 
noting its coupling of cheap and architecturally distinguished 
houses, and pointing to the downtown skyline rising close by to 
the east. Promoting areas that are isolated from a city's existing 
centers of residential investment is not impossible, though it is 
uncommon. In fact, from the 1960s most rehabbers and realtors 
looking for opportunities to gentrify or to profit from gentrifica­
tion in Chicago took the more conservative course, which was 
to look to near North Side neighborhoods such as Lincoln Park. 
What hindsight may characterize as the conservative course 
of action—to rehabilitate and trade real estate in an environ­
mentally attractive area that also adjoined existing prestigious 
areas—at the time, to many gentrifiers, did not seem so conser­
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vative. Indeed, the pioneering gentrifiers of Lincoln Park did not 
simply fix old houses, they modified these structures with an 
eye to, among other things, maximizing personal safety. Re­
habbed homes and newly built single-family structures and 
apartment buildings typically included such security precau­
tions as electronic entrance and alarm systems; iron gates, fences, 
and window grates; and attached garages. As gentrification ad­
vanced, the very cautious building designs of the 1960s gave way 
to lower fences, more windows, and greater accessibility to the 
street; but developers of large condominium complexes still use 
security systems as a primary tool in advertising their properties. 
Even close observers of Lincoln Park seldom note this subtle 
modernization of a "historic1' neighborhood, but we shall return 
to discuss how this physical redesign affects the social character 
of the area. 
Just as architectural and locational factors interact in rather 
complicated ways, so do the political and economic factors of 
organizational development and resource access. If one views 
the activation of political resources as simply a matter of the 
degree of mobilization, there is little to distinguish Lincoln Park 
from East Garfield Park. In both neighborhoods, the years fol­
lowing World War II brought the appearance of a wide array of 
community organizations. However, neighborhood organiza­
tions in Lincoln Park managed to work more congenially with 
city officials than did those in East Garfield Park, their indig­
enous resource bases were greater, and their community re­
ceived substantial infusions of external resources—most nota­
bly, capital. 
The different paths of the two neighborhoods lead to an 
obvious question: could organizations in East Garfield Park have 
done better? Possibly organization leaders could have set and 
achieved objectives more effectively. Some current East Garfield 
Park leaders suggest that community groups in the 1960s were 
overly confrontational in dealing with city leaders and private 
firms. Nonetheless, when one considers the degree of change 
occurring in the community, the relative poverty of the incom­
ing population, the consequences of redlining, and the dearth 
of local "corporate actors," one is hard-pressed to conclude that 
more effective organization would have yielded a substantially 
different East Garfield Park in the mid-1980s. 
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The contrasting stories of Lincoln Park and East Garfield 
Park suggest that organization building in itself is unlikely to 
slow neighborhood decline. However, when organizational de­
velopment is able to mobilize and "import" resources, it can 
make a difference. Yet contrary to the usual assumption of 
causality, access to resources—via institutional commitments to 
maintain or expand facilities, lending by banks, or the personal 
wealth of neighborhood newcomers—is more likely to be the 
antecedent than the result of organization building. In other 
words, neighborhood organizations that successfully promote 
local revitalization are located in areas that otherwise have ac­
cess to resources. Certainly, the resource disparity between 
Lincoln Park and East Garfield Park has been monumental, and 
the relative availability of resources has played a large part in 
determining the character of organizational mobilization in each 
neighborhood. 
From the foregoing discussion of why Lincoln Park gentri­
fied while East Garfield Park experienced neither gentrification 
nor upgrading, one might suppose that we have traced a simple 
contrast of neighborhood success versus neighborhood failure. 
East Garfield Park is indeed a troubled community. Located a 
mere two miles from Chicago's imposing downtown, the neigh­
borhood's abandoned buildings and vacant lots cry out for even 
a trickle of investment. Meanwhile, a sizable share of the local 
population suffers from the array of social ailments that charac­
terize slum neighborhoods across the country. However, Lincoln 
Park is in some important ways less of a success story than its 
boosters and local realtors would have one believe. 
The gentrification of Lincoln Park has changed the character 
of the community in subtle ways that can be defined, in part, by 
considering the evolution of land-use and development disputes 
over a thirty-year period. During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
underlying issue of public debate over development was the fate 
of the local minority population: would the black and Hispanic 
population continue to increase? As an element in the neigh­
borhood's political discourse, the racial issue was raised through 
competing views of how urban renewal sites should be dis­
posed. Representatives of the minority population called for the 
construction of subsidized housing; members of the urban re­
newal board favored the sale of sites to private developers.48 As 
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a rule, private developers built for Lincoln Park's more affluent 
incoming population. 
During the 1970s Lincoln Park was secured for gentrifica­
tion, but the disputes over physical development continued. 
However, the subjects of debate shifted considerably. For exam­
ple, some of the homeowners on the side streets that adjoin the 
neighborhood's several entertainment districts sought to restrict 
commercial development. Along the lakefront, residents—in­
cluding some who themselves lived in highrises—sought to 
downzone adjoining areas to prevent future high-density devel­
opment. On the western edge of the community, residential 
developers sought to move into the manufacturing area along 
the north branch of the Chicago River. 
As in other gentrifying areas, these disputes were bound to 
more fundamental disagreements over the appropriate uses of 
public space and different individuals' and groups' tolerance of 
social and physical diversity. In general, newcomers to Lincoln 
Park, again like gentrifiers in other cities, attach great importance 
to the isolation of private spaces in and around the home and 
disapprove of public socializing, which they feel often turns to 
rowdiness.49 We have already noted that Lincoln Park rehabbers 
and developers have used a variety of physical design techniques 
to separate private and public space. 
Similarly, as gentrification has proceeded, residents increas­
ingly speak of the neighborhood as a "residential community." 
This is in spite of the fact that some part of Lincoln Park's initial 
attraction for gentrifiers was its active nightlife. In addition, the 
neighborhood's restaurants, clubs, and theaters continue to be 
important economic stimuli. Anthropologist Brett Williams, in 
characterizing similar sentiments among gentrifiers in a Wash­
ington, D.C., neighborhood, notes "that if they could they would 
transform Main Street into a different kind of place. "50 In the case 
of Lincoln Park, many gentrifiers would opt for a quieter, less 
diverse neighborhood than the one into which they moved. For 
these individuals, the neighborhood's bustling commercial streets, 
such as Clark Street and Lincoln and Armitage avenues, are too 
close for comfort to their homes and a source of recurring 
irritation. 
The preference for insulated private space and less diverse 
public space is also expressed by recent trends in local commer­
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cial development. As gentrification has spread west in Lincoln 
Park, developers have taken over old industrial and warehouse 
sites for commercial projects, such as shopping centers and 
theater complexes. These sites are desirable in part because 
developers can accede to the growing preference for commer­
cial/residential separation—this in a neighborhood where apart­
ments above storefronts were once commonplace. Within these 
complexes, individual storefronts are located off the neighbor­
hood street system. The proximate reason for isolating stores in 
this fashion is to provide parking. The practical effect is to 
reduce the prospect of these developments knitting themselves 
into the pedestrian network of the surrounding neighborhood. 
In fact, the assumptions regarding land-use segmentation and 
automobile dependence that are revealed by these designs are 
indistinguishable from those employed by suburban shopping 
center developers. 
One subtext to this pattern of evolving land-use disputes, 
characterizations of the neighborhood, and design practice is 
Lincoln Park's emergence as a high-status residential enclave. 
But beyond this fairly obvious trend is a more important devel­
opment. Lincoln Park is defining a new form of high-status, 
homogeneous neighborhood. Not only are poor and most mi­
nority people excluded from residence and shopping, but the 
physical design of the community aims to hamper street life, 
chance encounters, and the opportunities for surprise that are 
characteristic of older neighborhoods. Furthermore, Lincoln 
Park's accommodation to the automobile removes residents 
from the sidewalk in favor of the insulated yet expansive physi­
cal movement usually associated with suburban life. Like the 
downtown megastructures discussed in chapter 2, Lincoln Park 
is in its city without really being a part of its city. 
Three Visions of the 
Prospective American City 
In the preceding two chapters we examined changes in the 
physical environment of American cities. These discussions looked 
at downtowns and neighborhoods, in turn, and in each instance 
we discussed the physical rebuilding of cities as a function of 
and influence upon the social character of cities. However, in 
locating and discussing the sources of urban redesign, we for the 
most part related contextual factors, such as economic transfor­
mations, public policy, and demographic shifts, to the process 
of urban rebuilding. Thus, we connected national and interna­
tional economic restructuring to the redefinition of downtown 
space and neighborhood gentrification. Similarly, urban renewal 
as practiced in the 1950s and 1960s appears in both discussions 
as a factor contributing to later trends in downtown and neigh­
borhood rebuilding. 
In this chapter we approach urban rebuilding from a differ­
ent perspective. Our focus is on the intentions of urban designers 
and the degree to which their designs "fit" the emergent Amer­
ican city. In this analysis, the built form of cities is employed as 
an indicator of social values and, more specifically, of society's 
"vision" of the urban future. The effort to shape the physical 
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form of cities is one of the primary methods of reshaping urban 
society. Through their designs, architects and associated urban 
designers seek to provide physical environments that inspire 
sociability, meet socially defined standards for human shelter, 
and structure the movement of people and products. The pro­
cess of design is seldom, if ever, a straightforward expression of 
designers' intent. To varying degrees sponsors, contractors, and 
even users play a part in shaping thefinal product. Nonetheless, 
if one assumes that the intentions of designers register prevalent 
social values as well as their personal visions and commitments, 
the interpretation of intent as expressed through their work is a 
meaningful enterprise. 
However, urban designers do not necessarily succeed in 
achieving their objectives, so we also inquire as to how inten­
tions, built structures, and human use interact. How well do 
designs conform to the actual needs of urban residents? Are new 
urban designs compatible with evolving patterns of city settle­
ment and the use of public space? This relationship is problem­
atic for a number of reasons. For instance, urban structures 
sometimes fail to have the social effects intended by their design­
ers because inhabitants or visitors impose their own pattern of 
use. William H. Whyte has documented the highly convivial use 
by pedestrians of the Seagram Building plaza in New York City, 
a circumstance that is apparently quite at variance with the 
expectations of the building's architects, Ludwig Mies van der 
Rohe and Philip Johnson.1 In other instances, architects miscon­
strue the physical form that their designs will take. As a rule, 
architects possess an imperfect understanding of the needs of 
their buildings' presumed users, the uses of adjoining structures 
and districts, and even the composition of the population inhab­
iting the neighborhoods in which their structures are located. 
In this chapter we will examine three distinctive "visions'1 
that animate the practice of architects and the associated urban 
design professions. I refer to these three visions as the "city-as­
megaforum," the "city functional," and the "city-as-glass menag­
erie. Each of these visions is observable in the physical struc­
ture of cities around the United States. Although no particular 
city is systematically designed according to any one of these 
visions, they represent three characteristic strategies for order­
ing urban space. The purpose of identifying these visions is not 
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primarily to distinguish among architectural styles, but rather to 
evaluate how designers of the urban environment envision the 
urban order, and how their designs are likely to affect the urban 
order. In other words, how will the structural redefinition of 
urban space interact with and redirect day-to-day use of the city, 
as well as the patterns of economic action, residential settlement, 
and leisure activities? 
THE CITY AS SOCIAL ARTIFACT 
In chapter 1 we noted Jane Jacobs's comment that cities " . are 
settlements where much new work is added to older work and 
that this work multiplies and diversifies. " This characteriza­
tion of the city as the principal location of economic enterprise, 
which is the consistent theme of Jacobs's extensive analysis of 
the dynamics of contemporary cities, is an unobjectionable 
proposition, yet it clearly construes the functional importance 
of cities too narrowly. One might amplify it by stating that the 
built form of cities is the physical container of core social 
processes, such as economic production and distribution, gov­
ernance, and the dissemination of valued cultural artifacts. 
In this sense, a city is a mechanism whose structural com­
ponents are buildings, open space, and pathways. David Har­
vey's neo-Marxian formulation identifies the physical form of 
the city as an important part ofa society's "mode of production. 
In relating mode of production to urban form, Harvey divides 
the concept of mode of production into two components. The 
first is "social relations of production, including the physical 
processes of goods fabrication and service production, the own­
ership and direction of these processes, and such support activ­
ities as public administration, legal practice, banking, real estate 
manipulation, and advertising. This enumeration of activities 
and social relationships summarizes the core economic activi­
ties in any advanced industrial country. Invariably, such socie­
ties are heavily urbanized. 
The second component of mode of production is "social 
reproduction." Here Harvey refers to those activities, products, 
and services that contribute to the perpetuation of society as a 
physical and social entity. The provision of shelter is an impor­
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tant aspect of social reproduction, as well as a longstanding 
urban problem. More generally, urban form's contribution to 
social reproduction may be gauged by considering how a city's 
commercial, industrial, residential, and recreational configura­
tions permit amenable family development, hospitable relations 
among individuals of different ages, genders, ethnicities, and 
social preferences, and the orderly movement of individuals 
through day-to-day activities as well as the life cycle.2 
Harvey's conceptualization can be summarized to suggest 
that the city contains society's primary economic units and 
means of governance (relations of production), and also serves 
to sustain and modify individual, family, and community devel­
opment (social reproduction). Lewis Mumford, though working 
in an intellectual tradition quite different from Harvey's, had 
earlier made a similar distinction: "The city is both a physical 
entity for collective living and a symbol of those collective 
purposes and unanimities that arise under such favoring circum­
stances. Through its concrete, visible command over space 
the city lends itself, not only to the practical offices of produc­
tion, but to the daily communion of its citizens. .. "3 Mumford 
thus augments the identification of productive and reproductive 
functions with a particular emphasis on the symbolic role of the 
city's built form. In essence, the designers of urban space seek 
to communicate a variety of values through urban structure. 
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz's description of a Balinese 
royal palace captures one of the symbolic uses of urban space: 
the puri was itself, in its sheer material form, a sacred 
symbol, a replica of the order it was constructed to symbolize. "4 
The Balinese puri was a structure intended to express the heav­
enly order with which its worldly society identified. Mumford 
has drawn a similar connection in relating the structure of the 
Bernini forecourt to St. Peter's Cathedral to the absolutist phi­
losophy of the Baroque Papacy.5 
In other instances, the form of cities underlies social rela­
tions within society. Architectural historian Manfredo Tafuri's 
interpretation of workers' housing blocks in Weimar Germany 
notes this symbolic function. In Tafuri's view, the functionalist 
architectural elements that would later be assimilated in the 
"international style" were used to extend the factory aesthetic 
directly into the residential environment of the urban working 
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class. The city as a whole was conceptualized as a machine; given 
this principle, the repetitive, blockish apartment complexes 
were integral components of the larger urban order.6 Similarly, 
historian Lauro Martines notes the correlation between aristo­
cratic families' social prominence and the sumptuousness of 
their palazzi in Renaissance Florence, Milan, and Siena.7 This 
interfamilial architectural competition is not so different from 
the efforts by contemporary corporations to build headquarters 
that are more architecturally distinguished or at least bigger than 
those of their competitors. 
Urban form can also symbolize conflict over use of the city. 
In the late 1960s the University of California at Berkeley cleared 
some housing adjacent to campus. While the university contem­
plated how the site might be redeveloped, neighborhood activ­
ists converted the vacant space to what they called the People's 
Park, a symbol of their opposition to the university's expansion 
at the expense of Berkeley's stock of rental housing.8 In the two 
decades since the declaration of the People's Park, dozens of 
examples of urban space as a symbol of social conflict have been 
reported in American, European, and Third World cities.9 
These examples suggest two extensions of the observations 
by Harvey and Mumford. The first, which is salient to Harvey's 
discussion of social relations of production and social reproduc­
tion, is that the physical form of individual cities varies in its 
capacity to structure these functions. In other words, some cities 
are more efficient producers than others; in some cities housing 
or leisure opportunities may be more accessible. Second, and 
not explicitly addressed by either Harvey or Mumford, is the 
prospect of dissonance between functional designs or their 
symbolic content and the response of urban residents. That is, 
the meaning of particular facilities or spaces is not strictly a 
matter of designer-sponsor intention. It is also affected by the 
reactions of users or other urban residents. The evolution of 
People's Park exemplifies this relationship. 
My goal in identifying and describing three basic strategies 
used by urban designers in the United States to organize urban 
space is to explore how applied visions of the city both interact 
with the extant city and seek to shape the future city. Specifically, 
the following sections of the chapter address three lines of 
inquiry. The first grows out of Harvey's concept of social rela­
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tions of production. What understanding of the material process 
of production is expressed by these visions? Relatedly, what 
assumptions regarding the social composition of cities animate 
each of these visions? In effect, how do these visions define the 
contents of the city? 
The city as a communicator of symbolic messages anchors 
the second line of inquiry. How do these visions rationalize the 
urban order and relations among different groups within the 
city? Moreover, through its acknowledgment of the possibility 
of dissonance between message and reaction, the discussion of 
the symbolic content points to the third line of inquiry. How is 
social reproduction specified, and how do different classes of 
people within the city react to these visions? 
These are, of course, large questions that defy any effort to 
provide unqualified answers. However, by applying them to the 
three urban visions defined in the following pages, and by 
considering prevalent trends in local urban economic develop­
ment, patterns in the use of urban public space, and widely 
observed stresses in the social fabric of American cities, one is 
forced to some very uncomfortable realizations. Among these 
are that these three urban visions are not likely to lead to cities 
in which economic opportunity is widely available, street-level, 
face-to-face congeniality is promoted, or fundamental human 
needs, such as access to decent shelter and public services, are 
generally met. 
The City-as-Megaforum 
The city-as-megaforum is a widely applied vision of urban form 
that in the United States is typically associated with monumental 
complexes of public buildings. The most ambitious example of 
the city-as-megaforum is the Mall and its environs in Washing­
ton, D.C. Other important examples are the civic centers in 
Cleveland and San Francisco, whose initial plans were prepared 
by Daniel Burnham's firm, the Benjamin Franklin Parkway in 
Philadelphia, and the Government Center in Boston. 
In midtown Manhattan, Rockefeller Center is the rare exam­
ple of a wholly private development cast as a megaforum. Nev­
ertheless, the special circumstances of its creation—construc­
tion during the Great Depression well away from the center of 
The City-as-Megaforum 
—I1 
Boston City Hall 
Lincoln Center, Manhattan's Upper West Side 
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development in Manhattan, financing by the formidable wealth 
of John D. Rockefeller, Jr.—help account for its ambitious de­
sign.10 More recent private megaforums in Manhattan, such as 
the row of office-towers-with-plazas along the Avenue of the 
Americas, were induced by zoning regulations that awarded 
developers height bonuses in exchange for street-level plazas.11 
In this case the zoning ordinance was used to produce a public 
amenity through private construction. 
The city-as-megaforum punctuates urban space with monu­
mental buildings, uses structures, gardens, and pathways to 
create highly symmetrical arrangements of space, and seeks 
dramatic visual effects through focused lighting and the closing 
of vistas with prominent buildings or statuary. This highly self-
conscious manipulation of urban space often has an analogue in 
the treatment of component buildings' interiors, but for the most 
part the city-as-megaforum is a vision of the outdoor city. The 
important public spaces and buildings that it includes are usually 
directly accessible to the surrounding city by streets, pedestrian 
paths, and mass transit lines. Given the function of most mega-
forums—to give focus to a community by highlighting the 
structures that house its chief governmental and cultural institu­
tions—this connectedness with the city at large is essential. 
In the United States the city-as-megaforum can be traced to 
the City Beautiful movement at the turn of the century. However, 
the grand manipulation of urban space that is the core of the 
city-as-megaforum can be linked to European city plans that are 
several centuries older. Lewis Mumford has identified Burn-
ham's 1909 Plan of Chicago, which sought to apply megaforum 
principles to an entire metropolitan region, as a remnant of 
"baroque" city planning.12 
Since the apex of the City Beautiful movement at the begin­
ning of this century, there has been considerable change in the 
design vocabulary of the city-as-megaforum. For example, the 
classical architectural style of the 1893 Columbian Exposition 
in Chicago and of the older structures along the Washington Mall 
is no longer an essential ingredient. The structures forming the 
Government Center in Boston are only vaguely classical, and the 
City Hall at the heart of the complex is a starkly modernist 
building. Nonetheless, this is a characteristic megaforum. The 
Government Center is located at the convergence of several 
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major downtown streets. The buildings, though not in a classical 
vocabulary, are imposing edifices. Set well back from Cam­
bridge Street, the City Hall faces a huge plaza, which is available 
for large-scale outdoor civic events. In this and other cities, the 
megaforum seeks to communicate a sense of civic power and 
pride by housing government in imposing quarters and locating 
these imposing quarters at a highly visible, generally accessible 
point in the central city. 
The City Functional 
Like the city-as-megaforum, the city functional manipulates ur­
ban space in a highly self-conscious manner. However, unlike 
the city-as-megaforum, the city functional's principal method of 
spatial manipulation is enclosure. It is epitomized by downtown 
commercial megastructures such as the Renaissance Center in 
Detroit and Peachtree Center in Atlanta. These complexes en­
close a variety of enterprises and activities, including shopping 
areas, offices, and hotel accommodations. The layout of their 
shopping arcades approximates that of city streets, with shops 
facing onto landscaped pedestrian paths, but this internal struc­
ture does not connect with the street system of the "outdoor" 
city. For example, the Renaissance Center, which is separated 
from Detroit's old downtown by a busy boulevard, Jefferson 
Avenue, is nearly inaccessible to pedestrians. A landscaped bar­
rier faces the street, and the main access points to the complex 
are the entrances to its parking garage. 
Also unlike the megaforum, the city functional's principles 
have been applied to residential as well as commercial and 
public buildings. On Chicago's North Side, Carl Sandburg Vil­
lage provides residences for several thousand people. Its site 
plan orients activity to the center of its superblocks by arranging 
tall residential towers around plazas, with townhouse units sub­
stituted for highrise structures at some points in the plan. The 
plazas are set a few feet above the street level, and access to the 
complex is provided by a limited number of walkways. Under­
ground parking garages relieve residents from vying for street-
side parking spaces. 
The city functional's characteristic enclosure and separation 
of urban space is sometimes carried to such an extreme that this 
The City Functional in Three Downtowns 
Renaissance Center, Detroit 
Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles 
Atrium of the IDS Center, Minneapolis 
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urban vision, in effect, replaces the older city. The Crown Center 
in Kansas City, Missouri, and Water Tower Place in Chicago were 
built at some distance from the old downtown districts, and each 
has supplanted the old urban core as its city's premier shopping 
district.13 On the periphery of metropolitan areas, the city func­
tional is the characteristic form of the new communities that 
develop at the intersections of major expressways.14 
The intellectual lineage of the city functional can be traced to 
the futuristic urban schemes proposed by several early twentieth-
century architects, of which Le Corbusier's have had the greatest 
impact.15 The famous Swiss-French architect contended that the 
historic European city, with its clotted, serpentine street system, 
must be replaced by an efficient city of "straight lines,'' separation 
of pedestrian and auto traffic, and orderly segmentation of urban 
functions.16 In the "city of tomorrow, a modernist architectural 
vocabulary and an advanced system of highways would not only 
enhance efficiency in a material sense, they would also symbolize 
the arrival of the new machine age. Although the city functional 
does not always adopt Le Corbusier's central image of the new 
city—the modernist tower placed in a park—its adaptation to the 
automobile, generally modernist architectural vocabulary, and 
dislocation from the surrounding city are direct descendants of 
Le Corbusier's city of tomorrow. 
The City-as-Glass Menagerie 
The city-as-glass menagerie may be easily distinguished from the 
city functional by its attitude toward the historic city. The city-
as-glass menagerie seeks to preserve older structures and dis­
tricts, although the means of preservation and ultimate use of 
such remnants of the pre-World War II urban fabric vary widely. 
Certainly the most pervasive settings for the glass menagerie are 
the dozens of gentrifying residential neighborhoods across the 
United States. In these neighborhoods, middle-class urbanites 
have restored homes from a potpourri of periods and architec­
tural styles, among them Federal, Victorian, and Art Deco.17 
Since the 1970s, the practice of adaptive reuse of older 
structures has added a second element to the city-as-glass me­
nagerie. In many cities, underused and abandoned industrial 
structures, including railroad terminals, warehouses, and facto­
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ries, have been renovated for use as residential and commercial 
spaces. Conversely, in several East Coast cities, formerly residen­
tial rowhouses have been recycled as shops and professional 
offices.18 
In all of these instances, rehabilitators have expressed rever­
ence for the craftsmanship typically found in older structures 
and an understanding that these structures were often built on a 
more human scale than much mid-twentieth-century architec­
ture. In the case of some larger structures, such as railroad 
terminals, which are in fact quite massive buildings, there is a 
related romantic appreciation of nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century engineering. The scale is immense, but the structure is 
comprehensible to the layperson. Interestingly, the city-as-glass 
menagerie vision can also be identified as an agent in the evo­
lution of an emergent philosophy of new architecture, post­
modernism. Through their interest in reintroducing ornament 
to buildings, by seeking to evoke premodernist architectural 
styles, and by sometimes reducing the scale of their buildings, 
postmodernist architects are struggling to root new architecture 
within the extant urban fabric.19 
The degree to which the city-as-glass menagerie seeks to 
reknit the city's physical fabric is not always matched by its 
capacity to weave itself into the social fabric. It is no longer 
argued that the rehabilitation of older structures is an assured 
means of producing low-cost housing; in many cities where 
residential gentrification is widespread, dislocation of low-
income neighborhood incumbents has been substantial.20 In­
deed, as we noted in the preceding chapter's examination of the 
gentrification of Lincoln Park, gentrifiers and merchants in gen­
trifying neighborhoods employ a variety of techniques to pro­
tect their quarters from outside intrusion: formidable walls and 
gates, electronic entry systems, garages discreetly located on the 
ground floor or at the back of lots. Thus, like the city functional, 
the city-as-glass menagerie is not available to all. 
The sources of the city-as-glass menagerie are quite distin­
guishable from those of the city-as-megaforum and the city 
functional, each of which began with the dreams of professional 
architects. There can be no question that Jane Jacobs's powerful 
indictment of post-World War II city planning and celebration 
of the densely settled, street-dominated industrial city, The 
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Death and Life of Great American Cities, helped give rise to the 
city-as-glass menagerie. However, the direct influence of Jacobs's 
book was greatest upon architects and city planners; the gentri­
fication movement, in particular, came about through the inde­
pendent action of thousands of rehabilitators. The renewed 
affection for older urban neighborhoods represents a substantial 
transformation of popular taste, principally among young adults 
who were raised in postwar suburbs and who harbor nostalgic 
images of prewar city life.21 
THE CITY-AS-MEGAFORUM, CITY 
FUNCTIONAL, AND CITY-AS-GLASS 
MENAGERIE AND THE PROSPECTIVE 
AMERICAN CITY 
One can locate examples of the city-as-megaforum, city func­
tional, and city-as-glass menagerie in nearly every major city and 
in many smaller communities across the country. The rebuilding 
of downtown cores, which was frequently the prime objective 
of post-World War II local urban renewal efforts, has proceeded 
at an accelerated pace in the past decade.22 Countless architects 
have used either the city functional or the city-as-megaforum as 
their guiding principle in reworking the downtown fabric, al­
though the city functional is the more prevalent of the two. 
Downtown rebuilding, in many cities, has been accompanied 
by residential gentrification, which characteristically produces 
the city-as-glass menagerie. Yet throughout the post-World War 
II period, it has been on the edge of metropolitan regions that 
the greatest development has occurred. The decentralization of 
business management, retailing, and other commercial activities 
has led to a need to shape peripheral "urban villages," and in this 
part of the metropolis the city functional has reigned supreme.23 
Thus, in identifying and describing the city-as-megaforum, 
city functional, and city-as-glass menagerie, we are not simply 
categorizing design strategies. Each of these three urban visions 
has been used repeatedly to shape urban space, and collec­
tively they summarize how practicing urban designers are seek­
ing to structure the city of the future. We shall turn now to the 
questions growing out of our earlier consideration of the func­
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tions of the city's built form: What assumptions regarding the 
contents of the city give form to these visions? What is their 
symbolic intent? How do various groups in the city react to these 
visions? 
The Contents of the City 
Of these three urban visions, the city-as-megaforum is the most 
puzzling in its interpretation of the city's composition. As a 
design strategy, the city-as-megaforum is usually employed in 
city hall and state capitol complexes, museums and other edi­
fices of high culture, parks, and some private office develop­
ments. Aside from these uses, one does not often observe this 
design strategy; in particular, the city-as-megaforum is not used 
to structure housing. 
We have noted that the source of the city-as-megaforum in 
the United States was the City Beautiful movement, and by 
considering the social context of the City Beautiful, we can begin 
to understand the truncated application of the city-as-mega­
forum. Most commentators agree that the City Beautiful was 
both a reaction against the sprawling industrial city of the late 
nineteenth century and an effort to dignify and express the 
importance of cities to the United States' performance as a world 
economic and political power.24 Given the laissez-faire attitude 
of American capitalists at the time, the architects and landscape 
designers who created particular projects, such as the 1893 
Columbian Exposition, and later began to define a new profes­
sion, city planning, articulated a rather narrow-gauged urban 
vision. For instance, Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., characterized 
the City Beautiful's agenda in the following fashion: "First, the 
sizes, shapes and slopes of the streets; second, the sizes and 
characters of the buildings and their location in respect to each 
other and the street spaces; third, the distribution of the unbuilt 
land not included in the streets; and fourth, the surface treatment 
of the unbuilt land both with and without the street limits, and 
the character and distribution of objects that rise from these 
surfaces, whether trees, telegraph poles, fences or what not."25 
In short, the objects of planning were streets, buildings, and 
undeveloped space. 
Peter Marcuse has described how the early city planning 
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movement in the United States excluded housing from its policy 
priorities.26 The intellectual predilections of many early plan­
ners, as well as the ideology and interest of the private sponsors 
of early planning efforts, account for this circumscription of 
planning practice. In the ensuing decades, this produced a 
profession that devoted much attention to comprehending and 
seeking to enhance the city's existing physical system as a device 
for private economic activity.27 
There also remained a commitment to reshape the city, but 
this was channeled largely in the direction of planning impres­
sive public edifices. Advocates of this enterprise took it quite 
seriously, as evidenced by this statement by Charles Mulford 
Robinson, publicist of both the City Beautiful movement and the 
city planning profession: "The moral and spiritual standards of 
the people will be advanced by this art, and their political ideals 
will rise with a civic pride and community spirit born of the 
appreciation that they are citizens of 'no mean city' "28 Implicit 
in Robinson's observation is the recognition that the turn-of-the­
century metropolis included many residents whose "moral and 
spiritual standards'' should be improved. He was referring, no 
doubt, to the thousands of European immigrants who poured 
annually into New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and other indus­
trial centers, as well as to the many unpolished industrialists and 
machine bosses who were assuming leadership roles in these 
same cities. The City Beautiful, thus, observed the industrial 
city's growing ethnic and class stratification. However, through 
its designs for the city, the City Beautiful sought to relieve these 
social differences, as well as resultant social tensions, by drawing 
attention to an idealized vision of the community that was 
embodied by monumental buildings and grand public spaces. 
The City Beautiful's failure to reshape American cities has 
been attributed to a variety of technical problems, such as 
inadequate land-use controls, but a more fundamental flaw was 
its very understanding of the city.29 The City Beautiful's classical 
architecture, sculptural manipulation of urban space, and lovely 
vistas were simply irrelevant to the underlying needs of the 
evolving industrial city. Not only were its planners unable to 
articulate how the City Beautiful might impinge on housing 
development, but private capital could find nothing in its urban 
vision to help in organizing factory complexes, speeding the 
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transportation of raw materials and finished products, or assist­
ing communication between buyers and sellers. 
The city-as-megaforum is a vestige of City Beautiful plan­
ning. Its application is limited to governmental and cultural 
complexes or, in rare instances, to the office complexes of 
benevolent corporations. Like its antecedent, it offers no vision 
of an integrated urban complex. This is not surprising, as its 
impetus was the desire to turn away from the emerging character 
of the real industrial city. 
The city functional is likewise a truncated vision of the city, 
but in contrast to the city-as-megaforum, it is an urban vision 
that is wholly in keeping with emergent trends in the private 
economy of cities. As the industrial sectors of the national econ­
omy, as well as the industrial base of particular American cities, 
have shrunk, the city as a center for corporate management, 
place of residence for managers, professionals, and service work­
ers, and setting for "upscale" private consumption has emerged 
as the predominant model of urban development.30 
This model appears in its purest form on the metropolitan 
periphery, where open space and agricultural land have been 
converted to suburban and exurban development nodes. En­
closed city-functional complexes permit convenient pedestrian 
movement. Communication with other locations is provided by 
an array of technological innovations, and the primary mode of 
interlocal transportation in the automobile. When used in the 
central city, this design strategy produces the kind of disconnec­
tion from the urban fabric that characterizes the Renaissance 
Center and Sandburg Village. 
In effect, the city functional produces two cities that corre­
spond to the dual economy of contemporary American cities. 
The city functional houses the growing sectors of corporate 
management and business services, personal services, and retail­
ing to the affluent. The outlying city holds declining industrial 
belts, small-scale enterprises on decaying neighborhood shop­
ping strips, and neighborhoods with minimal housing invest­
ment.31 
The city-as-glass menagerie also gives form to important 
conditions within the emerging urban economy. And like the 
other two urban visions, it offers only a partial vision of the city. 
Its residential form, in gentrifying neighborhoods across the 
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country, reflects the renewed taste for rowhouses, highly orna­
mental facades, and eccentric interior spaces. Typically, the pro­
cess of physically rehabilitating neighborhoods whose struc­
tures meet these expectations is accompanied by a parallel process 
of resident substitution. Gentrifiers, whose jobs in the city's 
growth sectors give them sufficient income to finance expensive 
house repairs or pay steep prices for newly constructed resi­
dences, move into neighborhoods previously occupied by low-
income residents. 
Incumbent dislocation proceeds along several paths. Low-
income tenants may lose their leases, or in some cases their 
landlords may allow properties to run down to the point of 
inhabitability. Homeowners on fixed incomes may feel financial 
pressure from upward tax reassessments. In any case, the factors 
that attract gentrifiers—architectural charm, solid construction, 
romantic ambience—raise real estate prices to the point that the 
factors that once attracted less-affluent incumbents—aging, there­
fore less-expensive housing; access to the central-city job mar­
ket—are no longer meaningful. In short, the gentrifying neigh­
borhood serves a new function, and a different residential 
population, within a shifting local economy. 
Glass menagerie neighborhoods quite frequently are lo­
cated near resurgent downtown areas. For the high-income 
managers, professionals, and service workers who prefer the 
physical character of such neighborhoods, their proximity to 
work, restaurants and entertainment, and cultural facilities is a 
major attraction. The city-as-glass menagerie thus defines a vi­
sion of the city that is consistent with individual consumption 
patterns arising from the economic restructuring of the new 
downtowns. As such, it is an urban vision that complements the 
city functional. In practice, it is commonplace for the corporate 
manager to awaken in the morning in a restored townhouse, 
proceed to an off-street parking area to pick up the family car, 
drive to a work place located in a downtown megastructure, and 
once more park in an off-street garage. 
Symbolic Intent 
The intentions underpinning the city-as-megaforum include the 
representation of community virtues, the cultivation of alle­
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giance to the community, and the communication of refined 
cultural values. Its constituent buildings' monumentality ex­
presses the city's achievement. The spaciousness of its public 
areas also expresses achievement and, more importantly, pro­
vides room for large gatherings to attend speeches or artistic 
performances. 
To connect the megaforum, once more, with its sources in 
the City Beautiful movement, this approach to urban monumen­
tality seeks to use structures and space to transmit desirable 
civic values, which, it is thought, may not be in wide circulation 
among the population. One of the visitors to the Columbian 
Exposition observed that the fair in Chicago "revealed to many 
Americans, whose lives were necessarily colorless and narrow, 
the splendid possibilities of art, and the compelling power of the 
beautiful."32 The proposition that public buildings should com­
municate such values is hardly unique to American urban cul­
ture. However, the burden of this responsibility may be greater 
in the United States, given the widespread perception of sprawl­
ing, unattractive development in the city at large. In essence, 
powerful and uplifting urban space will compensate for the 
banality of most urban space and the lack of civic and cultural 
models for the urban population. 
The partial urban vision offered by the city-as-megaforum is 
attenuated by the inability of municipal governments to main­
tain important components of their megaforum plans. For ex­
ample, turn-of-the-century advocates of public parks in cities 
such as Boston, Chicago, and New York envisioned their ambi­
tious systems as oases of calm amid the bustle of the industrial 
metropolis.33 By developing citywide park systems, the benefits 
of these oases would be available to all local residents. In the 
long run, this image of democratic urban parks has turned into 
an empty dream. The typical park system in the American city 
of the late twentieth century features one or two "showcase" 
parks that are accessible primarily to central-area workers, resi­
dents, and visitors. Less-visible parks away from core areas 
usually suffer from inadequate staffing and poor maintenance. 
These latter parks are the elements of the city-as-megaforum that 
are in closest proximity to most urban residents. 
Unlike the city-as-megaforum, which seeks to give form to 
collective sentiments, the city functional expresses shifting class 
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divisions within the contemporary city. The city functional^ 
enclosure of space reserves a new city for qualified visitors and 
inhabitants, and its generally characterless architectural mod­
ernism in no way invites the outsider. Typically, the city func­
tional challenges the pedestrian's courage and industriousness 
and is simply inaccessible by mass transit. 
Inside the city functional are business offices, upscale shop­
ping, and high-priced hotel and residential space. These uses 
define the principal segments of the new urban management and 
service economy. Thus, their separation from the extant, outdoor 
city expresses the proposition that this new city can operate quite 
independently of the older city. Indeed, just as few laid-off indus­
trial workers find jobs in the urban service economy, few former 
auto workers or steelworkers or their spouses shop in Detroit's 
Renaissance Center or Chicago's Water Tower Place. 
The city-as-glass menagerie's partial urban vision is also 
related to the emerging urban economy. Gentrifiers are usually 
high-income managers, professionals, or service workers. Their 
preference for particular neighborhoods often turns on proxim­
ity to work as much as intrinsic environmental attributes. How­
ever, the glass menagerie throws its own peculiar light on local 
social divisions. The restored rowhouses and lofts, factories 
converted to shops, and upgraded commercial districts of the 
city-as-glass menagerie represent, in essence, the commoditiza­
tion of urban history.34 Most of these restored properties are held 
as private property. As a rule, the restoration process is an 
expensive enterprise, so only very well-off individuals or busi­
nesses can afford it. These individuals or businesses thus have 
bought and restored some of the most visible artifacts of their 
city's heritage. 
Moreover, glass-menagerie districts usually appear in sec­
tions of the city that have undergone a cycle of physical decay. 
In most cases, if in the past there has been a substantial residen­
tial population, a disproportionate share of the population con­
sisted of racial minorities. Thus, gentrifiers and commercial 
renovators often "reclaim" the city from some of its most disad­
vantaged residents. The reclamation process is usually perilous, 
with incumbent residents feeling much resentment toward new­
comers, and with newcomers often indifferent to the higher 
rents and pressure to move effected by their arrival.35 
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These dislocations, however, are not the concern of the 
developers, designers, and inhabitants of the city-as-glass me­
nagerie, nor have public officials shown great interest in the fate 
of those unhoused by gentrification. Enhanced street ambiences 
and property tax bases are the valued consequences of neigh­
borhood revitalization. In the typical calculations of public de­
cision makers, these benefits far outweigh costs associated with 
reducing the stock of low-cost housing. Less-visible consequences 
of gentrification, such as the inconvenience visited upon dislo­
cated populations, are not even tallied in these accountings. 
Responses to the City-as-Megaforum, City 
Functional, and City-as-Glass Menagerie 
The city-as-megaforum presumes that cleavages in urban society 
are inconsequential, or at least subject to reduction through the 
inculcation of civic values. This urban vision also assumes that 
the public spaces of cities are widely accessible to the urban 
population, and that urban residents regularly make use of these 
spaces. 
Although the era of the industrial city in the United States is 
long past, the postindustrial city is no less socially stratified. 
Moreover, the differential use of urban space is a principal indi­
cator of social divisions. Although less-affluent inner-city resi­
dents still shop in old downtowns and use the recreational 
facilities of the central area, their more-affluent fellow urbanites 
often commute to work on the periphery of the metropolis and 
seldom visit downtown commercial areas or cultural edifices. 
As a consequence, the monumental public spaces of the contem­
porary city cannot transmit a common set of civic values. 
To the degree that today's Americans do share a common 
culture, or participate in public affairs, the media that facilitate 
this participation are electronic: television, radio, and cinema. 
The city is not a space for participation in a collective enterprise; 
its spaces can no longer express a sense of common purpose. 
Given these conditions, the city-as-megaforum is an obsolete 
urban vision. 
If the city-as-megaforum provides space for dialogue and 
common action, but is used by only a fraction of the population 
for these or any other purposes, the city functional actively 
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works to delineate class and racial divisions. The explicit pur­
pose of enclosed shopping arcades is to restrict entry of unde­
sirable individuals, and the owners of these complexes make the 
legal claim that their internal paths are private property.36 
Although the city functional begins as an expression of the 
divisions in urban society, its ultimate impact is to increase these 
divisions. For the privileged users of the city functional, the 
ambiguity of urban life is reduced. In particular, the affluent, 
largely white population that inhabits the city functional has no 
need to cope with the human diversity that is characteristic of 
generally accessible public spaces. The city functional explicitly 
works to reduce the likelihood of surprising encounters by 
liberating its users from the chance situations and social mixing 
that are the essence of life on the streets of the outdoor city. For 
those who are unwelcome within the city functional, it becomes 
the object of envy. Indeed, even if they can gain entrance, they 
cannot possibly afford to purchase the products it markets or 
join the lucrative professions it houses. Thus, the city functional 
is also the enemy of tolerance, whether one's perspective is 
safely inside looking out, or out on the street looking in. 
Nonetheless, when compared to the city-as-glass menagerie, 
the class divisions expressed and amplified by the city functional 
are often muted. Police surveillance of city-functional districts 
is intense; and although shoplifting is a pervasive problem in the 
city functional, explicitly violent reactions to it are limited. The 
city-as-glass menagerie reveals urban class tensions in rawer 
form. For example, gentrifiers are the frequent victims of break-
ins or property defacement, most notably turf-claiming graffiti 
left by youth gangs. 
Daily newspapers regularly report the rigors of gentrifica­
tion, typically from the standpoint of newcomers. Yet the vio­
lence can have other sources and objects. On Chicago's near 
Northwest Side, the Wicker Park neighborhood has, since the 
late 1970s, been the focus of intense real estate speculation. A 
small number of gentrifiers have renovated some of the com­
munity's grand old homes, and several realtors and developers 
have promoted Wicker Park as the city's "next Lincoln Park.' At 
the same time, organizations representing the area's incumbent 
low-income population have fought displacement, and a non­
profit developer, Bickerdike Redevelopment Corporation, has 
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sought to meet this need by building subsidized low-cost in-fill 
housing. In the winter of 1983, vandals disrupted Bickerdike's 
building sites in Wicker Park. Neighborhood newcomers, con­
cerned that the subsidized housing might undercut property 
values and provide shelter to undesirables, were responsible.37 
In the years to come, such incidents are likely to recur, for the 
city-as-glass menagerie permits the most direct of confrontations 
between hostile urban populations. 
At its heart, the city-as-glass menagerie is a vision of social 
reproduction. It is also a nostalgic urban vision, filled as it is with 
historic homes and charming shops. It evokes a city in which 
children were safe and families could remain in the same house 
for decades. Yet the people who can afford to live in gentrifying 
areas typically hold jobs in the most advanced sectors of the 
local urban economy: corporate management, business ser­
vices, and the professions. Furthermore, in spite of the variety 
of means they use to protect their homes, they live in the extant 
city with its streets, alleys, and adjoining neighborhoods. The 
good fortune of the residents of the city-as-glass menagerie can 
be observed by their less-advantaged neighbors. Conversely, 
gentrifiers are well aware that further gentrification enhances 
their own property values. Thus, political disputes over access 
to the neighborhood are the subtext of physical confrontations 
such as the one in Wicker Park, and are a characteristic feature 
of the city-as-glass menagerie. 
THE FAILURE OF CONTEMPORARY 
URBAN VISIONS 
A comprehensive vision of the city would address the functions 
of social relations of production, symbolic meaning, and social 
reproduction in some kind of consistent manner. In this sense, 
each of the visions identified in this chapter must be judged a 
failure. The city-as-megaforum offers a symbolic representation 
of community while neglecting how the city produces, who 
produces for whom in the city, and how urban society is to be 
reproduced. The city functional presents a bountiful vision of 
urban production and consumption joined to a dissonant sym­
bolic message. By turning away from public space as well as the 
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extant city of older factories, municipal facilities, and neighbor­
hoods, the city functional communicates exclusiveness. In an 
analogous manner, the city-as-glass menagerie represents a nar­
row type of social reproduction, available to only a few and the 
source of envy to many urbanites. 
At the heart of this failure to define comprehensive and 
consistent urban visions is a more fundamental problem. The 
city-as-megaforum, city functional, and city-as-glass menagerie 
do not use physical structure as a vehicle in service of surprise, 
tolerance, innovation, and participation. On the contrary, they 
seek to overcome or suppress the open-endedness of life in the 
city. As such, each in its own way evades or seeks to reduce the 
diversity of cities, and none of these visions pretends to give 
form to a city in which jobs, shelter, public services, and leisure 
are available to the full range of urban residents. In short, the 
strategies of urban rebuilding that we discussed in chapters 2 
and 3 not only reflect contextual factors reshaping urban econ­
omies and amplifying tensions among different classes of urban 
residents; as elements of these three urban visions they further 
undercut urban diversity and give form to the proposition that 
valued urban space must be reserved for economically advan­
taged residents. It appears that the practitioners of these urban 
visions cannot even imagine a diverse and egalitarian urban 
order. 
The Environmental Politics 
of Neighborhood 
In A Theory of Good City Form, Kevin Lynch writes that the 
. . . idea of the urban neighborhood has ridden a professional 
rollercoaster. In the first quarter of this century, it was a unit of 
social analysis used by pioneers in urban sociology. The idea 
then grew that the neighborhood was the proper territorial base 
of a socially supportive group, among whom there would be 
many personal contracts. Planning theorists, reassured by their 
organic models, picked up the idea of the neighborhood as the 
basic building block of a city. It was to be a defined spatial unit, 
free of through traffic and as self-sufficient in daily services as 
possible. . Later, the social assumption of this idea was thor­
oughly debunked.1 
However, the debunking of the planners' neighborhood unit 
concept was not the end of the story. Lynch continues: "Just after 
the neighborhood idea had been thoroughly demolished at the 
highest levels it flared up again from below." The flaring up of 
the neighborhood "from below' resulted from, among other 
things, the massive public works initiatives of the 1950s and 
1960s. Residents of inner-city neighborhoods scheduled for 
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clearance or falling within the rights of way of proposed express­
ways fought to save their homes, streets, and local businesses. 
Their resistance, in turn, piqued the attention of politicians and 
social scientists, who began to question the logic of this first 
wave of post-World War II urban rebuilding. 
Thus, since the 1960s the idea of neighborhood has ridden 
a political as well as professional roller coaster as neighborhood 
activists have sought to grasp power from municipal bureaucra­
cies and to develop autonomous mechanisms for promoting 
residential stability and local economic development. This is the 
sense in which current neighborhood politics are environmen­
tal: massive shifts in the physical structure of cities have yielded 
political movements that seek to preserve specific neighbor­
hood areas. Movements to protect neighborhoods as physical 
entities have overlapped with forces seeking to restructure de­
cision making in cities, producing in the 1980s what became 
known as the neighborhood movement. Many observers argue 
that this recent neighborhood mobilization represents the best 
hope for recreating congenial urban communities. 
In the first portion of this chapter, we examine the three 
principal "pivots" around which the postwar politics of neigh­
borhoods have revolved, each of which is connected to urban 
physical rebuilding. In the second half of the chapter, we trace 
the development of a Chicago neighborhood movement, the 
Save Our Neighborhoods/Save Our City (SON/SOC) Coalition. 
The story of SON/SOC makes for an illuminating case study 
because each of the three neighborhood political pivots has 
affected the group's sense of identity and definition of objec­
tives. Moreover, one observes in SON/SOC's activities and pro­
grams the same preference for spatial and social segmentation 
found in the designs of the new downtowns and gentrifying 
neighborhoods. 
THE THREE PIVOTS OF POSTWAR 
NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS 
Since the era of publicly sponsored urban rebuilding in the 
1950s and 1960s, three characteristic themes, or pivots, have 
grounded neighborhood political disputes. The first of these 
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involves competing definitions of satisfactory neighborhood 
physical conditions. The second concerns access to neighbor­
hoods: who has the best claim to changing neighborhoods? The 
third is the issue of neighborhood decision making. How much 
authority should city governments devolve to neighborhoods? 
Within neighborhoods, should activists channel their activities 
through formal institutions, such as neighborhood councils, or 
stand apart as a means of maintaining their political autonomy? 
Whose Idea of Neighborhood? 
The original premise of urban redevelopment was to substitute 
new, soundly constructed housing for the slums of American 
cities. Business and some legislative supporters of urban renewal 
added to this objective a desire to rebuild downtown business 
districts, and with the passage of legislation mandating urban 
expressways, a reasonably comprehensive urban vision emerged. 
The old urban core was to be rebuilt and linked with the ex­
panding metropolitan periphery by high-speed expressways. 
Inner-city neighborhoods dating from the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries would be replaced or substantially augmented 
by new residential districts, comprehensively planned and set 
apart from the extant city. 
From the outset, there were objections to this program. 
Carole Rifkind, in her examination of the physical appearance of 
American communities, Main Street, notes that urban renewal 
and expressway demolition robbed cities of a wealth of physical 
landmarks as well as historically resonant public spaces and 
residential areas.2 In addition, there were critics of neighbor­
hood demolition in such heretofore obscure places as Boston's 
West End, New York's East Tremont, and Chicago's near West 
Side.3 
The West End was one of Boston's first urban renewal sites, 
and although there was little mobilized resident opposition to 
its demolition, a number of social scientists observed and were 
disturbed by project execution. The comments of two of these 
researchers, Marc Fried and Peggy Gleicher, identify the Bos­
ton Redevelopment Area's (BRA) misunderstanding of the West 
End, a neighborhood that was much liked by its residents: "On 
the one hand, the residential area is the region in which a vast 
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and interlocking set of social networks is localized. And, on the 
other, the physical area has considerable meaning as an exten­
sion of home, in which various parts are delineated and struc­
tured on the basis of a sense of belonging."4 The contrast 
between BRA and resident views can be summarized quite simply. 
The redevelopment authority observed an untidy-looking neigh­
borhood whose residential structures fell below professionally 
defined standards of housing quality. Residents viewed the West 
End as a friendly place, which, because of low rents and easy 
access to public transportation, was also affordable and con­
venient. 
Not only did researchers and neighborhood activists begin 
to argue that planners' definitions of neighborhood blight un­
derestimated the virtues of older residential areas, but other 
critics also began to question the purported virtues of the new 
projects. W. L. Yancey, in an article published in 1971, discussed 
residents' attitudes toward and use of public space in the high-
rise Pruitt-Igoe housing project, which had opened in St. Louis 
in 1954. Yancey reported that his interviewees appreciated the 
more commodious apartments available in Pruitt-Igoe, but that 
they considered the project's public spaces inconvenient and 
even hazardous: "In Pruitt-Igoe, the familiar aspects of slum 
living, such as fires and burning, freezing and cold, poor plumb­
ing, dangerous electrical wiring, thin walls, and overcrowding 
of children and parents into single rooms are somewhat abated. 
Yet the amenities of lower-class neighborhoods are apparently 
lost."5 Pruitt-Igoe's privatistic design undermined the formation 
of the informal social networks used in poor neighborhoods to 
channel mutual aid and as means of social control. 
In accounting for the inhospitability of Pruitt-Igoe, Yancey 
notes how front stoops, the street, and adjoining backyards 
provide space that is amenable to the formation of social net­
works. The work of Jane Jacobs, the celebrant of the urban street 
and stoop, as well as of the mixed-use neighborhood with 
permeable "edges, represents the overturning of the planning 
mentality that gave urban renewal its physical vision. Like the 
planners she criticized so roundly, Jacobs was an advocate of the 
neighborhood. However, Jacobs's idea of the good city neigh­
borhood contrasted with the planners' model not only in form, 
but also in function. Jacobs attacked the mechanical vision of the 
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city embodied in the work of Le Corbusier and his followers 
that defined neighborhoods as discrete, subordinate residential 
entities within an overarching urban order. Reversing the line of 
causality, Jacobs's conceptualization began with the city's set of 
neighborhoods, arguing that healthy neighborhoods produced 
a safe, economically vital city at large.6 The upshot of this 
approach is to question even well-designed patching of the 
urban fabric, as the new cloth may not truly substitute for the 
old. What newly planned districts may offer in orderliness is 
likely to be offset by the loss of multifaceted connectedness that 
is characteristic of older urban neighborhoods. 
Practically speaking, by the early 1960s residents of older 
neighborhoods slated for urban renewal often called for renova­
tion rather than demolition, but their demands for the preserva­
tion of homes and existing, familiar public spaces overlapped 
with the second pivot of postwar neighborhood politics. This 
was the concern over who would live in cleared and other 
changing neighborhoods. 
Whose Neighborhood? 
In the early years of slum clearance, municipal redevelopment 
agencies often designated areas as slums, acquired property, and 
carried through demolition without encountering much neigh­
borhood opposition.7 Typically, residents of neighborhoods 
slated for demolition received assurances that they would be 
assisted in relocating, or even would be able to return to their 
rebuilt neighborhood. These pledges were often met with skep­
ticism, but in the face of seemingly determined city govern­
ments armed with federal approval and funding, most people 
saw little use in fighting urban renewal. Harold Kaplan, explain­
ing the lack of controversy surrounding clearance in Newark's 
Central Ward, notes that" . several Negro leaders emphasized 
how pointless any opposition would have been."8 
This situation did not last. Two characteristics of the first 
wave of urban redevelopment quickly became evident to neigh­
borhood activists. First, a substantial portion of the cleared areas 
seemed more compatible with upgrading and expanding down­
town business districts than with improving slum housing. Sec­
ond, the incumbent residents of cleared neighborhoods were 
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seldom able to return. In many cases commercial and institu­
tional facilities replaced the old neighborhoods' houses and 
apartments. When apartments were constructed, their internal 
configurations and rents often precluded the return of neigh­
borhood incumbents. Thus, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
urban renewal proposals in Atlanta (Buttermilk Bottom), Boston 
(the South End and Charlestown), San Francisco (the Western 
Addition), and several other cities generated loud neighborhood 
disapproval.9 
By the late 1960s fiscally strained municipal governments 
pushed urban renewal and expressway construction less aggres­
sively. Federal aid was shrinking, and neighborhoods had learned 
to make effective use of local approval requirements to block 
unpopular proposals. Although hundreds of thousands of people 
had been dislocated by urban renewal and expressway projects, 
and their scrambling for new places to live had sent tremors 
through the neighborhood terrain of many cities, given federal 
and municipal fiscal constraints, as well as the erection of proce­
dural safeguards for neighborhoods, the twin issues of residential 
displacement and subsequent housing pressures in adjoining 
neighborhoods might have been expected to lose their force. In 
fact, during the 1970s these issues emerged in new guise. 
The 1970s marked the beginning of substantial neighbor­
hood gentrification, which typically proceeds without the initial 
publicity attendant to urban renewal. Also, in the early stages of 
a neighborhood's gentrification, when individual rehabbers are 
in the vanguard, the process of physical transformation is more 
elusive. The upgrading of individual structures occurs more or 
less randomly: one house on this block, a small apartment build­
ing two blocks over, and so on. As a result, the political contro­
versies that greeted the announcement of later urban renewal 
plans tend to be absent in the early stage of gentrification.10 
Nonetheless, there are local social tensions created by gentri­
fication. We have already noted that neighborhood newcomers 
and incumbents often divide over issues of use of public space.'' 
In addition, once there is enough momentum to a locale's gentri­
fication to attract large numbers of purchaser/rehabbers and 
developers interested in renovating larger buildings or con­
structing new residential complexes, then incumbent displace­
ment may emerge once more as a political issue. At present, the 
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pressures of downtown expansion and residential gentrification 
are so strong in Manhattan that incumbent residents of several 
previously neglected peripheral neighborhoods are voicing 
concern over displacement.12 In Chicago, displacement con­
cerns have emerged in the long-suffering Uptown neighbor­
hood as gentrification has proceeded north along the lakefront 
from Lincoln Park.13 
In the 1960s, although substitute housing for those dis­
placed by urban renewal was uncongenial, at least there were 
walls and roofs made available to the unhoused. In the late 
1980s, federal housing subsidies were unavailable to produce 
substitute housing. As a result, groups seeking to fight displace­
ment resulting from gentrification have had to fight on a second 
front. In addition to their efforts at blocking or at least slowing 
displacement, they have also sought to define new means of 
producing low-cost substitute shelter. These efforts have in­
cluded "linked development" proposals that tax downtown 
development and appropriate the proceeds to low-cost housing 
funds, litigation specifying that developers set aside some of 
their new housing units for low- and moderate-income resi­
dents, and the establishment of nonprofit housing development 
corporations.14 In each case, these efforts make demands on 
institutions located outside particular neighborhoods and devel­
opers operating in a number of neighborhoods. Consequently, 
these confrontations often spill over from particular neighbor­
hoods onto the political stage of the city at large. 
Who Decides? 
Even as the physical disruption of urban neighborhoods reached 
its peak in the early 1960s, a series of political forces were 
shaping a new perspective on the role of neighborhoods in cities. 
The political salience of this new perspective was in its presump­
tion that local residents should have some say in decisions 
affecting their neighborhoods. The cluster of issues centering on 
the question of who should determine the fate of neighborhoods 
constitutes the third pivot of neighborhood politics. 
Among the sources of this new perspective were the federal 
officials in charge of programs such as urban renewal. By the 
early 1960s these officials were cognizant of local resistance to 
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neighborhood demolition and began to require that redevel­
opment agencies engage in more thorough consultation with 
neighborhood residents in advance of project execution.15 Like­
wise, the Johnson administration's Community Action Program 
specified the "maximum feasible participation" of poverty-area 
residents in designing and executing local programs.16 However, 
just as important in promoting the idea of neighborhood partic­
ipation in the development and execution of policy were pres­
sures "from below." Among blacks and other racial minorities, 
the civil rights movement not only circulated the idea that those 
affected by municipal and federal programs should have a role 
in shaping these initiatives, but also defined a set of unconven­
tional political techniques for turning the heads of elected offi­
cials and bureaucrats.I7 Although less subject to comment at the 
time, the philosophy and practice of neighborhood organizer 
Saul Alinsky were teaching some of the same lessons in white 
working-class neighborhoods around the country.18 
By the mid-1960s a new term, community control, had 
entered the vocabulary of urban politics. Its genesis was a dis­
pute between the New York City school system, which had been 
under pressure for a decade to produce a comprehensive deseg­
regation program, and black parents in Harlem. In East Harlem, 
a new intermediate school (IS 201) was to open in the fall of 
1966, and residents of the neighborhood had been assured that 
it would be racially integrated. However, the siting of the struc­
ture and its proposed attendance area promised otherwise. Local 
parents reacted harshly to the school administration's apparent 
duplicity. One of their leaders contended that if the New York 
school system can do no more than it is doing, then the 
communities of the poor must be prepared to act for themselves 
just as they must become involved in the direction of all the 
programs set up to serve their needs."19 This viewpoint was 
crystallized in a conflict between local residents and the school 
administration over the appointment of the IS 201 principal, 
with the neighborhood activists making the novel claim that 
they should oversee the selection process. The IS 201 group 
articulated its case powerfully enough that the school system, 
with financial support from the Ford Foundation, subsequently 
established three experimental decentralized school districts. 
The performance of these three districts, especially the Ocean 
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Hill-Brownsville district in Brooklyn, became an inflammatory 
political issue in New York.20 Nonetheless, the city adopted a 
system-wide decentralization plan in 1970, and in succeeding 
years community school boards, neighborhood planning coun­
cils, police review boards, and other types of neighborhood 
boards were adopted in major cities across the country. 
Community control was a proposition that was subject to 
varying interpretations. For some, such as Milton Kotler, author 
of Neighborhood Government, the neighborhood was viewed 
as a ' political settlement of small territory and familiar 
association, whose absolute property is its capacity for deliber­
ative democracy."21 Adherents of this view proposed that neigh­
borhood boards ought to exercise substantial authority over 
policy definition, resource allocation, and municipal service 
delivery. But for many elected officials and municipal adminis­
trators, the appropriate role of such boards was advisory, assist­
ing municipal government by improving communications 
between neighborhood and city. In effect, their response to 
demands for community control was decentralization of city 
services, not the empowerment of local communities envisioned 
by the IS 201 parents, Milton Kotler, and others. 
Since the early 1970s, a considerable body of research has 
sought to assess the operations of these neighborhood institu­
tions. Typically, the researchers' evaluations turn on whether 
they envision neighborhood boards as a means of local empow­
erment or a vehicle for increasing administrative effectiveness. 
For example, political scientist Richard Rich writes of the neigh­
borhood councils in New York City, Raleigh, North Carolina, St. 
Paul, Minnesota, and Washington, D.C.: 
It appears that neighborhood councils in these four cities are on 
the lower rungs of Sherri Arnstein's oft-cited "ladder of citizen 
participation," serving to routinize community input into the 
policy process and render it safe. They had clearly done very lit­
tle to alter the class bias of local participation. NC leaders and 
staff frequently complained that they were so overloaded with 
requests for action from the city government that they had little 
time to devote to defining or executing their own agenda. Many 
councils had very few ties to the neighborhoods they were to 
represent and did not operate as true community organiza­
tions.22 
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In short, these councils permit their respective city governments 
to engage in formal communication with neighborhoods over 
matters such as public works planning and applications for 
zoning variances, but they do not permit neighborhoods to 
control these decisions. Rich's evaluative criteria specify that 
local councils that do not empower their communities have not 
substantially shifted the balance between municipality and neigh­
borhood. 
However, when the observer's expectations focus on the 
more modest objectives of bureaucratic accessibility and the 
quality of decision making, the appraisal of local boards im­
proves. The following comments by John Clayton Thomas de­
scribe Cincinnati's community councils: "New segments of the 
population have been mobilized, contributing to broader par­
ticipation in community life. The municipal decisionmaking 
process has become much more permeable than it was twenty 
or thirty years ago. Equity, too, may have been enhanced as 
funding has been distributed to more neighborhoods, rather 
than going primarily to commercial renewal areas."23 It is alto­
gether likely that the actual performances of the boards ob­
served by Rich and Thomas differed less than did the expecta­
tions of their respective observers. 
In the early 1970s, political scientist Ira Katznelson con­
cluded from his observation of municipal decentralization in 
New York that the new neighborhood institutions in that city 
were intended to "render harmless" minority demands for po­
litical power.24 Katznelson's characterization of municipal intent 
may have been to the point, but in practice, the subsequent 
decade witnessed a considerable broadening of the demand by 
urban neighborhood residents for control of their affairs. In 
affluent white neighborhoods as well as poor minority areas, 
activists spawned a "backyard revolution" that sought to pre­
serve communities, improve service delivery, and rethink strat­
egies of economic development.25 Proponents of this new 
neighborhood movement, such as Harry Boyte, go so far as to 
claim that it will dramatically redistribute political power in 
cities and the nation at large. As a practical matter, these back­
yard revolutionists must determine whether or not to use the 
neighborhood institutions introduced in the preceding decade 
and a half, or to rely on autonomous, often confrontational 
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political action and nonbureaucratic service production. At the 
same time, critics of the new neighborhood movement argue 
that its objectives are merely reformist and that its advocates do 
not, in fact, envision a real transformation of society.26 
THE SAVE OUR NEIGHBORHOODS/ 
SAVE OUR CITY COALITION 
On April 29, 1983, Harold Washington traveled by limousine to 
Chicago's Navy Pier, where he would be inaugurated as mayor. 
Along the way he passed a cluster of residents from the city's 
Northwest and Southwest Sides, which in Chicago are widely 
known as the "bungalow belt." The principal occupants of these 
neighborhoods are "white ethnic" Catholics of Irish, Italian, and 
Polish descent, although on both the Northwest and Southwest 
Sides Hispanics are growing in number. In most parts of the 
Northwest and Southwest sides, single-family homes are the 
norm, and these are communities in which many residents 
express a fierce local loyalty. Most of this group beside the street 
probably had not voted for Washington, but on this day they 
carried with them a "candle of understanding" in the hope that 
the mayor-elect would notice it, stop, and in so doing begin a 
dialogue concerning their neighborhoods' needs. Washington's 
limousine did not stop, but over the course of the next four years, 
these Northwest and Southwest Siders formed an alliance called 
the Save Our Neighborhoods/Save Our City (SON/SOC) Coali­
tion and entered into an intense, frequently rancorous dialogue 
with the Washington administration.27 
The Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation was 
formed in 1971, and it presently includes eight Roman Catholic 
parish associations. The organization's membership is over­
whelmingly white, and for the past two decades the Southwest 
Federation's neighborhoods have adjoined what is often called 
the city's "racial divide." To the east are neighborhoods such as 
West Englewood, which underwent rapid racial turnover in the 
1960s, and quite close at hand is Marquette Park, a public 
recreational area that has been the site of violent clashes be­
tween blacks and whites.28 Since its formation, the Southwest 
Federation's principal objective has been neighborhood stabi­
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lization, which it has promoted in a variety of ways. The group 
is always on the lookout for "panic-peddling" real estate agents, 
who, once they are identified, are relentlessly pressured to 
rethink their practices. In the 1970s, the federation initiated a 
"greenlining" campaign to expose and reverse disinvestment 
by local banks. More recently, the federation has worked with 
a nonprofit development corporation in planning an "ethnic 
village" commercial project on West 63rd Street. 
Joining the Southwest Siders in seeking to present to Mayor 
Washington the candle of understanding were representatives of 
a second group, the Northwest Neighborhood Federation. The 
Northwest Federation dates from 1976, when some members of 
another, failing, neighborhood coalition, the Citizens Action 
Program (CAP), sought to initiate a new movement.29 Within a 
few years, eight neighborhood organizations were affiliated with 
the Northwest Federation. 
Well before 1983, there were extensive ties between the 
Southwest and Northwest federations. In the early 1970s, indi­
viduals who would play leading roles in each federation had 
participated in the fight to stop a proposed public works project, 
the Crosstown Expressway, that threatened to bisect their com­
munities. The Northwest Federation's constituent groups and 
their members do not feel quite so threatened by neighborhood 
transition as do residents of the Southwest Side; nevertheless, 
they also have demonstrated in opposition to local realtors and 
supported a municipal ordinance restricting front-yard "for sale" 
signs. The Northwest Federation's two principal professional 
organizers previously worked for the Southwest Federation. 
The proximate force that produced the SON/SOC alliance 
was Chicago's nasty mayoral election of 1983. In the Democratic 
party primary, three well-known candidates sought the nomina­
tion: the incumbent, Jane Byrne; Richard M. Daley, the son of 
the city's longstanding "boss,' Mayor Richard J. Daley; and a 
black congressperson, Harold Washington. Washington nar­
rowly defeated Byrne and Daley, but not before Alderperson 
Edward Vrdolyak made a well-publicized speech suggesting 
that Byrne supporters must go out and defeat Washington be­
cause of his race.30 In the general election, many Democratic 
party activists from the Southwest and Northwest Sides sup­
ported the Republican party nominee, Bernard Epton. 
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However, for the individuals who would form SON/SOC, the 
nadir of the campaign occurred when Washington and Walter 
Mondale visited St. Pascal Church on the Northwest Side. As 
Washington and the Democratic presidential aspirant sought to 
enter the church, they were surrounded by a hostile, chanting 
crowd.31 Local television camera crews documented the inci­
dent, and several media commentators lamented the tenor of the 
campaign, citing in particular the racism of the city's white 
ethnic population. Few Northwest or Southwest Siders voted for 
Washington in either the Democratic primary or the general 
election, but in the aftermath of the bitter campaign, leaders of 
the Northwest and Southwest federations sought a rapproche­
ment with the new mayor.32 
SON/SOC and Its Members 
Organizationally, SON/SOC fits comfortably in the cate­
gory of social movement that historian Robert Fisher terms 
"neo-Alinskyism."33 As such, the coalition's structural relation­
ships, means of decision making, and tactics represent an up­
dating of the community organizing philosophy of Saul Alinsky. 
But at the same time, in a number of respects SON/SOC's 
organization and methods reflect the particular character of its 
constituency. 
SON/SOC is an alliance of sixteen parish and neighborhood 
organizations, with the intermediate Southwest and Northwest 
federations coordinating the activities of eight local groups 
apiece.34 The coalition uses a committee system to organize its 
work. For example, at SON/SOC's first convention in April 1984, 
the Real Estate/FHA Practices, Schools, Anti-Crime, CHA (Chi­
cago Housing Authority)/Home Equity, and Economic Develop­
ment committees made recommendations to the membership at 
large. It is not easy to calculate the size of SON/SOC's member­
ship. The coalition's leaders claim to represent all of the residents 
in the sixteen parish/neighborhood organization areas, but even 
individuals who are quite active in one or another of the local 
groups may play no role in SON/SOC. Practically speaking, 
SON/SOC can deliver as many as 1,000 people to one of its 
political actions or conventions. The coalition's principal orga­
nizers estimate that there are sixty leaders in SON/SOC.35 At the 
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coalition's periodic leadership briefings and retreats, the turnout 
of activist members usually numbers about thirty. 
SON/SOC and the two federations share a small professional 
staff, with about a half-dozen organizers supervising office vol­
unteers and door-to-door solicitors. The role of the organizers is 
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, resident leaders and 
staff agree that the chief function of the organizers is to serve the 
constituent groups, and the public face of SON/SOC is invariably 
presented by resident activists. On the other hand, at any given 
time the organizers have the best idea of the full range of activi­
ties SON/SOC and its constituent groups are carrying on. More­
over, at the coalition's leadership retreats, the organizers clearly 
set the agenda for discussion. 
SON/SOC raises money from a variety of sources: door-to­
door solicitation in its organizing areas, bingo, contributions 
from local Roman Catholic parishes, and foundation grants. It 
received federal funding to research its "home-equity" insur­
ance proposal. Judging from the organization's austere office 
decor, it is not lavishly funded. However, SON/SOC does not 
appear to encounter difficulty in meeting payroll or in publiciz­
ing its activities. SON/SOC prints and distributes copious infor­
mation on upcoming events and its program proposals, such as 
linked development and home-equity insurance. 
A variety of specific events and circumstances have moti­
vated SON/SOC members' involvement in neighborhood affairs, 
but these varied routes to activism seem readily channeled into 
a focused cluster of organizational priorities: protection of the 
family home and the investment represented by the home, and 
preservation of neighborhoods. In 1982 a member of the South­
west Federation described the dynamic of neighborhood appre­
hension and residential turnover in a way that has meaning for 
many SON/SOC people: "They left Austin (a West Side Chicago 
neighborhood), which they loved, and also lost money on their 
homes. Of course, they're concerned when they see more 
signs of change. People get themselves into a state because they 
don't know what's happening."36 At the April 1984 SON/SOC 
convention, a video presentation recalled several of the South-
and Southwest-Side neighborhoods from which Southwest Fed­
eration members have fled, eliciting a vocal reaction from the 
audience. When Joseph Crutchfield, one of the leaders of the 
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Northwest Federation, was asked why he had gotten involved 
in neighborhood affairs, his response was quick and specific. 
The right-of-way of the Crosstown Expressway would have 
taken his house.37 
Joining these fears of lost homes, communities, and invest­
ment is a marked alienation from the conventional political pro­
cess. Given the opportunity, SON/SOC members and staff do not 
hesitate to attack politicians for laziness and dishonesty. Indeed, 
coalition members often express irritation at accounts of Chicago 
politics that suggest that they, as white ethnics, were well served 
by the Democratic party machine in its heyday under Mayor 
Richard J. Daley. In their view, they are underdogs who have had 
to fight for what they have accomplished, and neither local 
politicians nor city government have served them well. The 
following comments, from a letter addressed to the director of 
the Roman Catholic church's Archdiocesan Office of Human 
Relations by the chairpersons of the Southwest and Northwest 
federations, provide an apt representation of the embattled self-
image of many SON/SOC members: our people were not 
welcomed in this new land. We were called every vile name in 
the book. We were discriminated against in housing and employ­
ment. What labor we did find was wickedly exploited. When we 
organized to advance ourselves, we were denounced and often 
brutalized."38 In short, SON/SOC members see themselves 
caught between forces working to undermine their homes and 
neighborhoods and an unresponsive outside world. 
SON/SOC and the Southwest and Northwest federations are 
renowned for their media-oriented, confrontational political tac­
tics. In the late 1970s, the Southwest Federation organized a mass 
picketing ofa redlining savings and loan association in which one 
of the demonstrators dressed as a white elephant to highlight the 
institution's unwise nonlocal investment of local deposits.39 
SON/SOC and its affiliates often turn meetings with public offi­
cials into "accountability sessions" at which rank-and-file mem­
bers fire hard questions regarding the politician's stand on coali­
tion program proposals. In one sense, this approach to politics, 
which downplays persuasion and electoral participation in favor 
of highly publicized confrontation, reflects the Alinsky style of 
community organization. But in addition, SON/SOC political 
tactics are a direct expression of the membership's frustrations. 
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SON/SOC maintains member allegiance by thoroughgoing 
door-to-door mobilization. When SON/SOC is building support 
for its program proposals, its affiliate neighborhood groups hold 
meetings at which new initiatives are presented and discussed. 
At these meetings, staff members work very hard to relate pro­
gram objectives to the interests of rank-and-file members. Deci­
sion making at public meetings is consensual and formally dem­
ocratic. As a rule, the observer does not encounter internal 
disagreements regarding SON/SOC philosophy, programs, or 
tactics. At the group's well-attended April 1984 convention, one 
of the members questioned the cost of a particular proposal. 
There was a brief flurry in the audience—as no objections had 
been raised to any other committee reports that day—but the 
committee chairperson, without directly answering the query, 
assured the questioner that finances were not a problem. In just 
a few moments the proposal was approved without further 
dissent. The presumption appeared to be that the questioner 
was not raising a substantive issue, but rather that he had not 
been briefed sufficiently on the workings of the program in 
question. Thus, paralleling SON/SOC's commitment to open, 
participatory decision making is an internal culture that empha­
sizes rank-and-file allegiance to organization policy. 
Shaping Public Policy 
SON/SOC's neighborhood preservation agenda includes a vari­
ety of program components. We have noted that the practices 
of banks and real estate agents have been a source of concern for 
both the Southwest and Northwest federations. The Northwest 
Federation, in response to local fears of crime, has also spon­
sored an elaborate neighborhood watch program.40 Since the 
federations' amalgamation as SON/SOC, the coalition has de­
voted much energy to a pair of new policy initiatives: linked 
development and guaranteed home-equity insurance. By tracing 
the evolution of these two proposals, we can identify the dilem­
mas confronted by SON/SOC as it seeks to define an agenda that 
transcends simple neighborhood protectionism. 
From 1984 until 1986, much of SON/SOC's energy was 
devoted to promoting its linked-development program, which 
was introduced at its first convention, on April 29, 1984.41 
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SON/SOC's plan called for a S500-per-square-foot levy on all 
downtown commercial developments in excess of 100,000 
square feet. The funds thus generated would be distributed to 
the city's seventy-seven officially recognized community areas. 
Within each community, residents would decide how to use the 
funds. In making this proposal, SON/SOC leaders likened their 
plan to the linked-development programs just getting under way 
in Boston and San Francisco. However, unlike the programs in 
these two cities, linkage funds in Chicago would not be dedi­
cated to low-cost housing production. 
Business groups in Chicago did not approve of SON/SOC's 
linked-development proposal, but they also did not need to 
take it very seriously until later in 1984, when Mayor Washing­
ton indicated his willingness to consider the plan. Washington, 
who was working hard to assuage Southwest- and Northwest-
Side concerns about his administration, addressed the second 
SON/SOC convention in September 1984 and agreed to form a 
commission to study linked development. Washington ap­
pointed the committee shortly afterward, including business 
leaders, neighborhood housing activists, city officials, and Jo­
seph Crutchfield from SON/SOC. 
Decision making by the Mayor's Advisory Committee on 
Linked Development was anything but consensual. The banking 
and real estate representatives never accepted the SON/SOC 
proposal, and over the course of the committee's deliberations, 
SON/SOC leaders began to question whether Mayor Washington 
and the city government representatives, in fact, supported 
linked development. When the committee released its prelimi­
nary report in September 1985, a series of alternative funding 
mechanisms were substituted for the SON/SOC formula. In 
addition, the committee recommended that recognized neigh­
borhood organizations and not-for-profit developers serve as the 
conduits for linkage-fund expenditures. Coinciding with the 
release of the preliminary committee report was a minority 
report, offered by the business representatives, contending that 
a linked-development fee would undercut needed downtown 
investment in Chicago. 
SON/SOC was displeased by the preliminary report, and 
over the course of the next several months leaders and staff 
became convinced that Mayor Washington's support for linked 
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development was wavering. In fact, city officials accepted the 
proposition of linking downtown investment to neighborhood 
improvements, but their preference was to negotiate with devel­
opers on a project-by-project basis. In effect, this meant trading 
zoning variances or low-interest municipal bond proceeds for 
infrastructure improvements, contributions to a low-cost hous­
ing fund, technical assistance for neighborhood groups, and the 
like. SON/SOC opposed this type of "voluntary linkage. 
The Mayor's Advisory Committee on Linked Development 
took more than a year to produce a final report, and by the time 
this document was released, in December 1986, a mayoral 
election was well under way.42 Mayor Washington put off re­
sponding to the report until after the April 1987 general election. 
In the meantime, SON/SOC rejected the final report, which was 
essentially consistent with the preliminary document, and moved 
to promote its initial linkage plan. It was introduced as a munic­
ipal ordinance in 1987, but because of lukewarm support among 
city council members and the governmental hiatus that resulted 
from the sudden death of Mayor Washington late in the year, it 
was not reported out of committee. 
At the end of 1988, the administration of Washington's suc­
cessor, Mayor Eugene Sawyer, continued the practice of using 
development negotiations to win "linkage" concessions from 
developers. SON/SOC, however, felt betrayed by the Washing­
ton administration and hoped for city council action on its 
proposal. Yet a year before, in 1987, the coalition's primary 
attention had already turned to a second program initiative, 
guaranteed home-equity insurance. 
SON/SOC's home-equity insurance plan seeks to stabilize 
neighborhoods by protecting property owners from losses on 
their home investments. In designated home-equity districts, 
each homeowner will be levied a fee of up to 12 cents per $ 100 
of assessed property value and will have the opportunity to 
enroll in the insurance program. Interested homeowners will 
pay a registration fee and the costs of a property appraisal. If, in 
five years, an enrollee desires to sell his or her home but is unable 
to attract any offers at or above the home's appraised value, he 
or she will receive the difference between the best offer and the 
appraisal figure. The costs of these reimbursements will be 
underwritten by proceeds of the homeowner levy.43 
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SON/SOC's home-equity proposal closely parallels a pro­
gram devised by the Chicago suburb Oak Park, which has 
developed a comprehensive policy to promote racial integra­
tion.44 The Southwest Federation proposed its own home-
equity insurance plan in the late 1970s, but this proposal was 
rejected by the city council. The appeal of the program is espe­
cially strong in this part of Chicago, because many local resi­
dents have lived previously in racially changing neighborhoods 
to the east. Furthermore, for more than two decades the often-
turbulent racial divide has been creeping westward as black 
families have moved from Chicago's old "Black Belt" in the near 
South Side. SON/SOC leaders do not suppose that most resi­
dents of home-equity districts will enroll in the program; how­
ever, they do contend that the existence of the program will 
increase residents' sense of security. In this indirect way, home 
equity will promote neighborhood stabilization. 
In 1987 and 1988 SON/SOC demonstrated a remarkable 
tenacity in promoting its home-equity program. The group orig­
inally sought the support of Mayor Washington and attempted 
to push home-equity legislation through the city council. How­
ever, in order to demonstrate grass-roots support on the North­
west and Southwest Sides, SON/SOC sought state legislative 
action authorizing nonbinding "advisory referendums" in se­
lected precincts within Chicago. In late 1986 the state legislature 
approved the local referendum bill, and SON/SOC began to 
collect thousands of petition signatures to put the home-equity 
plan on the April 1987 city ballot. The petition drive was suc­
cessful, and in the election home equity passed with nearly 90 
percent of the vote.45 
SON/SOC's successes in the state legislature and at the poll­
ing place were not matched in the Chicago City Council. By the 
fall of 1987, Mayor Washington began to suggest that the home-
equity districts include black neighborhoods—SON/SOC's ad­
visory referendum was on the ballot only on the Northwest and 
Southwest Sides—and at October 1987 city council hearings, 
some black alderpersons termed the proposal "discrimina­
tory."'6 Indeed, the hostility of black alderpersons was sufficient 
that, following Mayor Washington's death, neither Mayor Sawyer 
nor any other leading black politician offered to support the 
home-equity ordinance. 
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In the face of these setbacks, SON/SOC once more turned to 
the state legislature, proposing legislation to permit the creation 
of home-equity districts by local referendums. Ultimately, a close­
ly divided city council approved the home-equity ordinance, but 
Mayor Sawyer vetoed the legislation. In July 1988, however, 
Illinois Governor James Thompson approved the state legisla­
ture's local referendum bill, and during the summer SON/SOC 
organized a second petition drive to place home equity on the 
ballot in about 500 Chicago precincts. One of the municipal 
ordinance's opponents, Alderperson Marlene Carter, challenged 
some of the SON/SOC petitions, but the referendum qualified for 
the November 1988 ballot in nearly all of SON/SOC's targeted 
precincts. On both the Northwest and Southwest Sides, the 
referendum passed with large majorities. In the aftermath of the 
election, and in spite of opposition from city government, work 
began on the formation of the home-equity districts.47 
Neighborhood Mobilization in a Segmented City 
The rise and development of the Save Our Neighborhoods/Save 
Our City Coalition reflects each of the three pivots of the postwar 
environmental politics of neighborhood. Residents of North­
west-Side and Southwest-Side neighborhoods such as Belmont-
Cragin and Chicago Lawn seek to preserve communities in 
which door-to-door neighboring, local churches, and familiar 
merchants communicate a sense of connectedness and security. 
Moreover, many of SON/SOC's Southwest-Side members, who 
have left neighborhoods subject to quick and harrowing racial 
transition, have direct experience of the loss of these values. At 
the same time, SON/SOC members perceive very little support 
from local politicians and city government in their efforts to 
preserve their neighborhoods. Thus, the coalition's attitude to­
ward established political figures and institutions is routinely 
combative; and as both the linked-development and home-
equity cases demonstrate, SON/SOC presently works to directly 
initiate and implement public policy. 
SON/SOC's debt to the Alinsky model of community orga­
nizing is quite evident, and the ways in which the coalition has 
amended the Alinsky model are also illuminating. For example, 
SON/SOC has avoided the "burnout" characteristic of Alinsky 
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groups by developing a set of program proposals whose promo­
tion represents an ongoing organizational commitment. How­
ever, by becoming a policy advocate, SON/SOC has moved into 
new political forums: city council and state legislative commit­
tees, municipal commissions, and the like. The coalition is often 
uncomfortable in these contexts because it is unaccustomed to 
the bargaining assumptions characteristic of their decision mak­
ing. SON/SOC's program proposals are also devices for mobiliz­
ing its constituents, and the coalition's leaders are wary of mak­
ing concessions that undercut its rallying points. Thus, the 
Washington administration's endorsement of the linkage "'con­
cept," which was tied to modified programmatic details, was 
unacceptable to SON/SOC. 
SON/SOC's structure, tfy uniting neighborhood groups in 
separate though similar portions of the city, also seeks to tran­
scend another weakness of Alinsky groups, their tendency to 
parochialism. Furthermore, SON/SOC has reached beyond its 
local constituencies in promoting its programs. For instance, it 
initiated discussions on linked development with the Chicago 
Urban League, and the two groups sponsored a linked-develop­
ment conference in June 1986. Nevertheless, SON/SOC leaders 
and staff often characterize opponents in the harshest of terms, 
and the coalition has not devoted its principal energies to pro­
posals that could reach across Chicago's racial divisions. Irre­
spective of the fairness or unfairness of criticism directed by 
black city council members at its home-equity insurance plan, 
the wrath directed at these critics by SON/SOC probably pre­
cluded the coalition's winning any support among rank-and-file 
black homeowners. 
Ultimately, the ideology of home and community that moti­
vates SON/SOC activists gives the coalition its force, but also 
limits its ability to make alliances across the lines of class, race, 
and neighborhood. In his study of post-World War II neighbor­
hood racial tensions, urban redevelopment, and public housing, 
Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 
1940-1960, Arnold Hirsch notes the sense of neighborhood 
"proprietorship" felt by Chicago's ethnic population. Even in the 
1930s, homeownership figures were quite high among foreign-
born Irish-, Italian-, and Polish-Americans. Moreover, these groups 
were in several instances the original settlers of their neighbor­
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hoods. Thus, Hirsch argues, the defenders of the racial divide on 
the city's South and Southwest Sides were clinging to turf of great 
symbolic value.48 Many SON/SOC members are the sons, daugh­
ters, grandsons, and granddaughters of the ethnics studied by 
Hirsch. 
The world view of SON/SOC members is not simply a func­
tion of neighborhood turbulence in Chicago. Anthropologist 
Constance Perin notes that in the United States the "... appreci­
ation of house value is regarded as a 'right' 'religiously 
defended in all income-levels' against the 'specter of decreasing 
home values' "49 For SON/SOC members, as for most homeown­
ers in the United States, equity in their place of residence is their 
principal source of wealth. As a consequence, neighborhood 
change—which SON/SOC members overwhelmingly associate 
with racial transition and declining property values—threatens 
one's sense of community and economic well-being. This com­
bination of factors accounts for the force of SON/SOC's defense 
of neighborhood. 
If there is a break in the consensus among SON/SOC leaders, 
members, and staff, it is over the specific sources of threat to 
their neighborhoods. For instance, SON/SOC leaders and staff 
privately admit that racism motivates some of SON/SOC's mem­
bers. More commonly and publicly, the coalition's spokesper­
sons attack redlining banks that have cut off mortgages in their 
communities and unscrupulous realtors who play on fears of 
racial change in order to profit from accelerated neighborhood 
turnover. Politicians are also cast as villains, but again, there is 
less than unanimity in designating just which politicians are 
SON/SOC's foes. For example, SON/SOC's leadership was di­
vided in assessing Mayor Washington. Finally, the Federal Hous­
ing Administration, as mortgage insurer of high-risk purchasers, 
is the object of something approaching universal dislike. 
There are other sources of neighborhood change and racial 
tension in Chicago that SON/SOC members seldom, if ever, 
identify. Although they recognize the shift of Chicago's econ­
omy from industry to services, SON/SOC leaders and rank and 
file do not draw a connection between national and international 
economic restructuring and the decline of central cities. The 
Reagan administration's reduction of federal aid to cities, which 
accelerated the municipal courting of downtown investment 
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and pressures on local service and tax levels, is also not criti­
cized. Nor do SON/SOC members accept the proposition that 
past racial discrimination in housing and the work place has 
helped produce the current competition for desirable living 
space among Chicago blacks and whites. And although they are 
very skeptical of politicians, SON/SOC activists do not identify 
the city's longstanding Democratic machine as an orchestrator 
of neighborhood competition and interethnic hostility. 
A key to understanding why SON/SOC finds fault with some 
of the foregoing institutions and trends, but does not link neigh­
borhood pressures to the others, may be inferred from the 
following comment, made in reference to SON/SOC'sfirst home-
equity referendum: "If the village of Addison, which is much 
smaller than most Chicago neighborhoods, can vote on whether 
they want a sports stadium, why can't neighborhoods have the 
same kind of privilege?"50 What is revealing about this comment 
is the identification of SON/SOC territory in Chicago with an 
exurban community to the west of Chicago. As the working- and 
middle-class owners of inconspicuous homes in neighborhoods 
threatened by sudden change, SON/SOC might envision some 
of Chicago's other "victimized" groups—blacks isolated on the 
city's South and West Sides, Hispanics and Appalachian whites 
threatened by gentrification on the near Northwest and North 
Sides, even the city's homeless—as prospective allies. In fact, 
SON/SOC's sights are set upward, and the coalition's leaders 
make their identification with suburban homeowners and other 
taxpayers threatened by crime, loss of home equity because of 
incompatible neighbors or land uses, and local tax hikes. View­
ing their situation in this way, SON/SOC leaders seek the means 
to control community resources, enhance the sense of local 
security, and counter the activities of rapacious relators, med­
dling city officials, and irresponsible bureaucrats, both public 
and private. In the context of the city in which they actually 
reside, this perspective produces a political stance that is at its 
core defensive and exclusionary. 
In spite of their professed attachments to their local neigh­
borhoods, many SON/SOC members, given the chance, would 
probably relocate to communities like Addison, Illinois. Others 
would leave Chicago if only they could take friends, neighbors, 
and familiar institutions with them. In fact, most SON/SOC 
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members do not have the option to relocate, and they remain in 
a city whose municipal services seem ever to decline and whose 
surrounding population seems ever to become more threaten­
ing. Chicago residents who have greater resources than do 
SON/SOC members confront these circumstances through a 
variety of strategies, of which spatial segmentation is one of the 
most pervasive. What other Chicagoans seek through architec­
tural means, city planning techniques, and household upgrad­
ing, SON/SOC members seek through restrictions on real estate 
practices, neighborhood watches, linked development, and home-
equity insurance. 
The Future of the New 
American City 
Cities are complex configurations of physical and social ele­
ments. Some of their physical elements, such as public build­
ings, parks, and transportation systems, are planned by govern­
ment officials with an eye to achieving broad social purposes. 
Their physical character also reflects innumerable decisions by 
real estate developers, architects, and individual property own­
ers pursuing more particularized agendas. The social character 
of cities both reflects broad cultural values and influences the 
design of cities. For example, in the United States cultural 
values emphasizing individualism and the sanctity of private 
property emerged long before the nation's massive urbaniza­
tion and have had a major impact on the physical pattern of 
cities. At the same time, the manner in which cities are built 
profoundly shapes patterns of neighborhood formation and 
interaction, how urban residents view their fellow citizens, and 
the use of public spaces. 
In the preceding chapters of this book we have examined 
how the post-World War II rebuilding of American cities has 
affected this complex set of relationships. The thesis informing 
this discussion has been that considerations of stability, security, 
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and predictability in confronting the ambiguities of urban life 
have produced design strategies that undermine cities' capacity 
to spawn surprise, tolerance, innovation, and democratic par­
ticipation. Ultimately, for cities to provide satisfactory environ­
ments for their residents, they must encourage surprise and 
security, stability and innovation. However, post-World War II 
urban rebuilding has emphasized safety while neglecting the 
historic role of cities as agents of personal growth and social 
innovation. 
The main trends in downtown and neighborhood rebuild­
ing, by isolating different uses and removing activities from the 
street, explicitly work to reduce the likelihood of surprising 
encounters. For many current users of these spaces, the reduc­
tion of surprise is desirable, but at the same time, one of the great 
pleasures of urban life is lost. Ultimately, the pervasive adoption 
of the new design strategies will foreclose any urbanites' even 
comprehending the pleasures of the street, much less learning 
the social skills taught by the street. 
The insulation of different uses coincidentally insulates dif­
ferent portions of the urban population—"upscale" consumers, 
the "underclass/ and so on—thus reducing individuals' contact 
with others of different race and ethnicity or with alternative 
patterns of public behavior and dress, as well as the use of public 
space for political purposes. Reducing surprise and reducing 
tolerance are thus twin consequences of the new American city's 
design, for only by learning to live with surprise does the 
individual come to tolerate and even appreciate diversity. 
In similar fashion, innovation—in both its more expansive 
sense of social exploration and its more limited economic appli­
cation—is undermined by the new American city. Increasingly, 
the urban social explorer seeking new experiences or to extrap­
olate from others' experiments must know where to go to find 
innovation. One of the remarkable ironies of contemporary 
urban economic development is that municipal governments 
must devote resources to establish specialized spaces, or "incu­
bators, to house small firms with the potential for dynamic 
growth. In this instance, an important outgrowth of urban form 
has been redefined as a specialized use. What the city once 
accomplished naturally must now be planned. 
If there is a positive consequence of recent urban rebuilding 
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in the United States, it is the increased participation in neighbor­
hood organizations and the widespread inclination among grass-
roots urbanites to engage in political action. However, as our 
account of Chicago's Save Our Neighborhoods/Save Our City 
Coalition suggested in chapter 5, given the physical and social 
segmentation of American cities, neighborhood action can have 
a largely exclusionary character. Residents of particular neigh­
borhoods, threatened by developments in the city at large, may 
use political action mainly to protect their own place in the 
game. In the short term this sort of grass-roots politics merely 
pits one local faction against another in the competition for 
scarce resources, and in the long term it does little to build a 
sense of community across neighborhoods. 
In the face of these unsettling trends, there are other signs 
of life in American cities. As my traversal of three locales in 
Chicago indicated, city residents are constantly improvising in 
their use of urban spaces, even those as seemingly inhospitable 
as fast-food parking lots. Furthermore, contemporary architects 
and other urban designers sometimes do construct inclusive 
public spaces and amenable housing that are available to more 
than just the most affluent. A shining example of the former is 
Chicago architect Helmut Jahn's State of Illinois Building atrium 
and concourse. In Boston's South End, the Tent City housing 
project is physically compatible with its surrounding neighbor­
hood and at least relatively affordable.1 
American cities are not yet dead, even if countless planners, 
developers, politicians, and architects are hard at work on the 
task. In this chapter, we examine the new American city from 
two final perspectives. First, we look at how recent urban re­
building has been influenced by the criticism of early postwar 
urban renewal offered by Jane Jacobs, whose descriptions and 
theory of urban form have played a major role in shaping the 
thinking of urban designers since the 1960s. To conclude the 
chapter and book, we return to the neighborhood movement, 
suggesting in more general terms its limitations, as well as its 
potential for reconstituting surprising, tolerant, innovative, and 
participatory urban life in the United States. 
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THE LIVELY, SEGMENTED CITY 
One of the paradoxes of observing urban life in the United States 
during the 1980s is the discrepancy between social scientists' 
measures of city well-being, such as population figures, munic­
ipal financial performance, and the quality of services, and the 
more anecdotal evidence one collects by walking city streets, 
reading daily newspapers, and talking with the residents of 
different neighborhoods. In the first instance, the depressing 
slide experienced by cities during the 1970s seems to have 
continued into the 1980s. Central cities continue to lose popu­
lation, and their governments still confront the nasty choice of 
cutting services or raising taxes just to keep up with basic 
municipal priorities. Nor is there much evidence that the 
quality of urban services, such as public education, has im­
proved. 
Yet despite the downward slope of these indicators, since 
the 1970s the life of central cities in the United States seems to 
have been reinvigorated. Part of this rebirth has been docu­
mented by this book and is attributable to the investment prac­
tices of large corporations building downtown office and com­
mercial complexes. We have further noted how the seemingly 
individualized practice of gentrification, in fact, grows out of the 
economic restructuring that is pumping dollars into downtown 
areas. Nonetheless, gentrifiers as individuals do express the 
preference for a kind of urban life—though it may be smoothed 
of its rougher edges—and one observes in many other niches of 
American culture signs of renewed appreciation of cities. The 
general quality of architectural practice in American cities seems 
to have improved in recent years, in large part because of the 
profession's increased understanding of contextuality, that is, 
fitting new buildings into the surrounding urban fabric. From 
the standpoint of popular culture, the middle-class passion for 
dining out and the resurgent interest in jazz are bringing more 
people onto city streets and into the semipublic space of restau­
rants and nightclubs. Neither separately nor collectively do 
these developments represent a contradiction of the more ob­
jective measures of urban decline, but they do attest to the city's 
revived status in American culture. 
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A clue to understanding this dichotomy between urban 
indicators and signs of urban liveliness may be found by recon­
sidering the work of Jane Jacobs, in particular her famous indict­
ment of urban renewal, The Death and Life of Great American 
Cities.2 Jacobs's book appeared in 1961, at a point when the 
failings of the urban renewal planning and relocation processes 
were evident, but when relatively few observers were prepared 
to suggest that the vision of urban renewal was defective. 
Jacobs's critique of postwar urban renewal may be summa­
rized as follows. The highly concentrated, jumbled city of ad­
joining mixed uses served two principal functions: (1) in local 
areas, by virtue of the "busy-ness" resulting from ongoing, over­
lapping activities, the achievement of a high degree of neighbor­
hood security; (2) through the accumulation of activities and 
resources based in particular locales, a highly energetic and 
innovative citywide economy. 
Several specific characteristics of the unrenewed city con­
tributed to this urban vitality. Its mixture of primary uses, which 
"bring people to a specific place because they are anchorages,' 
insured busy, safe streets throughout the day.3 The unrenewed 
city's short street blocks permitted residents to make many 
variations in their daily transit, thereby increasing the number 
of attractive commercial locations. Older buildings' cheap rents 
allowed nascent businesses and other forms of enterprise to hold 
down their initial overhead expenses. The physical concentra­
tion of unrenewed cities was itself a key contributor to mixing 
primary uses. 
In Jacobs's account, postwar planners identified these fea­
tures with disorder and sought to correct them through strict 
zoning and the development of integrated single-use complexes. 
Furthermore, urban renewal planning, by inducing intense real 
estate speculation in advance of land purchase and clearance, 
inadvertently hurried neighborhood decline. 
Jacobs was unequivocal in naming planners and their intel­
lectual precursors, such as Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier, 
as perpetrators of the demise of great American cities. Howard 
misled planners through his advocacy of low-density, decen­
tralized metropolitan regions. Le Corbusier, as we noted in 
chapter 4, was a segmenter of urban space. As one might expect, 
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the response of professional planners to The Death and Life of 
Great American Cities was not especially friendly, although in 
subsequent years the book became required reading for profes­
sional planning students.4 
As one who recalls professional training in city planning, I 
find a curious inconsistency between Jacobs's estimation of the 
impact of planning and the self-estimate of professional planners, 
who typically view themselves as serving other masters, such as 
redevelopment officials, politicians, and private real estate de­
velopers. To quote one of the early reviewers of Jacobs's book: 
"Most planners will be shocked to find that Mrs. Jacobs has 
aimed her needle-sharp pen at them, and that they are the 
archenemies who must be rendered impotent if cities are to be 
saved. The typical frustrated, maligned, ignored, and powerless 
planner will ask himself 'Does she mean me?'"5 In fact, Jacobs's 
explanation of the forces producing the planners' passion for 
order is the least satisfactory element of her argument. In The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities, when Jacobs leaves 
the street, her close observation of how orthodox redevelop­
ment strategies undermine the creative disorder of cities shifts 
to a factually suspect polemic. 
Jacobs's baseline for indicting urban renewal planning was 
an unusually rosy appraisal of the nineteenth-century industrial 
city. For most residents in most such cities, conditions were not 
especially pleasant, and these cities' explosive economic energy 
is attributable to a variety of factors aside from their peculiar 
physical form. These included massive immigration and the 
resultant low-wage labor supply, the availability of cheap indus­
trial inputs, and expansive new markets. Moreover, by the end 
of the nineteenth century, forces quite apart from city planning 
were beginning to unscramble the spatial order of industrial 
cities. Although the visions of Ebenezer Howard, the proponents 
of the City Beautiful, and Le Corbusier served to rationalize the 
segmentation of the postindustrial city, the forces producing it 
transcended the practice of city planners. 
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, some of the great 
industrial enterprises, such as the Pullman Palace Car Corpora­
tion and U.S. Steel, were already locating their new facilities on 
huge sites away from the central city.6 This practice simplified 
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land assembly and reduced the costs of land acquisition, and it 
also permitted these industrial producers to concentrate their 
work force in adjoining residential areas. Even earlier in the 
nineteenth century, suburban residence had become a desirable 
objective for affluent families.7 After the turn of the century, the 
invention of the automobile increased the physical accessibility 
of outlying residential areas, and the spread of automobile own­
ership gave a much larger proportion of the population the 
means to reach the metropolitan fringe. Coincidentally, the 
advertising industry was shaping an image of suburban resi­
dence that was to become a touchstone of American family 
aspiration.8 
In short, while Jane Jacobs was on the mark in detailing how 
postwar planning practice tore at the urban fabric, her indict­
ment of planning failed to recognize that the planners were 
executing physical plans that were consistent with the dictates 
of an emergent economic order and quite in keeping with most 
people's understanding of how cities should be organized. The 
mechanical vision of the city revealed in Le Corbusier's drawings 
and models, postwar urban renewal projects, and the modern 
city functional have all played a role in inculcating the necessity 
of urban segmentation, but much of the underlying power of 
these urban images has been because of their congeniality with 
prevailing social conditions and expectations. To cite the classic 
source of unease in contemporary American cities, street crime, 
it is because so many people recognize the danger of street life 
in areas of extreme unemployment and poverty that the mega-
structure is so successful. For Detroit suburbanites, the Renais­
sance Center really does represent a safe haven in an otherwise 
dangerous central city. 
For developers, architects, and the other design professions, 
the key lessons of The Death and Life of Great American Cities 
pertained to specific urban spaces and how these might be given 
distinctive character, liveliness, and the aura of security. This is 
why, as one observes and uses particular developments in con­
temporary downtowns, one is often impressed by their vitality. 
James Rouse's central city "markets'1 in Boston, Lower Manhat­
tan, and Baltimore are textbook examples of the skillful deploy­
ment of mixed uses and architectural contextuality. 
The Evolution of the Street 
Early nineteenth-century residential block, Philadelphia 
Turn-of-the-century block, Chicago's North Side 
In Atlanta's rebuilt downtown 
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Again as noted in chapter 4, parts of Jacobs's analysis have 
also been incorporated by gentrifiers and developers of the city-
as-glass menagerie. Jacobs's affinity for old buildings was quite 
pragmatic—they required lower rents—whereas gentrifiers 
create a nostalgic image of urban charm, attention to struc­
tural detailing, and human scale. As practiced by the "new 
traditionalist" planners and architects praised by critic Philip 
Langdon, the incorporation of older structures and design strat­
egies in new developments can result in lively and visually 
pleasing projects.9 However, these better-designed compounds 
are well beyond the means of most American urbanites, and the 
people who can afford to live within them may not wish them 
to be physically accessible from the surrounding city. 
The legacy of The Death and Life of Great American Cities 
is thus mixed. In the quarter-century since the book's appear­
ance, Jane Jacobs's appreciation of the city and her extremely 
careful observation of how particular locales function as physi­
cal space and social stage have been widely assimilated by 
architects, planners, and urban residents. This has produced 
many congenial buildings, complexes of buildings, and partic­
ular public spaces; and among the public at large, the city as a 
place of interest and excitement has become a well-entrenched 
idea. 
Yet as historian Robert Fishman has noted, by puncturing 
the legacies of Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier, Jane Jacobs 
also managed to deflate the very idea that one can define an 
inclusive vision of the city.10 And by focusing on the physical 
components of these twentieth-century urban visions, Jacobs 
implied that the source of the postwar urban crisis was faulty 
urban design. This narrow reading of her book was probably not 
intended by Jacobs, who was also attuned to the utility of neigh­
borhood political mobilization and a critic of bureaucratic deci­
sion making. Nevertheless, the clearest arguments presented in 
The Death and Life of Great American Cities redefine the 
criteria for good urban design; and, unfortunately, Jacobs's solu­
tions offer few if any answers to the problems posed by extreme 
economic disparities, social pathologies bred by poverty and 
racial exclusion, and ineffective provision of municipal services. 
In the end, good design can be used to insulate more-advantaged 
urbanites from the city of the poor. 
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The Lively, Segmented City: James Rouse's Harborplace, 
Baltimore 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD MOVEMENT 
AND THE NEW AMERICAN CITY 
Jane Jacobs, by advocating the organization of neighborhood 
districts that have the authority to review planning and develop­
ment initiatives, may be viewed as a forerunner of both the 
community-control and neighborhood movements.11 Yet, much 
like her appreciation of older buildings, which has been trans­
formed by the very nostalgic art of gentrification, Jacobs's es­
pousal of local political mobilization was essentially pragmatic 
and narrowly gauged. Neighborhood politicking would not cre­
ate community—indeed, in Jacobs's view community at the 
street level was the prerequisite for effective neighborhood 
mobilization—nor would it be the basis for social transforma­
tion. Much more circumspectly, Jacobs viewed neighborhood 
political mobilization as a means for local urban areas to protect 
their interests. 
Nevertheless, current proponents of neighborhood mobili­
zation have linked their movement to those larger objectives: 
building community and achieving social transformation. Yet 
even as the rebuilding of the American city has given impetus to 
neighborhood mobilization, its principal characteristic, spatial 
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segmentation, forms the main stumbling block for the organiz­
ers of an inclusive neighborhood movement. 
This is because the use of structures and space to locate 
particular urban groups has the immediate political effect of 
reducing the bases for mobilizing residents across neighbor­
hood lines. In the new American city, the interests of different 
neighborhoods simply do not correspond. At the very moment 
that affluent residents of gentrifying neighborhoods protest prop­
erty tax increases, parents in slum areas criticize the education 
provided in rundown, antiquated school facilities. 
This fragmentation of neighborhood interests grows out of 
a more fundamental effect of neighborhood physical segmenta­
tion. As residents of different neighborhoods, members of dif­
ferent racial groups, and persons of differing levels of affluence 
lose the habit of sharing public space, they also lose the empa­
thetic urbanity on which common political action is built. In 
essence, the residents of other parts of the city are not viewed 
as fellow citizens whose particular neighborhood concerns may 
vary. Instead, these "others" are seen as enemies in a desperate 
competition for local security and scarce municipal resources. 
Exacerbating these conditions engendered by the segmenta­
tion of the new American city are the prevalent Alinsky and 
neo-Alinsky styles of neighborhood mobilization. As Harry C. 
Boyte comments: . Alinsky believed that the organizer must 
appeal to people's perceived self-interest around concrete issues. 
He was nonideological, experimental, pragmatic. He voiced little 
interest in long-range goals. . . "12 This tactical stance may con­
tribute to the efficacy of local organizing, but it also contributes 
to the unyielding parochialism into which Alinsky groups often 
fall. Yet self-interest organizing is an article of faith even among 
post- or neo-Alinsky organizers, as witnessed by this statement 
by West Coast activist/organizer Mike Miller:". . people will act 
when it is in their immediate self-interest to do so. A larger more 
"enlightened' self-interest may emerge but it is not what initially 
moves people to active participation."13 
Given this approach to mobilizing particular neighborhoods, 
one is hard-pressed to identify how an inclusive neighborhood 
movement can coalesce. Urban segmentation represents a sys­
tem of "nests" for particular groups and reduces individuals' 
tolerance of diversity. The predominant mode of neighborhood 
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organizing accepts this nesting and capitalizes on it as a means 
of spurring neighborhood-specific mobilization. The neighbor­
hood movement is in this sense bedeviled by what Ira Katznel­
son has called "city trenches/ a segmentation of urban political 
life that is attributable to the spatial division of work place and 
home and the competing "home" interests of disparate neigh­
borhoods.14 
Without exception, when one seeks the grounding for neigh­
borhood mobilization across neighborhood lines, the principal 
issues around which groups organize founder in the face of these 
contradictions. Although problems in delivery of urban services 
are the object of political mobilization in many neighborhoods, 
just which services need to be improved is subject to varying 
identification. Even more problematic is the question of how to 
raise the funds to pay for better services. In gentrifying and 
defensive middle-class and working-class communities, support 
for the tax increases to pay for better schools and other social 
services, which will mainly benefit less-affluent communities, 
does not appear to be in the offing. Similarly, the preservationist 
movement is a powerful force in some gentrifying areas, but its 
program is too narrowly drawn to elicit much support in other 
parts of the city. The provision of affordable housing touches on 
more profound and pervasive neighborhood needs, but activists 
in stable working-class and middle-class neighborhoods have 
little stake in this objective. 
Enhanced participatory democracy, both as a vehicle for 
better decision making and as an exercise in developing the 
norms of citizenship, is a consistent aspiration of neighborhood 
activists.15 In principle, this is a mobilizing objective that unites 
neighborhoods across the spectrums of race and class. But 
neighborhood-based decision making, in the context of wide 
disparities in local economic and political resources, does not 
promise to solve fundamental urban problems, nor does it re­
solve the contradictions among local interests in a highly seg­
mented city. Indeed, more local democracy, without accom­
panying measures to rectify service delivery and economic 
disparities, could be a recipe for increasing neighborhood in­
equality. 
There may be other organizing objectives that can bridge 
the segmentation of urban neighborhoods. Dolores Hay den has 
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argued powerfully in support of redefining neighborhood and 
household relations in such a way as to redistribute the burdens 
of paid work and family nurturing between men and women, 
reintegrate home and work place, and reduce class- and race-
based economic disparities. Hayden's agenda is ambitious, but 
she has identified a wide array of practical techniques, including 
"spatial reintegration" of residential neighborhoods, limited-
equity cooperatives as an alternative to homeownership, and 
congregate housing for the elderly and families with small chil­
dren, as means of approaching her objectives.16 Moreover, her 
program offers the prospect of winning the support of lower-, 
working-, and middle-class residents in central-city and sub­
urban communities. 
Other rallying points for inclusive neighborhood organizing 
might be environmental issues, given that air, water, and noise 
pollution degrade most urban neighborhoods, and that the 
unresolved problems of disposing of various environmental 
toxins ultimately threaten everyone's street and home. There is 
also the prospect of joining neighborhood concerns to an attack 
on the warfare economy, which at the federal level absorbs a 
huge portion of tax revenues, in the 1980s cut into social-service 
and infrastructure expenditures, and threatens our continued 
habitation of this planet. 
The suggestions offered in the preceding two paragraphs are 
not meant to denigrate the utility of organizing around specific­
ally neighborhood concerns. Indeed, what remains of public life 
in cities can be one base upon which a politics of urban rebirth 
and social transformation might be built. However, given the 
fragmented character of the modern American city, both physi­
cally and socially, neighborhood organization by itself is not a 
sufficient basis for transforming contemporary society, or for 
building democratic, inclusive, economically just urban commu­
nities . Furthermore, for Americans to relearn the neglected urban 
virtues of surprise, tolerance, innovation, and participation, they 
must also relearn how to build political coalitions that reach 
across neighborhood, class, and racial lines. When these coali­
tions are formed, urban public spaces will once more be used 
with pleasure and confidence, and downtown and neighborhood 
can be viewed as inclusive physical and social territories. 
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